




Language in the Mirror: 











Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of 
 Doctorate of Philosophy 
under the executive committee of 


































All rights reserved 
 ABSTRACT 
Language in the Mirror: Language Ideologies, Schooling and Islam 
Rehenuma Asmi 
My study explores language ideologies in the capital city of Doha, Qatar, where school 
reform movements are placing greater emphasis on English language acquisition.  Through 
ethnography and a revised theory of language ideologies, I argue that as languages come in greater 
contact in multi-lingual spaces, mediation must occur between the new and old relationships that are 
emerging as a result of population growth, policy changes and cross-cultural interactions. I 
interrogate the development concept of the “knowledge economy” as it is used to justify old and 
new language ideologies regarding Arabic and English.  As Qataris change their education systems in 
response to the economic development framework of the “knowledge economy,” they are 
promoting language ideologies that designate English as useful for the economy and “global” 
citizenship and Qatari Arabic and Standard Arabic as useful for religious and cultural reasons.   
I argue that Standard English, through its association with the “knowledge economy,” 
becomes “de-localized” and branded an “international” language. This ideology presents English as 
a modern language free of the society in which it is embedded, to circulate around the globe. In 
contrast, Standard Arabic is represented as stiff, archaic language of religious traditions and Qatari 
Arabic is presented as the language of oral culture and ethnonationalism. These findings counter the 
arguments of scholars who have viewed Arabic’s linguistic diversity as a binary of written religious 
tradition and spoken dialects. I argue that scholars have ignored the metapragmatic analysis of 
Arabic speakers, who view both Standard Arabic and their regional dialects as one language that 
needs to be defended against the encroachment of foreign languages.  
In chapter one, I explore the history of Qatar through narrative accounts of western 
historians and Qatari oral and written accounts. I reflect upon the efforts of the current Qatari 
 leaderships to connect with narratives of globalization through the framework of the “knowledge 
economy.” In chapter two, I outline the actor-networks of the “knowledge economy” that create a 
development hierarchy between English, the language of the de-localized “international” citizen, and 
Arabic, the language of the “local” Qatari.   In chapter three, I trace how privatization of schooling 
affects Arabic teachers and their defense of the value of Arabic through an ideology of “Arabic is 
the language of the Quran.” In the following chapter, I move to sites of higher education, where 
orality and literacy of Arabic are disputed by Arabic teachers, Qatari students and non-Qatari 
students of Arabic.  I contend that studying language through the speech community reduces the 
tendency to see language variability as problematic or a sign of language death. In chapter five, I 
explore the role of Islam in Arabic language ideologies by juxtaposing discourses of the secular and 
of religious tradition.  While some scholars have argued that Arabic speakers do not fully understand 
the implications of Arabic’s connection to Islam, my work indicates that speakers are fully aware of 
this relationship and when necessary, utilize it discursively to promote various political, social and 
cultural agendas.  
 In conclusion, I argue that a methodology of actor-network theory has allowed me to write a 
situated ethnography of globalizing processes.  The tracing of actor-networks is ideal for studying 
the rapid changes in Qatar and the ways in which immense wealth has brought many different types 
of individuals into the country to create new models of schooling and education.  Rather than 
placing the focus on “international” discourses, knowledge economies and globalization, my 
ethnography emphasizes the need for situated accounting that combines the metalanguage of 
academics, policy makers and leaders with those of the individuals affected by reforms and projects 
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Notes on Transliteration of Arabic 
 
Modern Standard and Classical Arabic (fuṣḥā l-ʿaṣr wa fuṣḥā t-turāṯ ): I have used the International 
Journal of Middle East Studies Transliteration Guide to transliterate words or phrases that occur 
in Classical and Modern Standard Arabic.  While widely considered the language, I prefer to 
refer to this variety of Arabic as a dialect because it is used in contexts of formal and 
standardizing language use and therefore has a specialized purpose. It is similar to Standard 
English that is used for print, schooling and professional culture in the United States.1  
Regional Arabic Dialects (al mahkia, al ammiya, al darija, al lahja, al mahalia): For Arabic 
dialects that are spoken in specific regions, I have used my own system of transliteration. I have 
transliterated according to the individual pronunciation of my interlocutors and interviewees.  
As Arabic dialects do not have strict grammatical and denotional code, like their fusha 
counterpart, individuals use their own knowledge of letters and sounds of the Arabic alphabet 
to write terms that do not exist in the more codified fusha.  Since there are very few 
conventions in regards to writing regional Arabic dialects, there is greater variability, range and 
individual discretion. People are also more likely to be forgiving of this variation, as grammatical 
conventions and spelling are not strictly enforced. I refer to specific Arabic dialects by 
referencing the country they are nominally connected to.  The Qatari dialect of Arabic is 
referred to as Qatari Arabic, Egyptian as Egyptian Arabic, and Lebanese as Lebanese Arabic. In 
Qatar, the Arabic dialects are referred to as al mahkia, the spoken.  In Egypt and in fusha, they 
are called al ammiya, folk language or the language of the masses. In Morocco and Tunisia, they 
are called darija, which literally means “rolling”, but contextually references “slang.” The 
mahalia are “local” languages recognized by territorial or tribal specificity. They are often 
considered a “dialect of a dialect.” 
Translations: Unless specifically stated, all translations of interviews, documents and sources 
were undertaken by me.  I have tried to stay close to the original intention of the speaker or 
writer in my translations, while simultaneously attuning myself to the way the translation reads 
in English.  Some translations are more literal or formal than others, depending on whether the 
original speech or text was in Standard Arabic or a regional dialect.
                                                     
1
 Trudgill (1999) clarified in Standard English: What it isn’t, how Standard English came to be the dialect of English 
privelegdged in writing, schools and other formal spaces where grammatical conventions are strictly followed.  
While Trudgill notes that it is unusual in English to hear dialects being used to debate topics normally discussed in 
Standard English, this is normal in other countries and regions. In particular, he sites the case of German, “In 
German-speaking Switzerland, for example, most speakers use their local nonstandard dialect in nearly all social 
situations and for nearly all purposes. Thus it is that one may hear, in the corridors of the University of Berne, two 
philosophy professors discussing the works of Kant using all the appropriate philosophical vocabulary while using 
the phonology and grammar of their local dialect” (122). This is the case for the Arabic dialects and has been so for 






This project would have been impossible without the support and love of family, friends 
and colleagues who have helped me through challenges and triumphs of academia, field work 
and motherhood.  I would like to thank my husband, Younus Mirza, who has encouraged me 
throughout the years of our marriage to follow my dreams and passions.  Without his gentle 
nudging and words of praise, I would not have made it this far.  I would also like to thank him 
for helping me bring into the world two beautiful daughters, Inayah and Ayisha, who have been 
the comfort of my eyes and my heart.  Not far behind, is the constant support of my mother, 
Jobaida Quadir, and my in-laws, Muhammad Yaqub Mirza and Tanveer Mirza.  They have each 
given their time, support and energy to helping me and my family to grow and develop.  My 
mother has been my role model, my caretaker and my critic throughout my life and I continue 
to grow in my respect and love for her strength of will and her generosity for all things family.  
In keeping with the theme of family, my sibling, Ashraful, and my sister-in-laws, Asma, Sana and 
Fatima have been each helpful in their own ways: providing babysitting, a kind ear and words of 
respect and reaffirmation for the importance of the work I am doing.  My gratitude also to the 
uncles at Sterling Management who fed me lunch and gave me a necessary break from 
dissertation writing. There are countless unnamed friends and family who helped by 
babysitting, providing encouragement and praying for me.  
I am grateful to the individuals who fill the pages of this study.  Qatar has become like a 
second home to me.  I want to acknowledge the hospitality and generosity with which many of 
my interlocutors opened their homes, shared their thoughts and provided their companionship.  
In particular, I want to thank Georgetown University in Qatar and Qatar University for helping 
to partially fund my research.  I would also like to thank the many Arabic teachers who allowed 
me to interview and observe them and many other colleagues and friends who helped me to 
better understand the ways in which Arabic functioned linguistically and practically. Finally, the 
 vii 
 
young generation of Qatari men and women who shared their vision of Qatar and their lived 
experiences with the Arabic language were indispensable to this research. 
Lastly are the individuals who have helped me from the beginning of my doctoral 
coursework through to the writing of my dissertation.  My adviser, Herve Varenne, has been a 
wonderful individual to work with. His theory of education is also his theory of practice: he 
recognizes that when the necessary tools are provided, individuals can conduct their own 
bricolege.  Lesley Bartlett and Louis Cristillo helped me to focus on the intersection of academia 
and practice in the fields of education and the Middle East. Brinkley Messick has been generous 
with his time and wisdom and has helped me to think deeply about theory, language and 
religion. Fida Adely has been a wonderful colleague who has shared her hard earned wisdom 
and experience from her disciplinary background in anthropology of education and the Middle 
East.  In addition to these individuals, there were many professors who have shaped my 
thinking about the issues that fill these pages and I am indebted to each of them. The process 
of writing is often a lonely one and was greatly improved by the company of several colleagues 
who took the time to read, edit and comment on my work. Hoda Yousef, Leah Gogel, Juliette 
Wolfe, Katie Keenan, Attiya Ahmed and Younus Mirza have all looked at various drafts of this 
study and given indispensable feedback and advice.    I have found that the work of life and the 
work of writing are not so different: each is made better by reflection, composition and the 








To My Mom 






Prologue: In Search of Arabic 
 
 The Arabic language has been an interest of mine for several years and my 
relationship with the language has been interwoven with several important life events.  
Born in Bangladesh, my mother taught me the Arabic alphabet and several small suras 
or chapters of the Qur’an by the time I was five years old.  I also learned the English and 
Bangla alphabets and attended classes at the school across from my family home. When 
I moved to the United States at the age of five, I would continue to focus on these 
various languages in different arenas.  English became the medium of schooling, 
television and play with friends outside the home.  Bangla was used by my mother in 
our daily communications and Arabic was taught in the Saturday and Sunday school 
programs organized by the local Muslim community in Virginia.  As a teenager, I became 
fascinated by the Qur’an and its meaning, wanting to discover the key to unlocking its 
secrets.  When I entered undergraduate at Georgetown University, I chose Arabic as my 
major and undertook the study of a language which was to give me access to the 
Qur’an.  
My understanding of Arabic changed when I finally had the opportunity to live 
abroad in Jordan and Qatar.  After living abroad in the Arab world, I realized that the 
Arabic of the Qur’an was not the same as the spoken Arabic used to communicate in 
daily conversations. In addition, my increasing interest in the intersection of education 
and culture (sparked by two years of teaching in inner city Washington, D.C. and one 





anthropology and education in graduate school. Arabic continued as one of my major 
interests, a space for exploring the nexus of religion, culture and education.  I continued 
to be fascinated by the depth and range of Arabic in cultural life as well as religious and 
political contexts. 
 In reading texts and articles of various scholars on the subject of Arabic 
language, I realized that this search for Arabic was both old and new.  Muslims, 
Orientalists and Arabs alike have long been perplexed by the intertwining of religion, 
politics and ethnicity under the sign of Arabic. In more recent years, the question of 
Arabic’s divergence between the standard and the spoken has become a subject of 
increasing interest to scholars of Arabic. In my field research of Arabic in Qatar, I 
observed the intersection of these genealogies of thinking about Arabic which were 
competing against newer ideologies of the English language as the language of an 
economy of education. The Qatari government was melding a strange number of 
people, languages and ideologies together in one place in the hopes that something 
magical would happen.  Instead, a history of conflicting ideologies of the Arabic 
language and its relationship to Arab identity are being brought to the fore.  
 Arabic, as intimately related to my own religious faith has been a central aspect 
of my spiritual and intellectual explorations. In an academic setting which has 
oftentimes been at odds with religion, and especially Islam, coming to terms with a 
divine language and its worldly application, has necessitated a critique of a secular 





Asad’s and Bruno Latour’s work on modernity, secularism, religion have been 
exceptionally helpful in working through intellectual quagmires. For when the secular 
liberalism of western academia meets a distinctly religious society such as that of Qatar, 
reflections on several conflicting visions of utopia are necessary: the religious, the 
secular and that of the physical space of real time. What becomes important then and 
what is actually always important, is who is involved in defining utopia and how 
individuals understand their own reflections. For me, that has meant recognizing that all 
things are inherently contingent upon reality, especially the desire for perfection. 
In the case of a study of language, the utopian vision of language is one in which 
mono-lingualism predominates. But the reality is that for most of humanity’s history, 
linguistic pluralingualism has been the norm.  The rise of the secular nation-state has 
made mono-lingualism a defining element of creating a successful national identity.  But 
in the history of Arab and Muslim societies, the civic realm of life existed in tandem with 
the religious realm, rather than the former subjugating the latter or vice versa. What 
became clear to me, in my search for Arabic, was that several linguistic and social visions 
could exist simultaneously, especially in highly multilingual societies.  Was this made 
possible by religion or obstructed by it?  I began to wonder if Arabic had some intriguing 
element which elided it from the utopian vision of language supported and spread by 
European nationalist ideals. Could the utopian vision of religious language support a 
type of language plurality that secular utopian visions of language struggle with?   In 
exploring the role of Arabic in the making of Qatari society, I recognized a dissonance 





and politics.  In a utopian world, all languages would be equal or humanity would only 
speak one language, but in reality, languages take on various values based on the power 
and privilege of its speakers.  These activities and discussions are the heart of this 
ethnography, whose simple goal is to illustrate the ways in which Arabic becomes a 
different thing for different people, and makes (im)possible a range of actions and 
beliefs.  Religion, along with culture, education and politics all play a part in indexing 
language use and making it work for people’s needs.  The reflections in the mirror of 
Qataris and non-Qataris, performing and telling a story of Arabic in Qatar are what 
follow in these pages.  My own positionality vis-à-vis these  reflections should be 
understand as one of not an objective observer, but a conscientious scholar-
practitioner, who views language as a fascinating mirror of human behavior and belief, 
including my own.  This brings me back to my own search for Arabic, one which 
continues today in the teaching of Arabic, along with Bangla, to my two daughters.  
Learning multiple languages, one of which gives access to a religious tradition, requires 
reflection on various elements of language, power and society.  It requires recognition 
that, while a language may give access to individuals, books, ideas and cultures, it 
cannot teach them how to live.  That takes the ability to analyze and reflect on what, 
where and how to use language to reach your desired goals. Language is a conduit and a 







Introduction : Strange Language or Language Strangers? 
 
 “Stranger in my own land” by Mimi, translated by R.Asmi 
 
 
Stranger in my own land 
I see that people don’t understand my words 
Their garments do not cover their flaws 
And their glances follow me like a plague 
I speak to them in Arabic 
And they respond to me in a foreign tongue 
And they laugh all around me and say: 
“uneducated” 
But… am I not in an Arab country?... 
To where should I turn? To the West which sees 
me as backwards? 
Or to the people who see me as a rebel? 
To who… to where, my country? 
 ٌبيرغٌيفٌيدلاب  
ىرأٌسانأٌلاٌنومهفيٌيملاك  
مهسبلامٌلاٌيفختٌمهبويع  
وٌمهتارظنٌينقحلاتٌ ٌنوعاطلاك  
مهثدحأٌةيبرعلاب  








Written by a popular Qatari blogger who writes under the penname Mimi, the 
above excerpt of her poem describes the Qatari landscape as one mired in conflict and 
uncertainty. Mimi refers to a sense of estrangement at the very beginning of the poem 
with the words, “stranger in my own land,” and returns to this feeling at the very end, 
“to who, to where…. my country.”2 In between, she explores why she feels displaced 
                                                     
2
 http://mimizwords.wordpress.com/2010/11/08/  بيرغ يدلاب يف . The poem is published in Arabic, but most 
of the comments are in English, many of which appear to be from young Qataris like herself.  Mimi says 
about herself that she traveled abroad for her studies and now has returned to find herself stifled by a 
conservative culture. Writing is her only medium of expression where “I aim to share my thoughts- things I 





and not at home in Qatar.3 To untangle this poem, one requires some context to Mimi 
and to Qatar.  Mimi is a Qatari citizen who, at the time of writing, has recently finished 
her undergraduate degree in the United Kingdom.4 She writes about herself: 
As a Qatari women who has lived abroad and returned to life in a conservative 
society, writing is my way of remaining true to my own thoughts and dreams. In 
this Blog, I aim to share my thoughts- things I could not share with others 
because they have thought me even more different than they suspected (About 
Mimi). 
 
The word ghareeb, which means strange or stranger, is used to begin her poem and its 
synonym, different, is used in her introduction. Mimi feels out of sorts and out of place 
in Qatar. Why? What has changed? Mimi acknowledges that she has changed after her 
study abroad, but her poem implies that Qatar has also changed.  
The poem begins with disaffection over the language Mimi wants to use and the 
tropes which arise because of her use of it.   She notes, with frustration, that when she 
goes to speak Arabic, she finds people responding to her in English and calling her 
uneducated.  This part of the poem reflects the shifting educational and linguistic scene 
in Qatar and ends with the rhetorical question, “am I not in an Arab country?” Mimi 
ends her poem also with a question of belonging, or lack thereof. She finds herself 
                                                                                                                                                              
Although bilingual, Mimi chooses to post mostly in English because her readership is comprised mainly of 
expatriates and Qataris who were or currently are educated in English language schools.    
3
 The entire poem focuses on issues ranging from Qatar’s wealth to internal discrimination and prejudice 
among Qataris. 
4
 Mimi also contributed to a volume of short stories called Qatar Narratives in which she shares her 
experiences as a woman growing up in “modern” times verses that of the time of her mother and 
grandmother.  She is grateful that she has the opportunity to study abroad and be independent and struggles 
against the unequal treatment she receives, as compared to her brother, because she is a female.  She wants 





stranded between “the west which sees me as backwards” and “the people who see me 
as a rebel.”  In her final words, “to who, to where… my country,” Mimi evokes a feeling 
of alienation and displacement.  
This study explores whether Mimi and others like her, including myself, who 
operate at the boundaries of multiple langauges are using a strange language or are 
language strangers.  Does our meta-pragmatic awareness or reflexivity about our 
language use, when placed in the mirror of another language, result in a dislocation of 
the language itself, the individual in the society or both? These questions arose out of 
my own experiences with Arabic, as a strange language, and a language stranger (to 
Arabic) while doing field work in Qatar amidst a school reform movement.  Mimi and I 
are both reflecting on the question of whether we are the language strangers and is 
Arabic becoming strange because of our reflection in the mirror of another language 
(English) and culture (the west)? 
The sparks of this ethnographic story started in 2005 when I was a teacher at a 
British school in Qatar. I was hired because I was an American citizen, who had two 
years prior teaching experience in American public schools, to teach a class of 
kindergarten students who were primarily Qatari, the British KG2 English curriculum.  
During my year at the Gulf English School, I became intrigued by the relationship 
between the English teachers, western expatriates like myself, the Arabic teachers, 
expatriates from different Arab countries, and the Qatari population of students and 
families we interacted with on a daily basis.  I began to ask myself how all these people 





languages we spoke and the institutional languages that were imposed upon us. This 
experience made me wonder what reflections of language were being seen by these 
individuals and how we could make sense of these differences within the context of a 
“globalized” Qatari population. 
I became further intrigued when I read Haeri’s 2003 book Sacred Language, 
Ordinary People about Arabic in Egypt, I began to think about the implications of what 
she proposed in a place like Qatar. Haeri argues that: 
As the language of religious rituals, Classical Arabic has an integral place in the 
daily lives of believers who find it utterly beautiful, soothing and powerful (as do 
in fact many nonbelievers). It is when the language is taken out of the realm of 
religion that its status becomes ambiguous and its politicization difficult to 
prevent…The far greater share of the burden is on those who wish to use the 
language of religion for creating a world where religion is not supposed to 
occupy a central place. [2003:156-157] 
Haeri’s argument is built upon the idea of vernacularization as coinciding with 
modernity and the development of a national imagination (Anderson 1981), a process 
that occurred historically through the production of the secular nation-state.  She 
contends that because “Classical Arabic” is tied to religion, Egyptians act as “custodians” 
of this dialect of Arabic, while they are “owners” of Egyptian Arabic. Central to Haeri’s 
argument is “the realm of religion,” one which she argues is unwelcome in “a world 
where religion is not supposed to occupy a central place” (2003:157). 5  
                                                     
5
 Haeri calls fusha Classical Arabic and doesn’t give credence to the existence of a Standard Arabic, 
whether Modern or Classical. This is an important point of distinction between Haeri and other 
sociolinguists.  Haeri chooses to subsume Standard Arabic under an all encompassing Classical Arabic 





 Haeri makes several assumptions about Egyptian society that depend upon the 
binary of secular and religious societies and the tenuous relationship the “secular” and 
the “religious” have to language.6  She conflates the concepts of vernacularization and 
secularization and does not attend to their ethnographic authority in the lives of her 
interlocutors.   While Haeri critiques the language ideologies that consider Classical 
Arabic “sacred”, she fails to do the same for the language ideologies that posit various 
languages as “modern tongues” and “the soul of the people,” both ideologies critical to 
the formation of secular nationalist thought (Bauman and Briggs 2003; Bonfiglio 2010).7 
 Haeri would argue that Mimi’s feelings of strangeness arise not as a result of her 
inability to use Arabic in a population that is increasingly trying to acquire the English 
language, but because her own native Arabic suffers from a condition she calls 
“discomtemporaneity” (2003: 150) in which Classical Arabic is stifling the “native” 
language of the Qatari, which is a spoken variant of Arabic typical to the region(s). This 
discontempoarenity has also been called “diglossia” by western linguists studying 
Arabic.  While my findings concur with Haeri’s findings on several fronts, including the 
respect given to the Qur’an as a model of Arabic language, I would like to posit that 
there is a substantial problem with Haeri’s argument arising from her effort to supplant 
the Arabic speaker’s own meta-pragmatic awareness of language with that of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
“sacred” and therefore, are unable to be “contemporary,” as they would be if they developed their dialects 
into a written language.    
6
 aeri’s analysis of Arabic has been critiqued by several scholars for not attending fully to poststructuralist 
thought (Caton 2006), for holding rigidly to a Saussueran view of language as arbitrary (Miller 2008) and 
for reducing Arabic to the diglossic binary of classical versus spoken Arabic (Suleiman 2011). I 
7
 Bauman and Briggs (2003) deal extensively with the divergent positions of scholars critical to the 





theoretical model in which the vernacular should supercede the religious script (as the 
romance languages did to Latin).     
In my own reading of the language ideology literature, I have come to a different 
understanding of how one studies “language ideologies,” especially in multilingual 
contexts with diverse political and social histories.  In doing so, I have drawn upon the 
work of  Michael Silverstein (1979) who defines “language ideologies” as “a set of beliefs 
about language articulated by speakers as a rationalization and justification of perceived 
language use and structure” (193). 8  In addition, Kathryn Woolard distinguishes 
language ideologies “as a mediating link between social structures and forms of talk” 
(1994:55). I contend that language ideologies are a way of describing how individuals 
and groups form enduring notions of what language does and how it should be used. It 
is a dialogical process in which speakers use language to talk about language (meta-
language), which then results in language ideologies that shape how language is used.  
While a language ideology is a very useful way to study language, I also attend to Bruno 
Latour’s critique that: 
We have to resist pretending that actors have only a language while the analyst 
possesses the meta-language in which the first is ‘embedded.’ As I said earlier, 
analysts are allowed to only possess some infra-language whose role is simply to 
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 This approach to language studies has yielded several volumes and branches, ranging from historical 
studies of language ideology to national and institutional levels and regional and local language studies, 
which has historically been the bread and butter of anthropological linguistics (Bauman and Briggs 2003; 
Errington 2001; Gal 1979; Kroskity 1993).  Of particular interest to a study of Arabic language ideology 
are the work of scholars who have written about language contact and variation, dominant or standard 
language ideology and its relationship with the nation and religious or “ritual” use of language (Asad 1981; 






help them become attentive to the actors own fully developed meta-language, a 
reflexive account of what they are saying. [Latour 2005:49] 
I would apply this critique of Latour’s to Haeri’s work because she disregards the ”fully 
developed meta-language” of those who support Standard/Classical Arabic and places 
her meta-language of vernacularization and the “ushering in of modernity” at the heart 
of her argument (Haeri 2003: 146-147).  In the process, she places language ideologies 
that are popular in western contexts and within academia in a position of superiority to 
those of her interlocutors.  Rather than explicating an “infra-language” somewhere 
between that of her informants’ meta-language and that of her fellow theoriticians’ 
meta-language, Haeri focuses on how problematic Classical Arabic is for Egyptians from 
a theoretical point of view that priveleges the secular, thus judging their reflexive 
awareness as incomplete according to the meta-language of academia.   
I would like to expand upon Latour’s notion of infra-language as a useful analytic 
tool for understanding and mediating language in multi-lingual communities.  I struggled 
with applying the traditional anthropological approach towards Qatari culture, one 
which would deem certain things “Qatari” and others as “non-Qatari.”  If I took that 
approach, then I would be an intermediary between Qatari “culture” and academia, 
representing the habits, customs and language of Qataris as uniform and with strict 
boundaries.  Instead, mediating an infra-language has meant that I opened up my 
ethnography to the myriad of languages actually used in Qatar by Qataris.  It has also 
meant attending to what happens when there is more than one medium of translation 





As I mentioned, these questions of linguistic metapragmatic awareness 
regarding multiple languages arose out of a particular experience of teaching English in 
a Qatari British school where speakers of many dialects of Arabic and speakers of many 
dialects of English came together to formally teach and learn Standard Arabic and 
Standard English.  They did so also within the context of religious and cross-cultural 
differences. In this ethnography, I follow the implementation of the Qatari state’s 
education reform measures to demonstrate how multiple languages are coming in 
contact with one another in Qatar and what role schools and religious discourse play in 
the process. In particular, I focus on the response of Arabs to the growing use of English, 
in its many forms, in Qatar and how it affects internal discussion about variation in 
Arabic.   Throughout this study, I explore what happens when languages are mirrored 
and multiple language ideologies compete, collide and collate with one another. I argue 
that while language ideologies do exist, speakers are not unaware of them to the extent 
that linguists believe. This argument is supported by my data that shows individuals 
reflecting upon multiple languages and their historical and contemporary relevance to 
their lives.  While there is a movement to codify certain languages as only capable of 
certain linguistic functions, there is always a reverse movement to contest this 
codification. 
Silverstein (1998) identifies two communities of language that illustrate how 
fluid and rigid boundaries between languages can be.  The first is the concept of the 
language community, which is defined as the normative denotational code used to 





presupposable regularities of discursive interaction in a group or population” are used 
to define identity and belonging (1998: 407).  Where grammar and structure are 
essential to delineating the language community, speakers in a speech community are 
not required to attend to grammar and syntax to communicate. Speech communities 
are composed of various members of a language community and are highly pluri- or 
multi-lingual.   These two concepts allow us to think about language boundaries and 
they allow us to think about what happens when individuals move across these 
boundaries as plurilingual speakers. Throughout this ethnography, I will be moving 
between the speech community, predominantly in homes and informal conversations, 
and the language community, focused on in schools and formal settings.  In doing so, I 
illustrate how speakers move from language as denotational code and language as 
identity and belonging. I posit that through these movements, speakers are always 
engaged in “language games” (Wittgenstein 2009), through which “language much 
speak for itself” (Wittgenstein 1979: 40).  
The idea that “language must speak for itself” in “language games” allows the 
language user to construct and build new ways of communicating across the speech and 
language communities. In the mirroring of strange languages and language strangers, 
we discover that we are playing “language games” (Wittgenstein 2009) at all levels of 
linguistic analysis.  This game gets even more complex when crossing the boundaries 
and borders of language. I want to connect this back to metapragmatics of language in a 
multi-lingual community.  When an individual in Qatar goes to speak, they often have at 





language game with the person they are trying to communicate with.  Thus person A, a 
Qatari citizen, will say in English, “Give me two chicken” to the attendant at the KFC, a 
Filipino expatriate, who might respond, “You want Number 2 meal?” The Qatari might 
look perplexed at the confusing board above the attendant and reply, “Yes, number 2.”  
These types of exchanges occur on a daily basis in cafeterias, offices, schools, homes 
and streets of Qatar as individuals work out what language to use, if they are using it 
“correctly” and in the end, hopefully successfully getting their idea across.     
 In my field site, where English, Standard Arabic and regional dialects of Arabic 
are all used within speech and language communities, languages move against, in 
between and with one another.  This, I would like to suggest, is the case in most 
communities, regardless of whether the language community is highly standardized.  
Historically, when looking at non-western languages, scholars have attended closely to 
denotational code and linguistic interactions in mono-lingual contexts (Silverstein 1999). 
They have looked for ways to homogenize language or to see which language should be 
used for denotational code in the community. In this study, multi-lingualism is 
normative and necessary for communication in the Qatari language and speech 
communities.  
 My focus in this study is on outlining an infra-language, somewhere in between 
my own meta-pragmatic accounting of meta-language (the ways we talk about 
language) and my interlocutors accounting of their own language use (meta-pragmatic 





language speakers are constantly defining and redefining what languages to use and 
questioning the boundaries that language places upon their interactions and 
movements in Qatari society. Whether individuals are “correctly” assessing their 
language use is not the goal of this ethnography. I argue that language users make 
specific language choices to navigate the matrix of linguistic possibilities available to 
them in the speech and language community. They do so with a meta-pragmatic 
awareness that must be respected by the ethnographer.    
Contextulizing Multilingualism in Qatar: Globalization, Regional Politics and the 
Knowledge Economy 
 
To study Arabic in Qatar is to observe how languages flourish in a petri dish to 
which one adds (a little haphazardly) many different chemicals and nutrients. It is 
arguably one of the most rapidly “globalizing” places in the world today.  The population 
of Qatar in 2012 reached 1.7 million, of which only 15% are national citizens. The 
leaders of this small state have tried to create regional and international alliances that 
will fuel positive change in the country.  The vision of Qatar’s leadership is for a revival, 
one rooted in economic growth and religious faith.  But Qataris and their regional 
neighbors stand at a crossroads in which turmoil and revolution are redefining the 
boundaries of the Middle East.  
 The Qatari leadership is exploring how to take their small state and their 
regional neighbors into the next century with their National Vision 2030 (Qatar Strategic 





areas such as Lebanon and has supported revolutions in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. 
In addition, it has tried to support economic and political development through 
educational reform measures and providing scholarships and opportunities to Arabs 
throughout the region and at home in Qatar.  This is apart of what the state’s leaders 
call the “knowledge economy,” which connects education, economics and politics 
through policies popular in international development circles.  A concept found in 
business, economic and development circles, it refers to an economy that is based on 
knowledge and which directs its efforts towards research, technology and building 
infrastructure (schools) that supply the needed “knowledge” to run the economy 
(Drucker 1969; Chen and Dahlman 2005). 
This new vision for the country had its beginnings in 1995, when the current 
Emir, Sheikh Hamad, and his wife, Sheikha Mozah, began an effort to reform Qatari 
politics, society and education, making one of the core tenets of reform that change 
must begin with the “development” of Qatari youth. The government’s natural 
resources in oil and gas have allowed it to transport resources, human and non-human, 
into the country at enormous rates; elite universities, school specialists, consultants, 
technology, curriculum, theory and pedagogy from the best institutes in the West 
(primarily from the United States, but also Great Britain, Europe, Canada and Australia).   
To achieve this paradigm, the Emir decreed the creation of Qatar Foundation 
and his wife, Sheikha Mozah, became its director (Emiri Decree 1995). Sheika Mozah 





development of Education City and in the reform of the government’s K-12 education. 
In 2000, Sheikha Mozah asked the RAND Policy institute, an American consulting 
agency, to do a study of K-12 schools.  RAND offered three options for reform to the 
government; 1) Reform the current Ministry system; 2) Adopt a free market model in 
which new independent, charter schools would thrive or fail based on competition; and 
3) Completely privatize the schooling system by adopting vouchers.  The leaders of the 
reform chose option two and have followed the implementation plan as outlined by the 
analysts (Brewer et. al 2005).   
 “Education for a New Era” was the catchphrase for these multiple, inter-related 
changes to the K-12 schooling infrastructure of Qatari society.  Following the 
recommendations of RAND, existing government schools were slowly closed down and 
new independent schools, based on a charter school model, were opened up between 
2000 and 2010. Although ostensibly about government’s role in education, the reforms 
target the way that Arabic is taught in schools. RAND-Qatar Policy Institute’s 2004 
report on Qatar’s school system recommends that Arabic teaching be removed of its 
“unnecessary” grammar and heavy usage of religious texts.  Instead, Arabic teachers are 
encouraged to teach “practical” language skills and to create newer texts and methods 
of teaching Arabic to students. The analysts inform us that in order to create the Arabic 
standards, they “looked at the way English was taught as a first language in English 
speaking countries to draw parallels” (2005:102).  The reform’s writers explicate that 
the Arabic standards writing process was difficult because of the language’s ties to 





religion as a separate subject and the teaching of Arabic needed to be spelled out in the 
standards document” (Brewer et al. 2005: 104). The distinction between teaching 
religion and teaching English maybe patent in the United States, but it is much more 
complicated when turning to the history, teaching, practice and use of Arabic. 
  The implementation of a “knowledge economy” has prioritized English and 
produced debates about the direction of Qatar and its linguistic and religious character 
in popular media, newspapers and blogs.  The relationship between American 
consulting firms and the Qatari government has created “close encounters” (Tsing 2000) 
that bring together much more than contemporary companies, individuals and financial 
markets.9 They also reference and integrate genealogies and ideologies of language and 
religion from the region and from North America and Europe.  
The following chapters look at these “close encounters” from different vantage 
points in Qatari society. Following a history of Qatar in chapter 1, chapter 2 focuses on 
the Qatari state and school reform. In interviews with individuals about the Qatari 
state’s decision to move towards using Standard English in schools and private sector 
jobs, speakers of both English and Arabic feel the increasing tension of juxtaposing these 
two languages.  Standard English begins to take on an ideology of a “global” language 
and in the process, it becomes “de-localized” and represented as a “modern”, ideal 
language.  In contrast, Standard Arabic is rooted in the language of nationalism, ethnic 
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 “Close encounters” is defined by Anna Tsing as a “focus on the historical specificity of the events that 
resulted in alliance and the open-ended in-determinacy of the regional processes stimulated by that 
alliance” (2000: 349). In addition, these encounters should be studied for elements of collaboration, 





pride and religious discourse. Chapter 3 is focused on literacy in Standard Arabic and 
Standard English. In interviews with school teachers, metapragmatic awareness includes 
the notion of social literacies, that particular languages have more value in society than 
others.  In chapter 4, literacy in Standard Arabic at the university level is increasingly 
becoming a subject of concern for Arabic teachers because of the rise in English 
language literacy amongst Qataris.  In addition, the divergence between dialects of 
Arabic and the Standard is highlighted by teachers and students as a unique challenge to 
learning and teaching Standard Arabic. Chapter 6 continues to look at the language 
community, but through metapragmatic debates about what type of Arabic to use in 
Qatari society.  This chapter returns us full circle to questions of language ideologies in 
multi-lingual settings and how to develop an infra-language that is respectful of 
speakers own meta-pragmatic awareness.  The conclusion contends with the issues 
brought up throughout the ethnography and the value of actor-network theory in 
exploring complex, mulit-lingual environments.  
Theories of Globality and Locality: Actor Networks and Close Encounters 
 
The “West” and “East” are making there way into Qatar, in the form of objects, 
people and languages. This “localizing of the global” in Doha, the capital of Qatar, is 
often referred to as “globalization.”  But this term, as both Anna Tsing (2000) and Bruno 
Latour (2009) argue, often elides the tangible qualities of global movements and their 
localized realities.  Latour (2005) has offered an alternative to studying the social world 





global flows with his actor-network theory. I was very drawn to Latour’s actor-network 
theory (ANT) because it describes the work of the ethnographer:  
An actor-network is traced whenever, in the course of a study, the decision is 
made to replace actors of whatever size by local and connected sites instead of 
ranking them into micro and macro. The two parts are essential, hence the 
hyphen. The first part (the actor) reveals the narrow space in which all of the 
grandiose ingredients of the world begin to be hatched; the second part (the 
network) may explain through which vehicles, which traces, which trails, which 
types of information, the world is being brought inside those places and then, 
after having been transformed there, are being pumped back out of its narrow 
walls (Latour 2006: 175) 
In applying ANT, I have studied my field site as infinitely connected in many different 
directions to “local” and “global” sites.  I have also taken away distinctions in theoretical 
research between the academic and the subject of study, connecting their meta-
languages and attempting to find the infra-language, the mediating link between what 
theoreticians say about language and what my interlocutors are saying about their 
language use. Anna Tsing’s (2000) views on globalization mirror that of Latour’s and are 
particularly helpful in understanding how “close encounters” between English and 
Arabic can be better understood through localized accounting.  
Tsing brings a critical eye to globalization studies, one that was previously 
applied to modernization studies, in which the process is understood as a series of 
“projects” rather than a period of great “remaking” (2000: 3).  Tsing uses the image of a 
creek, which not only connects and flows, but creates channels and new trajectories to 
describe globalization.  Tsing wants to take the aura away from the term globalization 
and vague descriptions of it as “circulation” and “flow” and replace it with concepts of 





and movements.” 10   The latter terms designate localized ethnography that can critique 
global projects, like their modernization cousins, for “discursive specificities of 
development, which often thrived more through the coherence of its internal logic than 
through any insight into the social situations in which it was expected to intervene” 
(2000: 329). Tsing argues that social engagements and interactions can and should 
continue to be scaled up as opposed to being projected from a “global” view that is 
actually dependent upon “concrete trajectories and movements”.  
Both Tsing and Latour are suspicious of the grand narratives of modernity and 
globalization and posit in their place a more systematic accounting of activity which is 
rooted in real-time.  Latour emphasizes the work of anthropologists who have taken the 
lead in studying specific social spaces and sites and the oligos (small, tad, wee) of social 
life. Similar to Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology, which takes social facts and studies 
them as they are understood by social actors, Latour argues that following the social 
and studying social actors as they interact in their worlds allows the social scientists to 
remove the aura surrounding the event (2005). 11 
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  Tsing (2000) defines these concepts towards the end of her article “The Global Situation.” Concrete 
trajectories places the focus on social mobilization and following the how one item gets moved from one 
place to another while attending to how this affects identities and interests. Scale making is questioning the 
assumption of largesse associated with the term “global” and attempting instead to find how the idea of 
global or local is given its scale. Definitional struggles deals with redefining cultural frameworks as they 
come into contact: “Every globalization project is shaped from somewhat unpredictable interactions among 
specific cultural legacies” (349).   
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 Much of Latour’s theory is based on an early investigation in which he, along with a colleague, observed 
the processes of a scientific lab and deconstructed the activity within to demonstrate how dependent the lab 
and its inhabitants were on the society and economy in which they were embedded (Latour and Woolgar 
1979). They furthermore argued that science is not made up of an entirely deductive and rational 
methodology, but requires relative decision making on the part of scientists to decide which directions to 





In this study, “projects” of globalization and modernization can be observed 
through educational “projects”, which are defined by Bartlett (2010) as “cultural and 
sociopolitical initiatives accomplished by alliances of social actors, including actors in 
institutions, with different material resources, who engage and mobilize a variety of 
ideologies as codified in pedagogies and educational philosophies” (52).   The 
educational project of the “knowledge economy” in Qatar coordinates political, 
institutional and financial resources from many parts of the world to generate 
conflicting ideologies of language in Qatar.  This creates two idealized paths for Qataris: 
the first through “international” languages and schools and the second through a local 
and cultural understanding of language rooted in religion, Pan-Arab and Qatari 
nationalism.  These two pathways each have their own language ideologies: the former 
connecting English to a “global” and “international standard” of education and literacy 
and the latter connecting Arabic to religious tradition and Qatari culture.  
Language Ideologies, Nationalism and Speech Communities 
 
The affiliation between language and nationalism, which was most famously 
outlined by Anderson (1991), is of an imagined community that grows out of the 
confluence of vernaculars becoming print mediums that are able to create a sense of 
community.    While Anderson extended this theory and applied it to Indonesia and 
other post-colonial states, the notion of an imagined community in historically hybrid 
linguistic and religious communities was not quite as applicable as the European context 





critiqued by many, including Partha Chatterjee (1998)12 and Michael Silverstein (2000), 
for assuming the uniformity of the imagined community at any given time.  The latter 
two scholars argue that the construction of language unity is simply that, a construction 
touted by a polity that has amassed enough solidarity (not always in numbers) to 
represent their language as the language of an otherwise normally heterogeneous 
speech community.  In an analysis of Anderson’s “imagined community” based on one 
language, Silverstein argues: 
 Anderson seems to mistake the dialectically produced trope of “we”-ness for 
the reality. He seems not to see that the dialectical workings of political 
processes that construct the sharable space of realist reportage in standardized 
language are the facts to be characterized and explained. [1980:126] 
In a similar vein, Chatterjee (1999) argues that Anderson’s trouble lies in his focus on 
utopian vision of the “homogenous capital of time” into which individuals write and 
produce the nation.  I see in Silverstein’s and Chatterjee’s writings a parallel line of 
reasoning, one which emphasizes local heterogenous spaces.   
Silverstein (1998) advocates studying language ideologies as the relationships 
between local and global languages, with an eye to the anthropologist’s own biases 
regarding language and culture. From an understanding of locality as produced through 
contrast with globality, Silverstein draws a distinction between the speech community 
                                                     
12 Chatterjee (1993) also offers a compelling argument in the juxtaposition of the post-colonial state with 
its colonial forefather.  The post-colonial state arises out of a conversation and a contrasting with the 
colonial nation-state, highly cognizant of the disparities and hierarchies that existed and continue to exist 
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and the language community, urging anthropologists to pay greater attention to the 
diversity of language practices within the speech community.  Where the borders of the 
language community are regularly created out of denotational code, in contrast, the 
speech community is normatively plurilingual and “is the context of emergence, 
sustenance and transformation of distinct local language communities” (1998:407).  
Silverstein goes onto critique anthropologists and linguists for too eagerly defining the 
limits of local language communities and often times ignoring local “schemata” for 
organizing language practices.  I utilize Silverstein’s distinction between language and 
speech communities to explain how Qatari Arabic, fusha and English each can be 
“emblems” of “users’ positions in shifting field of identities”(Silverstein 199: 144). 
 Chatterjee and Silverstein both recognize that the nation is constructed out of 
local struggles and that the national language is often the winner of a battle between 
many languages.  Why is this relevant to a discussion of Arabic?  Rather than take 
vernacularization and secularization, which coincided in Europe as a model for Qatar, I 
ask what currents are flowing in Arabic speech and language communities. Within the 
Arabic speech community in Qatar, there are multiple dialects of Arabic and English, but 
preference is given to fusha in the language community and increasingly to English in 
schools.  The coming together of these language varieties requires in depth analysis of 







   
Genealogies of Religion and Discursive Traditions of Islam 
  
The writings of Talal Asad (1986; 1993; 2003) on religion and the secular-modern 
can be read in tandem with Chatterjee’s works on the post-colonial state.  Asad has 
been critical of the ways in which colonialism and western dominance in the 20th 
century has affected societies in non-western countries. His early work criticized the 
role of anthropologists in the colonial project and his most recent work focuses on Islam 
and secularism.  Asad (1986) has been highly influential in the anthropological study of 
Islam by opening up lines of inquiry which challenge the conceptual framework and 
boundaries of the “modern” secular state and in arguing that Islam should be studied as 
a “discursive tradition.”   By applying Foucault’s genealogical method, Asad (2003) 
unravels the tapestry of secularism which has tried to represent a universal “modern” 
world and subject.  In its place, he argues for a grasp of “its peculiar historicity, the 
mobile powers that have constructed its structures, projects and desires” and he 
suggests that “religion, in its negative and positive senses, is an essential part of that 
construction” (1993:24).  
 Essential to this undertaking is the analysis of discourse and discursive 
traditions, both secular and religious in origin.  Asad has drawn from MacIntyre (1988) 
and Taylor (2007) to argue that the secular is constructed partially in its control and 
definition of religion.  That it is not simply a separation of church and state, but “a move 





which it is understood to be one option among many others, and frequently, not the 
easiest to embrace “ (Taylor 2007: 2).   Taylor signals out Muslim societies as cases in 
which this process has not yet occurred.  
Asad (1993) agrees with Chatterjee’s notion of heterogeneous time and guards 
against the idea of homogenous time. He argues that secularism attempts to transcend 
pluralities or “multiple temporalities” through the homogenous capital of time and that 
liberal nations are invested in equality of representation while “religious communities 
belong, strictly speaking, to civil and not to political society—that is, to the private 
domain, where difference is permitted” (Asad 1993: 272). In analyzing Asad’s body of 
work, the theme of discursive tradition emerges in both his writings on secularism and 
on religion.  Asad argues against an anthropology of religion in which religion is treated 
as a system of symbols and signs which can be interpreted only by the ethnographer. In 
this vein, anthropology of Islam should focus on the conversations, relationships and 
shifts between Muslims as they draw from a set of foundational texts, such as the 
Qur’an, Hadith and their offshoots of fiqh (jurisprudence) to constitute their practices. 
Anthropologists studying religious societies should observe and understand what 
constitutes religion as a body of authoritative discourse.   While Foucault’s genealogy 
focused on ruptures or fissures, as defining motifs of change, Asad focuses on gradual 
movement and translation of words and ideas throughout history. Religion and 
secularism are then not separate entities, one handing the baton to the next, but rather 





discursive tradition to study the process by which Arabs and Muslims affirm their belief 
in God by connecting with the discursive tradition, through fusha, while simultaneously 
also recognizing the pressure to adopt secular patterns of thought and political rule. 
One of the major pathways for this “secularization” in Qatar is through education and 
school reform, which was historically a site of religious education.    
In a study of the Islamic textual tradition, Messick’s (1991) historical 
ethnography provides thick description (Geertz 1972) of the ways in which “modernity”, 
in the form of nation-state building, affected the religious elite and scholars in Yemen. 
Religious scholars in Yemen had to contend with ideologies of language in oral and 
written forms, as Messick states: 
A culturally specific paradox informed the grounding of spoken words in written 
texts.  From the recording of Revelation to the documentation of property rights, 
attempts to inscribe original speech, considered authentic and true, resulted in 
textual versions of diminished authority. The other side of the paradox was that 
speech events were fleeting and evanescent. Despite the staggering retential 
capacities of human memories, the spoken word needed the services of writing 
to endure [Messick 1991: 252] 
Messick demonstrates how Yemen’s education and legal system operated prior to the 
encroachment of colonialism in the Muslim world. He argues that Yemen, under the 
“calligraphic state,” was able to function outside the “structures of the world system,” 
but was then slowly integrated into it through Ottoman and British intervention (253).  
These changes are visually shown through images of documents prior to and after state 
formation which display a transition from a style of calligraphic writing which was 
handwritten, individualized and circular in directionality to documents written in 





personal seal of the caliph. These changes are paralleled in the eclipsing of western 
forms of schooling which replaced study circles with straight chairs and desks, individual 
chalkboards with one central blackboard and individualized and peer learning with 
teacher centered education.  
 Messick’s ethnographic work is relevant to this study for several reasons. He 
illustrates how orality and literacy co-existed in Muslim societies and in the religious 
discursive traditions of Yemeni Zaidi scholars. He also shows how western forms of 
knowledge and authority, in particular through literacy and print, shifted the ways this 
scholarly tradition had to re-authorize themselves through a different medium of 
communication, reducing their local authority to gain authority in the new nationalist 
imaginary.  This is relevant to the Qatari context because Islam was previously the realm 
of a select group of scholars with access to literary Arabic, but with the rise of 
nationalism, Arabic literacy beccomes important to nationalist visions.  This places the 
religious scholar, who gains legitimacy through access to the fusha of literary tradition, 
in competition with the citizen/subject of the new Arab nation states and also with the 
“international” Arab who is literate in English.   
 Despite the growing debates about Arabic literacy, Arabic still holds immense 
authority in the oral and aural realms of language use, where the “mother” tongue is 
idealized. Hirshckind’s (2006) study supports the argument that Egyptian Muslims, 
through habits of listening to oral speech, learn how to structure their language and 





debating and contending with discourses of secularity. Muslims are taught how to 
structure their arguments against secularism through Islamic speech habits, bodily 
rituals and religious discourses.  The textual tradition of Islam is secondary to a 
soundscape of Islamic sermons, music and oral discourse and debate about how to 
comport oneself as a Muslim in societies that increasingly frame citizenship and belong 
as connected primarily to the secular modern nation state. 
Saba Mahmoud (2005) has a similar argument to that of Hirschkind regarding 
agency in the context of Muslim women’s piety movements in Egypt.  Muslim women in 
Egypt see themselves as agentic selves because they actively conform to God’s religious 
prescriptions in their daily lives.  Although they engage and read texts, these women 
primarily engage in dialogue and discussion about how to apply the text to their lives.  
Texts are again secondary to engaging in oral discourse and debate about how Muslims 
should embody Islam’s tenants.  Mahmoud’s work is an example of trying to create an 
infra-language between interlocutor and academic. She does not subsume the Muslim 
women she interacted with under the rubric of western agency, but re-appraises 
western discourses of agency in light of the meta-pragmatic speech of her informants 
regarding their religious practices. Mahmood posits that “conditions of secular-liberal 
modernity are such that for any world-making project (spiritual or otherwise) to succeed 
and be effective, it must engage with the all-encompassing institutions and structures of 
modern governance, whether it aspires to state power or not” (2005:194). One of these 





a project intricately tied to nationalism. Education is often reduced to schooling, an 
interchange that anthropologists of education work against.  
Anthropology of Education 
 
Varenne (2007) has argued that culture is education and education is culture and 
efforts to reduce it to schooling should be opposed. “Arguably, anthropology should 
claim education along with culture as its core concepts to the extent that one cannot 
hope to understand cultural evolution without also understanding education” (Varenne 
2007:17).13 Cultural evolution is not the evolution of more advanced cultures, but what 
Varenne calls “difficult collective deliberations” (2007:1).  Difficult collective 
deliberations arise out of attempts to go from ignorance to knowledge and then back to 
ignorance again. It is not simply about learning or the transmission of knowledge, but 
about processes and interactions between individuals and communities as they talk 
about what is important and worthy of learning. These deliberations can be studied in 
actor-networks (Latour 2005) and communities of situated learning (Lave and Wenger 
1991). Varenne also shuns reductive efforts to understand the “consciousness” of 
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children in American schools, is the idea that they are being judged through an a priori standard of success 
and failure.  Children, teachers and parents begin to see education in black and white terms and turn the 
focus from the process of “collective deliberation” to one of reductive representations of education in the 






people, instead focusing on their discourses, actions and interactions.  In the same essay 
quoted above, Varenne argues: “Anthropology, if it has to have any punch, must be the 
activity that fosters the sense that the world we all experience is a cultured world 
constructed in a contingent history that has made something totally concrete” (2008:1).  
The reference to the concrete is the belief that there are still things that anthropologists 
can study, observe and comment upon as “culture,” found in the social activities of 
individuals and groups.  This theory of education coincides well with a theory of 
language ideologies that studies metapragamatics of language and infra-languages. It 
also dovetails well with a study of religion as an evolving discursive tradition that arises 
out of contestation and deliberation.   
 Another anthropological approach to education can be found in the work of 
Lesley Bartlett. Bartlett’s (2002; 2007; 2010) work critically analyses social constructions 
of inequality based on language, class and race. In her work on Brazil, Bartlett (2010) 
uses the idea of the “educational project” to explore how Freire’s pedagogy of critical 
literacy can benefit from New Literacy Studies (NLS)14 and also how NLS can benefit 
from critical approaches found in race, gender and class studies.  Gee (1999) defined 
NLS as “the idea that reading, writing and meaning are always situated within specific 
social practices and within specific discourses” (189). In critiquing and extending NLS, 
Bartlett  “urges literacy scholars and practitioners to remain aware of the ways in which 
thinking about, teaching and practicing or performing literacy entails cultural politics, 
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and to continuously reflect and revise our literacy practices” (2010: 11).  This is practical 
advice to scholars studying how literacy ideologies emerge through a focus on “cultural 
politics,” or the ways in which people assign difference through ethnicity, race, gender 
and language.  Bartlett’s work on educational projects and on marketization of 
education will be useful to understanding how the “knowledge economy” project 
engages in cultural politics of representation.  Her critique and extension of NLS is 
applicable to instances where literacy ideologies shift power and increasingly privilege 
English over Arabic.  Literacy theorists would benefit from an understanding of how 
language ideologies operate in multi-lingual settings.  While literacy can be studied 
directly, it is beneficial to understand how literacy in a language correlates with the 
language ideologies it is associated with.  
Providing a foil to the “glittering, empty” shell of Qatar 
 
The pace of urbanization and development in Qatar has occurred so rapidly that 
analysts often stick to generalizations and harsh critiques of the country’s 
“modernization” methods, although these methods are usually taken straight out of the 
handbooks and models of western countries. Several New York Times and Wall Street 
Journal pieces have labeled the country a “glittering, empty shell”, which takes the best 
from all over the world, but has nothing of substance at home to offer in return (Hartvig 
2012; Hossenally 2012; Shadid 2011; Slackman 2010; Tutton 2010).   The general 
conclusion is that Qatar’s ambitions far outweigh its capacity:  in borrowing from other 





is compensating for a lack of potential on the part of its population.  Having lived in 
Qatar on and off since 2005, I take the view that despite its size, Qatar’s government 
and citizens have huge ambitions that should not be ignored or underestimated. 
Furthermore, they have the financial resources to bring the newest and most innovative 
technologies and minds to the country, but are struggling to define the boundaries of 
their national and political identities. This is an arena in which Qataris, and their oil rich 
Gulf neighbors, also receive a great deal of criticism.  
The most recent anthropological literature on the Gulf region focuses on the 
conflicts that arise in defining the boundaries of Gulf national citizenship through the 
exclusion of South Asian laborers and other expatriates (Gardner 2010; Kanna 2011; 
Vora 2008).  The region is also a popular subject among political scientists who have 
explored the transition from merchants and sheikhdoms to political statehood (Crystal 
1995; Fromhaerz 2010; Onley 2007; Zahlan 1989).  These studies have explored the 
strategic changes made in the move from small polities to states with economic 
influence, but have left a lacuna in questions of language, schooling and religion.   
To the criticism that Qatar is a “glittering, empty shell”, my study provides a foil; 
that of the internal debates and discussions occurring in Qatar’s public sphere regarding 
language, Islam and schooling.  This ethnography illustrates that while Qatar has a lot of 
wealth and is brandishing it, this does not automatically preclude the state and its’ 
citizens from a long and rich tradition of orality and literacy, found in both Qatari Arabic 





their rich traditions, experiences and connections to various economies and political 
societies in the region today and in the past. It bespeaks a desire to delegitimize Qataris 
simply because they are “noveau riche.”   
This is not to ignore the very important questions and problems that have arisen 
as a result of rapid growth, which include but are not limited to the immense expatriate 
labor force and exploitation of the working and labor classes in Qatar, the erosion and 
wasting of resources such as water and land, the rise of a consumer culture which has 
resulted in obesity and major health problems such as diabetes, and the creation of a 
welfare state that makes working in the private sector unappealing.  While research on 
these measures is necessary and important, I have chosen to focus in this study on how 
Qataris are narrating the changes that are occurring in the country through questions 
about language and the ideologies that are attached to them. Qataris and the 
expatriates who work and live in their country are engaged in “collective deliberations” 
(Varenne 2007), which is learning and unlearning in a particular context through praxis, 
about whom and what to include in the narrating and building of Qatari state. This 
requires utilizing and questioning various languages, the ideologies that are built around 
them, and the physical infrastructure that supports them. 
 I see my contributions to the anthropology of the Middle East and anthropology 
of education in answering the following questions: What are Qatari individuals doing, 
saying, and thinking amidst the growing changes to the landscape and population of 





Qataris drawing upon, besides oil, to build and imagine their schools, economies and 
national citizenship?  How can these projects give us insight into questions of language, 
“the nation” and schooling? Qatar and the region as a whole is an important future plain 
of study because of the many elements through which bricolage can be conducted.  It is 
an intellectually rich arena for exploring how different traditions can potentially be 
brought together or divided. 
Methods of Movement 
لهآ ةكم أىرد راعشباه  
The people of Makkah are the most knowledgeable of their streets. – Arab proverb  
My methodology is based on George Marcus’s (1995) concept of multi-sited 
ethnography.  Lila Abu-Lughod (2005) employs Marcus’s methods to write her 
“ethnography of the nation,” which she calls “mobile ethnography” and describes as 
“doing ethnographies of ‘life-worlds’ in several locations- not haphazardly, but with the 
intention of revealing the connections among them as a logic of larger systems within 
which particular lives unfold” (2005:20). In my field research, I take Latour’s notion of 
the actor-network and Abu-Lughod’s “mobile ethnography” as models.  In doing so, I 
focused on several sites and points that were connected with one another because of 
the movement of people and things from one location to another.  I positioned myself in 
these sites and collected data from actors about their networks and the languages they 
used to navigate them. How did they learn about things? Who did they interact with? 
What information were they sharing and exchanging?  I took Latour’s suggestion to 





was strongest.  This meant, like an ant, I had to follow the trail and find where the 
centers were.  This led me immediately to my primary field sites: Qatar Foundation, 
Education City and Qatar University.  I collected data from individuals who worked, lived 
and were connected to these sites. I was able enter people’s homes and expand my 
research to schools and sites outside of these spaces, but these two were my most 
consistent research sites. 
My data were collected over a period of 14 months during which I lived in 
housing provided by Qatar Foundation and Georgetown University in Qatar and in 
housing provided by Qatar University.  I combined the use of traditional ethnographic 
techniques such as observations and interviews with media, technology, newspaper 
articles, policy and performance (poetry, videos, shows, speeches).  My observational 
data come from my daily engagements with Georgetown University in Qatar and Qatar 
University, their staff, workers, teachers and students along with my personal 
interactions with neighbors and friends in my social networks. This included 
participation and attendance at conferences, classes, graduation ceremonies, special 
events and parties.  A secondary source of data gathered from these sites was their 
communiqués, both public and private, which I gathered through working with various 
department heads in both universities.  In formal interviews with elementary school 
teachers, university professors and students, I gathered data regarding these 
individuals’ perceptions of the changing educational and political movements in the 
country, on Arabic language use in Qatar and on the growing influence and use of 





offices of Qatar Foundation and the Supreme Education Council which I analyzed 
regularly for their use of Arabic and English.  I read Qatari news in Arabic and English 
and watched Qatari national television, the news corporation Al-Jazeera and their 
channels for children, Baraem and JCC Children. I visited several of Qatar Foundation’s 
projects which hoped to develop Arabic language and Islamic culture, such as Baraem 
children’s channel, Al Jazeera Arabic and English, Qatar Islamic Art Museum, the Doha 
Tribeca Film Festival, the Heritage Library, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, the Sheikha 
Mozah Center for Qur’an Memorization and several other programs and institutions.  A 
typical day in Doha would consist of 4-5 hours at Georgetown University or Qatar 
University in the morning followed by afternoons spent with friends from various 
nationalities and linguistic backgrounds or reviewing news and developments in the 
educational and political scene.  Interviews were conducted throughٌthe snowballing 
technique as access to spaces in Doha can be limited based on who you know. 
Through snowballing, I was able to interview several key players in Doha’s 
language story, that of policymakers, teachers and students.  In 2005, when I first lived 
in Doha, I was a teacher at the Gulf English School and made many contacts with 
teachers which I revived when I returned in 2007 for field world. In the summer of 2007, 
I focused on policymakers in Doha’s education reform movement, interviewing 
individuals at RAND Corporation, Qatar Foundation, Georgetown University and Qatar 
University.  These individuals shared with me how the reform had shifted the linguistic 
scene in Doha, bringing in thousands of expatriates every day and changing the public 





continued to be problems and complaints from the national population regarding the 
increase in non-Qataris and in the changing linguistic and cultural scene.  There were 
complaints from Qataris about the dress and disrespectful behavior of expatriates, while 
expatriates looked down upon Qataris for their treatment of labor workers, nannies and 
household servants. Language was and continued to be a huge area of contestation in 
the public media between these different populations. 
 From 2009-2010, my field research shifted to teachers and students, although I 
still met with and spoke with policymakers.  My focus was on Arabic teachers who 
taught at the high school and university level because they were involved daily with 
change to Arabic language education as a result of the new project of the “knowledge 
eeconomy.” They were personally affected by education reform and the resulting 
marginalization of Arabic.  I had several Arabic tutors who became my interlocutors as I 
researched language issues in Doha.  The primary interlocutor was Ikhlas, a Syrian 
national who was born and raised in Doha and had received her Arabic degree from 
Qatar University.15  Ikhlas and I spent long hours talking about Qatar, its’ schools and 
language in Doha.  My second interlocutor was Noorah, a teacher at Qatar University, 
and a Qatari national who had impeccable command of Standard Arabic.  We spent 
many hours discussing the merits of Qatar’s education reform and the interactions 
between Qataris and expatriates in Doha.  In addition, I formed a strong connection 
with several groups of Arabic teachers in Qatar Foundation’s Education City and at Qatar 
                                                     
15
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University. These individuals were important sources of information about Arabic, Qatar 
and university policies and politics.  In addition, I interviewed over 20 Arabic teachers at 
high schools, both public and private, throughout Doha.  Students were my secondary 
source of interview information, but a primary source of observational data.  I mainly 
observed students at Georgetown University in Qatar and at Qatar University. I watched 
them in coffee shops, in classes and in malls.  This group of individuals was mainly 
composed of Qatari nationals, although there were several expatriates from Pakistan, 
America, Canada, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and several other nations who I interviewed and 
spoke to.   
In addition to individual observation and interviews, I did an extensive amount of 
research on media content about Arabic. As Arabic is often at its most expressive in the 
oral arena, these forums were places where the discussion of language, Qatar and Arab 
and Muslim society were at its most heated.  The role of Al-Jazeera in Qatar, along with 
the growing media empire of Qatar Foundation in the form of children’s programming 
and debate shows, were rich sources of information about language ideologies.  The 
individuals on these programs were from all parts of the Arab diaspora and therefore 
did not represent Qatar or Qataris, although many have claimed that Al-Jazeera is a part 
of the Emir’s political media machine.  These mediums are important across the actor-






In addition, I interacted with the expatriate community in Qatar extensively, 
which includes Americans, Bangladeshis, Indians, Britons and many others. I also had 
several interlocutors, mainly women, who were heavily involved in community schools 
either as teachers, students or policy makers.  These individuals’ experiences are not 
systematically reflected in the following pages as I focus primarily on language 
ideologies associated with Arabic and English.  While Qataris historically had strong ties 
with South Asian communities through trade and labor, today the focus is on interaction 
and trade with western and “developed” states as the leadership of Qatar wants to have 
a “world class” education system. South Asian economies and their citizens are 
perceived as inferior and are given lower salaries and less prestige in Qatar’s economic 
and schooling institutions.  In contrast, expatriates from Western states are given higher 
salaries and are respected more because they speak the Queen’s English.  These social 
and class hierachries are explored in depth in Vora (2008), Kanna (2010) and Gardner 
(2010), but the linguistic elements of this inequality are important subjects of future 
research.    
By tracing and elaborating the places where connections are being made, 
anthropologists can focus on the social as it is being produced rather than attending to 
predefined scales of “global”, “local” or to predefined discourses of “standard”, 
“colloquial” or “classical.” In regards to language, this requires studying the speech and 
language community and the ways in which individuals talk about their own language 
practices and behaviors.  In the following map, I highlight some of the places of field 





institutions (Education City, Qatar Foundation and Qatar University), homes (Ikhlas’s 
home, Johara’s home, Maryam’s home and my own home) and social and cultural sites 
of interaction and performance (The Corniche, The Pearl, Katara).   My mobile 
ethnography kept me moving between sites of the speech community (homes, hallways, 
coffee shops) and the language community (classrooms, conferences, debates). The 
map does not include the schools I visited, but they were all throughout the city and 
reflected both private and public schooling options for Qataris.  









Limits of the Limitless 
 
  With a methodological apparatus such as actor-network theory, a field site with 
marked plurality in language use and a host of other issues, it was my recurring 
challenge to stay focused on the question of language in Qatar.  Doha, the capital of 
Qatar, is small enough that one might feel that ethnography of the city could be within 
one’s reach, although it is not.  The networks with which it interacts are too numerous 
to count and they are expanding on a daily basis.  The access to technology and the 
proliferation of activity on the ground, on the internet and in the media is remarkable.  I 
chose multi-sited ethnography and actor-network theory specifically for their flexibility. 
They allowed me to observe and interact with the creation of a knowledge economy, an 
inter(nation)al image and local individuals positions vis-à-vis these changes.  But this 
methodology has its limitations, primarily in its expansiveness.  As my scope was broad 
enough to catch media coverage, literature and publications, speech and interaction, I 
was aware of the limits of the limitless. 
 Actor-network theory is a theoretical apparatus that emphasizes ethnographic 
inquiry, but does not allow one to focus inquiry in one space.  This creates a push and 
pull between the ethnographer’s design of an excellent research project and the irratic 
and unpredictable movements that the ethnographer is asked to follow.  ANT is similar 
to DeCerteau’s (1984) “walking the city,” where rather than peering from the top of a 





city anew.  When one walks the city of Doha, you find buildings demolished, streets 
emerging out of debris and people from all over the world speaking many different 
languages.   To follow their trails and see linguistic interaction from their perspective is a 
gargantuan task.  Doing this type of ethnography requires one to impose limits on 
oneself and to acknowledge that there are things we may not know and places we may 
not go.  Thus, one of the major limitations self-imposed by ANT, is the 
acknowledgement that we only know what we can experience first-hand. 
 There were many places I could not be physically: closed door meetings, 
invitation only events, schools that were too far away or that I did not have the time to 
visit. In my efforts to capture a movement, I was inevitably always stuck in one place 
and in one moment.  There were other practical limitations. These included being a 
wife, mother and pregnant woman during my fieldwork.   I tried to turn these 
limitations into research related activities.  My responsibilities to my three year old 
daughter required that I spend time exploring pre-schools and watching Arabic 
children’s television.  I made sure to ask these programs about their policy on language 
and to talk to her teachers and the administration about the changes in Doha in regards 
to language.  As a pregnant woman, I observed first-hand how private medical facilities 
in Doha operate primarily in English. Watching a Qatari woman struggle to explain her 
needs to a Filipina nurse allowed me to understand Qatari frustrations from a different 
perspective.  Experiences such as these filled the spaces between participant 
observation at universities and in classes and interviews with individuals involved in 





 I am also limited in what I can say about specific schools in Doha. Although I was 
a teacher in a British school in 2005, this was prior to the creation of my research 
proposal.  I used this prior connection to interview and get in touch with former 
colleagues, students and parents, but it was not the same experience as that of being in 
a school on a daily basis.  In my choice not to spend the majority of my time in the 
classroom, I cannot speak comprehensively about curriculum, pedagogy or teacher-
student-faculty interactions at the elementary school level.  I can only glean from 
interviews with teachers and students from these levels of schooling what these 
interactions might have looked like.   Thus this ethnography is not of a particular place 
or people in Qatar, but rather of multiple actors and actants involved in the production 
of language ideologies in Qatar.    
Organization of the Study 
 
   Language ideologies are layered, just like stories.  They evolve from local 
contexts and the juxtaposition of one language against another.  In order to relay 
ethnography of mobile languages and their ideologies, I have structured this study to 
reflect this complexity.  I have used the model of A Thousand and One Nights, a tale set 
in Persia that was originally orally shared and then collected into a book.  This is similar 
to ethnographic accounting, where anthropologists collect stories of their interlocutors 
and of themselves in the fieldsite, to be later collated in the written form of the 





 In organizing my ethnography around storytelling, I recognize that the stories of 
my interlocutors are lessons, parables and rationales that should guide me, the 
anthropologist- to make the best representations of them (Asad 1986; Clifford and 
Marcus 1986). In each subsequent chapter, I tell stories of conflict and debate between 
various tribes of storytellers.  Those that were collected through ethnographic fieldwork 
are given the titles of hizwi, which is the name for a story in Qatari Arabic.  Instead of 
using the Standard Arabic word for story, which is qisa or hikaya, I choose to use hizwi 
because it conveys the oral setting it was produced in.  In each chapter, I create a 
dialogical back and forth through narratives of my interlocutors and academics who 
have worked on the anthropology of education, globalization, religion and language.  As 
this ethnography is set in a relatively new urban city with a long history of oral 
storytelling, this model is ideal for explaining the intricacies of a story with several 
layers.  
 By focusing on debates and discussions within both the language and speech 
community, I demonstrate the resonance of various ideologies of language to emerging 
notions of Qatari citizenship.  The Qatari citizen is being asked to be both Qatari and 
international, but the latter identity is increasingly tied to English. This creates a 
conundrum for Qataris, who have an allegiance to both Qatari Arabic and fusha.  I argue 
that the metapragmantic accounting and stories told in my ethnography reflect a desire 
to hold onto the flexibility that Arabic affords through a focus on the oral speech 













Chapter 1: “A Qatari” and “A Global Citizen” 
 
 “In Qatar, we hope to inspire such self confidence in our citizens. We envision that every Qatari 
will perceive himself as both a Qatari and as a global citizen.” -Sheikha Mozah 
Visitors and even long-term residents in the cities of the Arab Gulf commonly, and accurately, 
comment that most of the people they meet in the course of their visit are not in fact from the 
Gulf. A visitor to Qatar’s capital, Doha, is likely to be assisted at the airport by a Nepalese luggage 
handler, driven to their hotel by a Yemeni taxi driver, greeted by an Indian front-desk clerk and 
checked into a room prepared by a Sri Lankan housekeeper …Schools, too, have been established 
for the children of foreign residents teaching the curriculum of the home country [Nagy 2006: 1] 
The above quotes illustrate two types of narratives about the increasingly 
diverse populations residing in Doha, the capital of Qatar, and the national citizens of 
the state.  The first narrative is representative of the Qatari ruling family’s national and 
global vision in which the Qatari citizen is being encouraged by their leaders to become 
active in their country and in the “global” community.  The second narrative is from the 
perspective of Sharon Nagy, an American anthropologist and non-Qatari, and highlights 
the “labor” many non-Qataris do and the segregation of Qataris from the expatriate 
community.  Each of these narratives places the Qatari Arab in relationship to the 
“globe”, its language of English, and the diverse inhabitants now living in Doha. In order 
to understand these varied representations, it is useful to relate the changes to the city 
and its inhabitants, the political and economic structures of rule and the ways in which 
institutions and individuals have interacted with these changes.  
 In part one of this chapter, I outline the geographic, demographic, political and 





connect the rise of the Al-Thani family with the power of oil and relationships with 
imperial powers such as Britain and the Ottomans, accounts in Arabic, by Qataris, 
emphasize the ways in which the Al-Thani family unified tribes in Qatar against these 
outside empires to establish the Qatari state. Following these historical narratives, I 
outline the demographic changes to the country and the rise in the population of non-
Qataris. I focus on schools and language as an important for exploring changes to the 
city and to the state.  In order to illustrate how important schools and “education” have 
become to outlining Qatar’s new vision, I share the narrative of Qatar’s leading lady, 
Sheikha Mozah, on the vision for the country. The sources that Sheikha Mozah draws 
upon in her narrative of Qatar are important for several reasons. While they highlight 
importance of Islam and Qatari culture and traditions, they are more reliant on the 
discourse of international NGOs and their reports on the “progress” and “development” 
of the Middle East.  While the Sheikha is at times critical of these reports and desires 
reconciliation between Islam and “modernity”, she sees the path to Qatar’s future as 
made by and through international standards and frameworks and acquisition of the 
“global” language of English.   
I utilize Ahmed Kanna’s (2010) work on neighboring Dubai and the nationalist 
project he calls Arabized neoliberalism to analyze Qatar’s “knowledge economy” 
narrative.  I argue that Qatar is slightly different from Dubai and therefore, requires local 
context. The historical outline of Qatar is often viewed through two different glasses, 
with western historians focusing on international dynamics and economic and political 





history and traditions of Qatar around both neoliberal frameworks and cultural and 
religious frameworks.  I argue that Qatar’s leadership is trying to find an intersection 
between neoliberal educational projects and cultural and religious discourses, but these 
efforts are unsuccessful because the neoliberal project of the knowledge economy 
undermines local knowledge. It also de-localizes English language education and certain 
private forms of schooling by labeling them as “international.” This contextual 
background sets the stage for the “close encounters” between United States 
corporations and school reform in Qatar, the subject of chapters two and three.   
From Tribes to National Citizens: Qatar from the 19th Century to Today 
 
 
Figure 1: Doha Coastline circa 1937 
 Historical sources on Qatar are comprised of two types: accounts by British 
colonial administrators regarding their relationship with the tribes in the region 
comprising Qatar today and oral, and now increasingly written, accounts by Qataris 
themselves that are used to produce tribal histories and narrate the emergence of the 
nation.   The emergence of the Qatari state’s national vision coincides with the 





but also through the re-entextualization of oral accounts.  As Shryock argues, “The tribal 
past, in the absence of standard texts, is continually reconstructed in speech. The 
reconstruction is quite accurate, but it is flexible as well” (1997:33). While Anderson’s 
thesis of print mediums producing the nation might hold true for many national 
histories, it should be complicated by the reality that print constructions originate out of 
contestations between several oral accounts and languages within the speech 
communty. The print becomes the standard, but should be seen for what it is, a 
representation of unity, where diversity presides.  There is a strong desire on the part of 
the current ruling family to connect the country to a rich and glorious past, one 
intimately connected to the ruling family of Al-Thanis, through both oral and written 
accounts of their history.  Simultaneously, in the narrative of Sheikha Mozah, Qataris 
can and should also draw upon the resources of the “globe”.  
Historical Accounts of Qatar 
  
 










Qatar’s geographical position along pilgrimage routes to Mecca and its 
participation in regional trade between Arabia and South Asia have ensured a history of 
diverse interests and individuals crossing the peninsula.  A desert climate supported the 
Bedouin lifestyle until urbanization in port towns such as Doha, Zubara and Um Salata 
led to increasing movement of tribes and communities across Bahrain and Saudia Arabia 
who settled into what we consider Qatar today.  Qatar is a very nascent state, having 
gained full independence from British protection only 40 years ago in 1971. The current 
ruling family of Al-Thanis views the state’s “modern” history as originating in the rule of 
its’ ancestors in the 18th century, with Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammad serving as a 
symbolic founder of the state because of his battle and defeat of Ottoman armies in 
1893 (Amiri Diwan 2012).16 In references to the founding leaders of Qatar, many note 
                                                     
16 Qatar’s engagement in the 19th with the Ottoman Empire was not a positive one, but did facilitate some 
of the developments in the early infrastructure of Qatar’s educational establishments and teachers.  The 
Ottoman desire to dominate the area led Jassim Al Thani to sign a treaty with the British to become one of 
the trucial territories. The Al-Thanis exchanged oil rights and territorial concessions with the British for 
protection from its enemies by land and sea. This exchange ended in 1971, with a new set of relationships 





their piety, support of Islamic education and the building of mosques throughout the 
region. In particular, Jassim bin Muhammad is noted for his writing of Arabic poetry and 
his delivering of khutbas (religious sermons) on Fridays.  
 The Al-Thani family’s rule of Qatar resembles that of its neighbors in the region: 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain.  Along with the Al-Thanis, several large tribal 
families had a significant presence in the region. Competition and fighting between 
these groups resulted in some of these families staying in Qatar and others leaving for 
Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Al-Khalifa, Bani-Utub, Al-Jalahima). The Al-Khalifas 
became the leaders of Bahrain when they left Qatar in 1783.  Figure three provides a 
brief genealogy of the Al-Thani family, whose ancestors were said to have arrived in 
Qatar between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The following 
image is a genealogy connecting the Al-Thanis to other prominent tribal families in the 
region, in particular, the Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia. The family traces its political rule of 
Qatar back to Muhammad bin Thani, who was considered the “governor of Bedaa’”, and 
was responsible for collecting revenue from pearling and fishing (Crystal 1995: 29). 
                                                                                                                                                              
emerging between Qatar and the United States, which is now a buffer against Saudi and Iranian interests in 
the state (Wright: 2007). The American army has the second largest military base in Doha that was used to 
launch air strikes against Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq in 2003.  While American and British oil 
companies both have rights to drilling and working in Qatar, America has emerged as a more powerful ally 


















Muhammad Al-Thani gained recognition from the British in the Treaty of 1968, following 
an attack by the al-Khalifa on Doha and Wakra and an answering attack by the tribes of Qatar 
on Bahrain.  Crystal (1995) argues that “the treaty laid the juridical basis for Britain’s later 
acknowledgement of Qatar as an autonomous political unit and through recognition, gave 
special standing to the Al-Thani family, who would thereafter rule Qatar” (31).17  The British 
played an essential role in the formation of Gulf monarchies in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates by acting as an internal buffer between the various leading tribal families 
and their competitors.  They also  physically contained the “house” of Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia 
through their treaties with the tribal families of Al-Thani, Al-Sabah (in Kuwait), Al-Nahyan (Abu-
Dhabi) and Al-Khalifa (in Bahrain)  (Peterson 1991; Silverfarb 1982; Zahlan 1998). Peterson 
notes that “the rise of the British position more or less coincided with the emergence of certain 
tribes along the Gulf littoral” (1991:1444). 
Following Muhammad bin Thani’s rule, his son Jassim was also able to use the British as 
a buffer against the Ottoman Empire and its interference in Qatar’s internal affairs. Jassim is 
lauded for his political craftsmanship in Qatari history and plays a prominent role in the 
celebration of Qatar National Day, a holiday established by the current Emir to celebrate 
                                                     
17 Crystal 1995 compares Kuwait and Qatar and finds that Kuwait’s leading family, the Sabahs, enjoyed strong 
internal family consensus and external support from other tribes to consolidate their position. The al-Sabah’s 
allowed other tribal families to pursue commerce while they took charge of governance. This led to a successful 
transfer of power through the Sabah family line for over four generations. In contrast, the Al-Thani family’s larger 
tribal commitments and their role as traders resulted in a series of contestations within the family that led to the 
overthrow or usurping of power of several of the tribe’s rulers (Abdulla- Ali-Khalifa-Hamad).  The Al-Thanis were 
not able, as the Al-Sabah’s were, to balance political and economic power between merchants and the statesman. 
Crystal attributes this to a lack of distinct merchant class and the Al-Thani’s strong interests in trade from the early 
period. The Al-Thanis built strategic alliances through trade deals and marriage with several wealthy and influential 





Qatar’s founding.  Qatar National Day coincides with the Qatari defeat, under Jassim, of the 
Ottomans, which marked territorial autonomy for the temporarily united Qatari tribes. In 
account by Ahmad Al Anani, he describes Jassim: 
The key secret of Sheikh Jassem Bin Mohammad Al Thani’s personality was his strong 
faith in God and the power of God, his courage when he felt his beliefs to be true and 
righteous and his extraordinary intelligence in evaluating situations. Thanks to him, and 
perhaps for the first time in several centuries, the State of Qatar is no longer just a trail 
and a grazing pasture for the tribes of the Eastern Arabian Peninsula, but a united 
country. [Anani 1984: 172] 
 
There are several more accounts of Jassim as an exceptional political and religious leader, 
fighter, businessman and defender of “Qatar.”18  None of them mention that Jassim dispersed 
the Indian merchants who lived in Doha to create a monopoly on trade, although this point is 
highlighted in British accounts (Crystal 1995: 31-32.) As mentioned above, Jassim’s reign and 
the war against the Ottomans represent a major turning point in the narrative of Qatar’s 
“modern” history. This narrative emphasizes the unification of tribes in Qatar against a 
common enemy (the Ottomans) and under the leadership of the Al-Thanis.   
While the Ottoman power declined, British military power in the region continued to 
play an influential role in the region, especially as oil entered the picture. Britain’s original 
involvement was largely due to its concern over the trade routes to India and the Indian Ocean. 
But when oil began to be discovered the region, Great Britain became more invested in stability 
of these emerging Gulf States. Crystal (1995) relates the process by which oil became a 
bargaining chip between Abdulla, Qassim’s son and the ruler of Qatar when oil was discovered, 
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and the British. This section illustrates the variety of interested parties in Qatar’s oil supply, 
beginning with the British Foreign Office: 
‘The Foreign Office has made it very clear that they are anxious to walk very carefully in 
this part of the world, so as to avoid an oil war with American oil interests over what 
was on a long view a relatively unimportant area.’ Saudia Arabia, aware of possible oil in 
Qatar, also took a new interest in the peninsula and its borders. In 1933 negotiations for 
a long-term concession occurred. Throughout the talks, the possibility of linking 
protection to concession recurred. In 1934 Britain offered Abdalla the first firm, if still 
qualified, protection: ‘His Majesty’s Government are prepared to give Shaikh a 
guarantee in respect of unprovoked aggression by land in return for grant by him of an 
Oil Concession to Anglo-Persian Oil Company… But are anxious to confine it to a major 
aggression, i.e. to an unprovoked attack by Ruler of a neighboring State and to major 
Bedoiun raids. [ Crystal 1995:116] 
Through this treaty, the Anglo-Perisan Oil Company (APOC) acquired 75 years of exclusive oil 
rights.19  Although oil was first discovered in the Dukhan Fields In 1940 and production had 
begun by 1947, there was a lull created by World War II that resulted in severe economic 
hardship in the country.  During this period, called the “years of hunger”, many tribal families 
migrated to Saudi Arabia and neighboring Gulf States (Fromherz 2012). The Al-Thani family was 
protected by oil concessions from the British and was again able to consolidate their strong 
hold over the region in this period (Crystal 1995).  The following decades of interaction 
between Britain and the Al-Thani family consisted of a partnership, based on the numerous 
treaties signed between the Al-Thani leaders and Great Britain’s representatives in the region.  
Qatari and British renderings of this period focus on the oil concessions and mutual projects 
embarked upon by both groups.  This history of trade relations had important ramifications for 
internal affairs and the regions oil workers and non-tribal, non-merchant families began to 
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 The early form of the Qatar Petroleum Company (Petroleum Development Qatar Limited-PDQL) was also created 
at the same time. The PDQL would play an important role in the strikes that would ensue in Qatar and would later 





rebel against this alliance. This is particularly poignant during Ali’s reign, when oil revenue 
increased. 
 Between 1950 and 1960, when oil finally began to produce revenue for the state, 
Abdulla’s son Ali faced increasing demands from his family members for higher allowances and 
there were a number of revolts and strikes from those working for the oil companies against 
Ali’s financial dealings with the British oil companies.20 Various struggles took place between 
the lower classes of Qataris who worked in the oil fields with those of expatriates brought into 
work. These strikes led to an alliance between the merchant families and the Qatari labor 
classes, comprised of mainly Qatari slave holders and their slaves.  By uniting around a Qatari 
identity, these latter groups combined in a nationalist move against the rule and influence of 
“outsiders”, in particular the British.  Ali and his son Ahmad dealt with this problem by cutting 
back allowances for the Al-Thanis, distributing large sums of money to the working classes and 
giving government jobs to the merchant families. In the process, slaves were manumitted and 
given allowances.  Ahmad disliked politics and increasingly removed himself from political 
affairs, vacationing often in Europe and Asia.  All of these events led to increasing nationalist 
sentiment for independence from both Britain and coincided with the British decision to 
withdraw protectorate status from the Trucial States in 1971 (Qatar, UAE, Bahrain).    
 The transition from Ahmad to Khalifa was precipitated by the formers support of joining 
the newly formed United Arab Emirates and the latter’s desire for independence. Khalifa was 
able to gain control of the country successfully by consolidating support of the Al-Thani family 
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and by gaining the backing of Great Britain.  Having observed the problems under Ali’s rule, 
Khalifa embarked on a series of projects that focused on the emerging “national” population, 
while curbing the government’s favors to the Al-Thanis and the merchant families.  Under 
Khalifa, a law was passed in 1971 that granted full citizenship to only those who were residing 
in Qatar prior to 1930.  The period from 1970 to 1995, when Hamad would seize power from 
his father Khalifa, consisted of progressive improvements to the social services provided to the 
state’s new citizens.  This did not mean an end to tribal ties, as many government posts were 
filled with close relatives of Khalifa and the Al-Thani allies, Al-Attiya and Al-Mannai.    
 This period of growth in government services brought with it the expansion of 
bureaucracy and the population of expatriates.  Al-Thani power and Qatari identity were 
consolidated through government welfare programs and distinctions between the increasing 
expatriate population being brought into work on the jobs that Qataris, through government 
subsidies and jobs, could now avoid (Fromherz 2012).   Crystal ends her section on Qatar with 
what she sees as tensions emerging in the Qatari state: “It is hard to reconcile a monarchist 
ideology (for the ruler) with a capitalist ideology (for the merchants) with a social entitlement 
ideology (for the population). The tensions inherent in this process have not been resolved” 
(1995:164). This historical overview of political and economic forces in the creation of Qatar as 
a state should provide a rich background for the following sections on trends in these arenas 
during the most recent reign of Hamad, Khalifa’s son.  The ruling family, the expanding 
bureaucracy and private sector continue to play important roles in mediating the flow of 
resources to the state’s citizens and inhabitants. These elements are also critical to 





and in the international arena.  Furthermore, it is clear through these various historical 
accounts that those residing in Qatar have often rallied against what is perceived as unfair 
economic disbursement of oil wealth.  What has emerged through these various struggles is the 
Al-Thani family’s central role in ensuring that distribution is fair. If the ruling family is perceived 
of as unjust, revolts on the part of either internal Al-thani factions or a combination of 
merchant and tribal families is not uncommon.  These threats have usually been assuaged 
through greater distribution of oil wealth.  As Fromherz (2012) also argues, this strategy is in 
line with the tradition of tribal customs and the role of the Shaikh. What has changed over the 
last several decades is the numbers of non-Qataris in the state, creating a stronger feeling of 
“us” versus “them” in the internal politics of the state. 
Qatar from 1970 to Today: Demographics and Development 
 
Doha in the latter half of the 20th century developed at an astonishing rate with the 
port and skyline of the country slowly eclipsing its desert surroundings.  Pictures presented 
below, in Figure 4, span from the 1970’s to 2010 and demonstrate the drastic changes to the 
environment and landscape of the country.  Hamad bin Khalifa has been even more inclined 
towards social and political reform than his father Khalifa and has embarked on a series of 
initiatives with the aid of his cousin the foreign minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber, and his 
wife, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al Missned. His vision for the country was consolidated in the 
Emiri Decision (44) in 2008 in the document, “Qatar National Vision 2030”, which outlines four 





Development Planning 2008). The path to the “first pillar to human development” is described 
in the following words:  
Future economic success will increasingly depend on the ability of the Qatari people to 
deal with a new international order that is knowledge-based and extremely competitive. 
To meet the challenge, Qatar is establishing advanced educational and health systems, 
as well as increasing the effective participation of Qataris in the labor force. In addition, 
Qatar will continue to augment its labor force by attracting qualified expatriate workers 
in all fields. [GSDP 2008:13, emphasis mine]   
The ways in which these new development goals have shaped the city are most visible in the 












In the most recent statistics published by the Qatari Statistics Authority, the population 
in 2011 has reached over 1.7 million, with males outnumbering females four to one, especially 
in the 15-64 year old range. This dramatic rise in male population is attributed to the 
“recruitment of large number of expatriate workers” (Statistics Authority 2011:5). The Qatari 
national population is said to be anywhere between 200 and 250 thousand, making them 
between 11-15 percent of the entire population, a minority in their own country.  In addition, 
99.3 percent of the private sector is manned by expatriate labor, with the majority of Qataris 
choosing to work in the more linguistically and culturally familiar realm of government agencies 
and companies.  In the following table, I outline the estimated population increase of Qataris 
and non-Qataris from 1908 to 2010 that highlights the drastic increase within the past 20 years 
in the expatriate population.  Figure 5 illustrates which areas of Qatar have seen the most 
growth.   










1908 Est. 26,000 Est. 6,000 Est. 20,000   
1939 Est. 28,000 Est, 11,000 Est. 21,000   
1949 Est. 16,000  Est. 14,000   
1971 Est. 120,000 Est. 78,000 Est. 42,000   
1986 Census 369,079 Est. 250,000 Est. 119,079 121,227 247, 852 
1997 Census 522,023 297,609 (Labor 
force) 
224,414 179,564 342,459 
2004 Census 744,029 466,046 (Labor 
force) 





2008 Census 1,533,729 1,102,812  350,348 1,203,381 











A clustering of Qataris versus non-Qataris occurs along the public/private divide. A majority of 
Qataris choose to work in the government sector, primarily in fields of public administration 
and education, while a minority works in private industry. This is important to understanding 
the current message of the leading family, one which is pushing Qataris to learn English and 
work increasingly in the private sector.  It also explains the policy of “Qatarization” developed 
by the government in 2000 with a goal to increase the Qatari workforce in all sectors, public 
and private, to 50%.  The policy is called Quality Qatarization, meaning they want “qualified” 
Qataris to take these jobs (Strategic Qatarization Plan).21  This is a controversial policy among 
expatriates as it often means they are not promoted or their job is given to less qualified 
Qataris in order to meet the percentage goals for Qataris in the workforce and in schools.  
Before turning to Sheikha Mozah’s narrative of Qatar’s future and its past, I want to briefly 
outline the history of schooling in the country and how demographic changes have affected 
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History of Schooling in Qatar 
 
 
Figure 7: Students in the 1970’s 
Qatar’s history of schooling dates 
back to the 1950’s when the first schools were 
opened and supported by the patronage of the 
Emirs and also by individuals passionate about 
teaching (Al-Missned 1985; Sultan Al Umary 
2004). These schools were the first places to 
teach formal writing and reading.  The focus of 
these schools was religious instruction in 
reading the Arabic of the Qur’an.  Within 10 
years, the country had developed larger 
technical schools where multiple subjects 
Figure 6: A classroom in the 1950’s 





would be taught. Teachers and professionals from Egypt helped form the first educational 
system under the Ministry of Knowledge (wizarat al ma’arif( whose classes and textbooks were 




In the contemporary period, schooling has taken a dramatic shift with the “global” 
vision of Emir Hamad and Sheikha Mozah. In order to create the Qatari and global citizens the 
state envisions, the schooling system has shifted to focus on “international standards”.  This led 
to the closing of the Ministry schools in the early 2000s. Under new leadership, new schools 
modeled off the American system of charter schools opened through 2005 and 2010.  These 
public schools are now called Independent schools and teach English as a core subject and as 
the language of instruction in math and science. This movement from instruction in Arabic to 
English in these subjects hinges on students literacy in the latter.  Historically, literacy has 
mainly been associated with Standard Arabic. 
Table 2: “Literacy” Statistics in 1986 
Figure 9: 1982, Ustadh Mamduoh Yousef and Ustadh Abdullah Abdur 
Raham Abdullah, Principal of Khaled al Waleed secondary school for 
boys. (Egyptian-Qatari school planning under the Ministry of Education 
and Upbringing) 
















“Illiterate”  65,655 65,093 14,016 54,578 7,583 
Read/Write 81,402 118,304 20,787 367,085 23,287 
Elementary School 
Education 
42,200 55,768 19,679 348,708 28,497 
“Preparatory” 
Education 




37,125 62,433 17,849 337,518 48,646 
College 20,968 44,841 13,693 217,386 35,353 
 
 In Table 2 above, I gathered statistics from Qatar’s Planning Council and census data on 
“illiteracy” and what is labeled as read/write, along with some numbers on who attend schools 
in Qatar.  The general trend in the Qatar has been a reduction in “illiteracy” and an increase in 
the ability to read and write, coinciding with increased emphasis on elementary, preparatory 
and secondary education.  The numbers of Qataris who attend college has also greatly 
increased.  Qatari women far outnumber their male counterparts in attaining college degrees, 
but still face gender barriers in the workplace.  It is important to note that when collecting 
these statistics, it is unclear what language individual “literacy” is being based on. Perhaps the 
assumption is that people can at least read and write in at least one language.  The following 
table outlines statistics taken from Qatar’s new school management body, the Supreme 
Education Council.   Although 2009’s statistics seem slightly off (perhaps a glitch in data 
collection), the remaining numbers show a decline in schools run by the former Ministry of 
Education (MOE) and a rise in the new “independent” schools.  The last batch of MOE schools is 
called “semi-independent”, their independence from what is unclear, as the MOE has been 





Table 3: Schools in Qatar 2000-2010 
Year 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009* 2010 
Government 
Schools (MOE) 






0 40 52 70 89 108 170 
“International” ND 
ND 
51 51 77 40 103 75 
“Community” 41 96 24 
 
 I want to focus on the names of these schools as an important way to understand the 
ways in which schools in Qatar are structured by demographics of nationality and language and 
a history of interaction with Great Britain, neighboring Gulf and Arab States and increasingly, 
the United States.  The MOE schools were distinguished by their administration under the 
government and by primarily Qataris, with help from Arabs from regional Gulf States and a 
borrowing of the British model of education (primary, secondary, preparatory). These schools 
heavily emphasized Arabic, Islamic Studies and nationalism, with a few magnet “scientific” 
schools focusing more extensively on English, Math and Science, or what it is sometimes 
referred to as STEM education.  
The new “independent” schools are a creation, as we will see in the next chapter, of a 
“close encounter” between Qatar’s schools and an American consulting agency, RAND.  
“Community” schools refer to those that were opened by communities of expatriates and 
usually with a tie to the embassy and home country of the affiliated school. These schools 
usually adapt the curriculum of their home countries and run in various national languages, 
although many are predominantly English language schools.  The last category of 





“international” citizen,  are usually run by British or American staff and administration and are 
known for providing education that will gain students entryway into American and British 
universities.  These schools earn the title of “international” by catering to any and all 
nationalities of Qataris and expatriates.    
For Qataris, schooling options now consist of the public “independent” schools and 
private English and Arabic schools.   While the majority of Qataris still attend the Independent 
schools (primarily because of gender segregation), many wealthy Qataris have transitioned to 
sending their children to “international” schools, which are often believed to provide a better 
education than the newly reformed government schools.  Another trend is the catering of 
private schools to Qatari interests.  As we will see in Chapter Three, Qataris are sent to 
particular private schools that are run by the British or Americans, but have a Qatari owner or 
conform to the Qatari custom of gender segregation for boys and girls.  Much of the changes to 
elementary school education are driven by changes to the higher education infrastructure in 
the country that is the subject of Chapter Five.  Several American universities have been invited 
to set up satellite campuses in Doha and the public university has embarked on its own reforms 
designed to make the education in line with “international” standards.  This has meant that the 
Qatari education system, in which instruction was solely in Arabic up until 15 years ago, is 
attempting to create a “world-class” education system that teaches and tests students primarily 
in English.  This creates a conflict between the older model of government sponsored Arabic 
language education and schooling in the country with the new, primarily privatized English 





vision of the Qatari citizen who through education and the “knowledge economy,” can be a 
source of social awakening for not only Qatar, but the world.   
Hazawi of  Sheikha Mozah, the Knowledge Economy and an Arab Awakening 
 
In Qatar, we believe education is not only the right of every citizen but also a pillar of a 
developed and just society. So, recognizing the power of education in stimulating a 
genuine cultural, social and political awakening, (yakadhah), Qatar began a series of 
educational reforms in 1995. The principals of collaboration, respect for others and 
popular participation have been the impetus to change in all levels of our educational 
structure from K-12 to post-secondary systems. 
- Sheikha Mozah, Speech at the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies (March 18, 2005) 
 
In Qatar, the development of Qatar’s knowledge economy is tangled with rhetoric about 
the revival of Arab and Islamic culture.  Sheikha Mozah has become the spokesperson of 
Qatar’s development projects and argues that borrowing neoliberal models of education will 
spur a cultural awakening, or yakhadah (ةظقي).  As head of Qatar Foundation, the largest non-
governmental body in Qatar regulating everything from science, health, technology and 
education, she has directed millions of dollars of the state’s oil revenue toward inspiring an 
“awakening” in the region.  The Sheikha’s role has blossomed in the last ten years, as she has 
moved from local educational and social projects to take on more high profile positions as the 
UNESCO’s Special Envoy for Basic and Higher Education and a member of the United Nation’s 
Alliance of Civilizations. She has given many speeches over the last few years at graduation 
ceremonies, conferences and various forums.  In analyzing the content of these speeches, I 
found that the primary references she makes are to Islamic “traditions,” Arab Human 





Appendix 1). In drawing from these varied sources, she attempts to solidify her argument that a 
“knowledge economy” will support a cultural awakening.  
 Sheikha Mozah sees young Qataris and Arabs as the key to this future vision, individuals 
such as Mimi (from chapter one), who are receiving the “best” education the world has to offer.  
In addition, she feels that the country must change to accommodate these individuals new-
found knowledge:  
In the past, countries in our region sent students abroad to be educated. Upon their 
return, such citizens were often isolated from their societies, for they had acquired the 
education needed to analyze and participate in their societies, but their societies had 
not developed any mechanisms to accommodate the practice of citizenry.  Such people 
either secluded themselves from others or returned abroad, initiating a process of brain 
drain in our region.  In Qatar, we are bringing institutions to our region, rather than 
sending our people outside.  [Al-Missned 2005: 13-14] 
 
She continues on to suggest that what is missing in their home countries is a “culture of 
quality” which should be instilled “in the beliefs, values, institutions and behaviors of our 
citizens.”22 What Sheikha Mozah proposes as a solution to this problem of “brain drain” and 
lack of a “culture of quality” is the transfer of numerous “international” and “prestigious” 
institutions into Qatar.   While she is very clear in her speeches, about the need for building 
upon “living traditions” in the region (i.e. Islam and Qatari/Arab culture), she has been elusive 
about the linguistic complexity that has arisen in the wake of the reforms the government has 
spearheaded, changes which have left individuals such as Mimi feeling estranged.  The source 
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initiatives for the confusion which it created among students, parents, teachers and administrators over the school 
years 2006-7 when efforts were made to cut down on homework in order to increase time devoted to enhancing 





of these ideas about the knowledge economy and “education as panacea” stem from the 
Sheikha’s growing engagement with international organizations and private businesses, but she 
tries to temper this strong neoliberal message with religious language and cultural symbols, 
positing that what is happening in Qatar is a revival of Arabic-Islamic tradition. 23   
During the early stages of education reforms in Qatar, Sheikha Mozah gave a speech at 
the opening of the UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education in which she explained the 
rationale behind the country’s plans for development: “The central theme driving our 
discussion today is the need for the global community to assume responsibility for reform and 
innovation in education in order to meet the challenges of globalization, democratization and 
knowledge based societies” (Al-Missned 2003: 5). She goes onto discuss how education must go 
hand in hand with a democratic society in order to create a “culture of quality,” which must 
also maintain “cultural integrity”.  Thus, Qatar has initiated a reform in education in order to 
“face the demands of a knowledge based global economy” (Al-Missned 2003:8).  She describes 
these changes in some detail; basic education at the primary level has been turned into a 
charter school model where competition, diversity of choice, parental participation and 
accountability are the driving principals.  At the higher education level, the state university is 
undergoing “intense rejuvenation” and private “top quality universities” (from the U.S.) are 
opening up campuses in Qatar.  She also emphasizes that Qatar has engaged in political reforms 
to encourage freedom of speech and has freed schools from state control.  
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 The concept of “education as panacea” is a part of the rhetoric of development institutions, but what it often 
conceals is the complicated relationship between education and the market, one which does not often produce the 





Towards the end of her speech, she argues that these reforms and changes should not 
be feared or considered alien to the country because “Islam requires critical thinking and 
constructive debate, and condemns misology.  To revive the democratic values inherent in the 
fabric of our society is perfectly in tune with the critical requirement put on Muslims, who were 
ordered by Allah to reflect independently on knowledge” (11).  Weaving back and forth 
between discourses of development and that of Muslim Modernists, the Sheikha hopes to 
connect the two as supporting a similar vision of a pluralistic, diverse and Arab society.  The 
question of language is mentioned in one talk, which is actually the only talk given in Arabic, to 
a group of Arab scientists.  The Sheikha says, 
Hadn’t Arabic, in those golden days, been the language of science and the medium of 
learning among the Greeks, Persian and Indian knowledge, and Latin, which became the 
language of science during the Renaissance? Today we have some concerns that our 
language, Arabic, would lose its time-honored status gained over the past several 
centuries.  As you all know, languages reflect the value of what they offer to humanity. 
Any language can be likened to a vessel and/or a vehicle which transmits peoples’ 
cultures and civilizations. Hence, languages may flourish with the progress of societies 
and fade away with their weakness. [Mozah 2006:4-5] 
Sheikha Mozah mentions the concern that Arabic may lose its “status” and posits that the 
problem will only be resolved if Arab society flourishes and offers something of “value” to 
humanity.  To provide support for this concept, she cites historical figures such as Harun Al 
Rashid, Ibn Khaldun, Rifa Al Tahtawi, Muhammad Abdu and Taha Hussain, each of whom she 
sees as being “open” to learning from other societies and cultures while proud in their Arab and 
Islamic culture.  Throughout her speeches, the Sheikha narrates the importance of a 
“knowledge economy” in which individuals such as Mimi may contribute their knowledge 





Arabs and Arabic to its previous glory.  While the vision is built on the Sheikha’s historical 
understanding of Harun Al-Rashid’ bait al-hikma in which he brought together scientists, 
scholars and poets to share knowledge, it ignores an important difference in the “knowledge 
economy” model.24 
 A cultural and social revival is not the impetus behind the construction of a “knowledge 
economy”, which is focused primarily on capital and production. It does not matter to the 
“knowledge economy” what individuals speak, read or write, as long as knowledge can move 
easily and capital is increased. Kefela, who writes positively about the adoption of a “knowledge 
economy” model as a response to the rise of “globalization” and technology for “developing” 
countries notes that literacy is an essential skill for its success:  
In order for those countries to move forward and be strong, they must invest in their 
citizens, ensuring that no member of society is left behind in the knowledge-based 
economy. Although most people know how to read, the real question is whether their 
reading and writing skills are such that they are able to meet the challenges of living and 
working in society and the knowledge-based economy. [Kefela 2010: 165] 
In Qatar, the question of reading and writing in the “knowledge economy” has been squarely 
fixated on English as a site where government and private interests coalesce.  What does this 
mean for the narrative of the national citizen and in the context of poor literacy skills in the 
national language?   
This strategy of mixing free market economics with “cultural authenticity” is referred to 
by Kanna (2011) as Arabized neoliberalism.  In his work on architecture in Dubai, Kanna argues 
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 In the literature that supports “knowledge” as the basis of new economies and societies, there are several ways to 
identify this term. The Sheikha calls it either a knowledge based economy or a knowledge based society (KBE and 
KBS).  I choose to call it knowledge economy because it crystallizes the connection being made between knowledge 





that the “ethnocracies” of the Gulf, where rule is through shared descent, are built through a 
convergence of the interests of the ruling family and neoliberalism, or what he calls Arabized 
neoliberalism.  Kanna posits that this Arabized neoliberalism is a result of two distinct projects: 
“The first was to demobilize potential critiques and non-state-sanctioned political 
movements…The second project consisted in adapting a free-market absolutism to local lived 
experiences” (2011: 32). This consolidation, Kanna argues, was accomplished by taking 
neoliberal ideas of economic productivity and aligning them with “themes of cultural 
authenticity and virtuous citizenship” (34).  Kanna continues onto describe how “flexible 
citizens do not, however, reject Emirati and Muslim identities. They appropriate and enact 
them in way consciously different from what they see as their more conservative counterparts” 
(34).  Kanna’s analysis of Dubai can be helpful to understanding Doha, as both cities play 
prominent roles in the national visions of their respective states and share many linguistic, 
cultural and historic traits.  Kanna’s notion of “flexible citizenship” is also appropriate to the 
emerging middle class of Qataris, who are increasingly being encouraged by the government to 
engage in the “global” and “Qatari” community.   
Although these terms are applicable to Qatar, Doha and its ruling family differ in several 
ways from that of Dubai. The first is in the level of importance given to Islam in the Qatari ruling 
family’s vision of the country, the second is in the role of women in the country’s political 





mirrors Dubai’s neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi.  Where Dubai is the flashy cosmopolitan and 
tourist capital, Abu Dhabi and Doha are its more responsible older brothers.25  
These three areas of difference are visible in the figure of Sheikha Mozah Al Missned, 
the wife of the Emir of Qatar, who in her public presence and speech, has attempted to define a 
vision for the country that combines nationalism with religion and development through a 
focus on education.  In asking Qataris to view themselves as “flexible citizens”, Sheikha Mozah 
is inadvertently placing greater power in the “global”, English speaking international citizen 
than the local” Qatari Arabic speaker. The irony emerges in the fact that although three aspects 
of Qatar’s history and traditions (Islam, Qatari tribal culture and Pan-Arabism) are tied to an 
Arabic language variety, it is the category of the English educated “global” Qatari that often 
holds greater power in the educational and social market.  
Conclusion 
 
While the economy of Qatar has fluctuated widely and while labour, development 
investment and technology has transformed the superficial appearance of Qatar, the 
fundamental social and political system, a system based on consensus between Qatari 
nationals, has remained stable and based on informal contracts established between 
the ruling tribe, Al-Thani, and other Qatari tribes at least a century ago. [Fromherz 2012: 
156] 
  This chapter provides an overview of the complex history through which Qatar’s ruling 
family emerged as the leaders of the Qatari state.  In the above quote taken from a recent 
history of Qatar, the author emphasizes stability as opposed to flux and upheaval.  Fromherz 
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furthermore argues that “Qatar cannot be explained in the same modernity-tradition paradigm 
used in the West” (6).  I would go further than Fromherz and argue that Qatar provides a small 
scale example of the narrative overlapping of historical accounts that emphasizes how 
“modernity” is constructed through written and oral accounts.  Qatar’s national identity was 
formed both through opposition and acceptance of foreign interference in internal Qatari 
economic and political affairs.  This frame story sets up the contemporary dynamics between 
the Al-Thani family, the citizens of the new Qatari state and the expatriates who have now 
come to reside in Qatar in increasing numbers. It also explicates how Qataris historically tried 
and are still trying to navigate various languages and their ideologies that come with interaction 
and engagement with diverse populations.  I have illustrated how these varied accounts arise 
from the political and linguistic position of the individual doing the accounting. Qataris, in 
particular the Al-Thani rulers, are trying to consolidate their rule, through oral and literary 
accounts in Arabic, of their role as the country’s leaders.  The leadership of Qatar is also trying 
to engage the “international” community through a “knowledge economy” paradigm and by 
adopting English as a language essential to global citizenship.   
 While the role of the “flexible” Qatari citizen is to be a bridge between these diverse 
interests, these individuals often find themselves as “strangers in their own land.”  I have 
argued that an essential part of this estrangement lies in the language ideologies that are being 
strengthened by the conflation of two interest groups and conflicting projects: that of the 
“international knowledge economy” that is produced through English, and Qatari national 
citizenship that is connected to Arabic orality and literacy.  In encouraging Arabic speaking 





as a “global” and “international” language is reified. In response, many Qataris and Arabs 
defend Arabic along religious and cultural lines.   Arabic, becomes even more effectively, “the 







Chapter 2:  Actor-Networks in the Knowledge Economy Project 
 
Instead of looking for world-wrapping evolutionary stages, logics, and epistemes, I 
would begin by finding what I call "projects," that is, relatively coherent bundles of ideas 
and practices as realized in particular times and places. The choice of what counts as a 
project depends on what one is trying to learn about, but, in each case, to identify 
projects is to maintain a commitment to localization, even of the biggest world-making 
dreams and schemes. The various instantiations of capitalism can be regarded as 
projects; so can progressive social movements, everyday patterns of living, or university-
based intellectual programs. Projects are to be traced in relation to particular historical 
travels from one place to another; they are caught up in local issues of translation and 
mobilization; although they may be very powerful, we cannot assume their ability to 
remake nature and society according to their visions. [Tsing 2000:347]    
Anna Tsing’s conceptualization of globalization as a series of projects, that can be 
studied as they move from one location to another, is akin to Bruno Latour’s (2005) idea of the 
actor-network, in that they both emphasize tracing situated accounts. In this chapter, I employ 
a hybrid of their methodologies in tracing the actor-networks of educational project of the 
“knowledge economy” and its relationship to literacy ideologies. As Bartlett (2010) notes in her 
work on critical literacy projects in Brazil, educational projects often fall along the ideological or 
autonomous models of literacy, concepts developed by Brian Street (1986). The ideological 
approach to literacy is similar to the idea of language ideologies, where power, social relations 
and discourse affect the representation of what constitutes language and literacy.  The 
autonomous model, favored by development agencies, “treats knowledge as factual and 





illiteracy to literacy (Bartlett 2010: 52).  This “autonomous” model rarely attends to how 
cultural views of language and literacy effect policies that are successful in one context when 
they move to another. 
This chapter illustrates divergent views of language and literacy in the “close 
encounters” between private American institutions and “locals.” In the following pages, I 
outline the actors and networks involved in the creation of a “knowledge economy” project in 
Qatar and the language ideologies that emerge through contestations between these actors.  I 
answer the following questions: How was the project of the “knowledge economy” translated 
into Qatari society, who did the work of translation and how effective was this process?  How 
did ANT of the knowledge economy effect language ideologies of English and Arabic?  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sheikha Mozah often references the reports of 
international NGOS in her speeches on education and development in the region. 26 In taking, 
implementing and adapting ideas of social, economic and educational development to Qatar, 
Sheikha Mozah and Qatar Foundation began to rely heavily on private American institutions, 
whose role it is to view language and literacy as autonomous and not culturally specific.  What 
has resulted is a focus on the English language, a pre-requisite for participation in the 
knowledge economy and a push to see Arabic literacy as “less developed” in comparison to 
English.  I will use the term language ideology when referring to broader ideas about what 
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 The concept of a “knowledge economy” was made popular through reports commissioned by the Organization of 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, the World Bank and other international bodies that are considered 
regulators of commerce and trade (Dahlman 2001; World Bank 2003). The idea that education is a government 
service and a human right began to emerge in the rhetoric of these agencies and were pressed upon member 
governments in the 90’s and 2000’s (World Declaration for Education 1990; Dakar Framework for Action 2000; 





language “should” do and literacy ideology when specific linguistic practices focus on reading 
and writing.  Critical literacy studies would benefit from a focus on language ideologies and how 
they affectliteracy practices. 
To begin to understand how ideologies of English and Arabic take shape through 
projects that focus on a “knowledge economy” model of education, I start with RAND, the 
agency hired by Sheikha Mozah and Qatar Foundation to provide a model for education reform 
in Qatar.  Following a review of RAND-Qatar’s analysis of the reforms and of their role in it (as 
“merely” consultants), I share several hazawi of how these reforms and their implementation 
have been perceived by Qataris in various sectors.  While those at the Qatar Foundation see the 
logic of RAND and the new focus on developing Qatari students with proficiency in English, 
faculty at Qatar University are disappointed in the new “development” focus on the part of the 
ruling family that is marginalizing Arabic in Qatar.  The discussions of these individuals about 
language and schools in Qatar crosscut lines of public and private schooling, but they also 
generally fall along these divides.  As the former Ministry of Education schools have been slowly 
shut down, there has been resentment toward the Qatari leadership for promoting 
privatization of schooling, which essentially leads to English dominating Arabic in the 
curriculum. This ties back to the neoliberal bent of the “knowledge economy” model, one that 
emphasizes international organizations and institutions at the expense of local and cultural 
discussions about the role of language in society.  Whereas international NGOs and private 
corporations favor projects that approach literacy as a universal, autonomous process, local 






Hazawi of RAND-Qatar: Neutral or Neoliberal? 
 
RAND Qatar was initially asked by Sheikha Mozah to analyze the K-12 education system 
as it existed under the Ministry of Education (Brewer et al. 2005).  After this initial project they 
set up offices in Doha and began conducting other studies on education at the university level 
and on projects such as school busing and vouchers for private schools (Moini et al. 2009; 
Busing).  They were hired following the period when Qatar Foundation had begun opening 
universities in Education City, which was supposed to be the ideal center for the “knowledge 
economy.”  Primary and secondary education, all of which was conducted in Arabic, would 
need to be reformed to generate students who were capable of entering these English 
language universities, all of whom would be delivering their programming in their native 
country’s language (English).  RAND Qatar’s report on K-12 education is called “Education for a 
New Era” and begins with a caveat: “in the realm of education, Qatar, through Qatar 
Foundation, has attracted branch campuses of some of the best universities in the world. But to 
support its economic and social development, Qatar needs much stronger results from its 
elementary and secondary education system, which is widely seen as rigid, outmoded, and 
resistant to reform” (2003: xvii).   The writers imply that the “world class” education system 
that the Qatari royal family desires can be found in the new American universities funded by 
Qatar Foundation, but the Qatari elementary and high school education is too rigid and old to 
graduate students who can attend these institutions.  The connection that RAND analysts draw 





because it creates a trajectory for Qatari students to meet the standards of these “world class” 
universities that operate primarily in English.   
 The RAND agency was not particularly concerned with culture or language in their 
analysis, striving instead for an “unbiased” report on how to create a unique education system 
for the state of Qatar (Interview, Head of RAND, July 2007).  In the same report mentioned 
above, the writers critique the Ministry of Education for not having a clear vision of what type 
of education they were providing students.  In place of the Ministry of Education, the RAND 
writers strongly suggested a standards based model of education with a focus “on four 
principles: autonomy, accountability, variety, and choice” and noted that “the adoption of 
these particular principles was notable in a region where such principles are both rare and 
poorly understood” (Brewer et. Al 2003: xix).   
Johara, who worked for RAND, described the agency’s role as controversial and 
problematic for the following reasons:  
I read both of RAND’s reports because I work there.  One of the problems is that these 
people are experts but they are experts in the States. The project leaders are usually 
based in DC, Santa Monica and the states.  They are not the ones based here.  What 
they come up with- they don’t know the history, tradition, culture, the history of 
education and so what they come up with sometimes doesn’t work. It shows up in the 
implementation. [Interview, June 5 2007] 
Johara agreed with the Head of RAND that it is “easy to blame RAND, but they only give 
choices.  It is the government that chose the independent schools.”  The writers of the RAND 
report offered the government three options, ranging “from limited choice and variety to 





introduction, but I would to like repeat them again here to illustrate the increasing privatization 
involved in each choice: 1) Reform the current Ministry system; 2) Adopt a free market model in 
which new independent, charter schools would thrive or fail based on competition; and 3) 
Completely privatize the schooling system by adopting vouchers.  What is showcased as 
“variety” and “choice,” is also increased privatization of education. These strategies were taken 
from the context of United States’ education system, from which most of the RAND analyst 
originated.  They chose the most “radical and innovative solutions” being used in American 
schools without highlighting the debates that are raging in the American context regarding the 
value of the privatization of education.  Bartlett et al (2002) critique these trends within the 
American context as a result of neoliberalism: 
Marketization takes many forms, discursive and structural. Primary among those is the 
unqualified celebration of "choice" in schooling, whether as vouchers, charters (also 
known as "public school choice"), or magnet schools. The rhetoric of choice positions 
parents and students as consumers of schooling; it implies that all parents are equally 
informed, politically connected, and capable of securing for their own children the best 
education. [2002:6].      
Bartlett et al. (2002) analyze the effects of neoliberal market based strategies on North 
Carolina’s education debates and find that they result in stratification based on class and race. 
The American national rhetoric of market based strategies is used in local school systems to 
justify why certain schools should serve a particular segment of the population (the harder 
working, more affluent and “caring” middle class) while other schools serving less privileged 
and minority groups can continue to receive less funding because they serve “problem 
students” who disrupt the process of learning and need to be separated from “hard working” 





the idea that education should follow a business model of “choice” and “variety”, implying that 
all citizens are equally able to find the best schooling for their children.  It also reflects 
neoliberal rationalizations that connect wealth accumulation with industriousness and poverty 
with the opposite.  It encourages the belief that some people choose to be poor while others 
work hard and become rich.  
  A similar critique to that of Bartlett et al. is made of RAND by an education specialist 
who used to work at Qatar University.  Reporter Turk Al -Salih uses the term atlaq al nar قلطأ 
رانلا, which is the Arabic equivalent to “opens fire,” to describe the interviewee’s opinions on the 
school reform movement (Al-Salih 2008).  Doctor Al-Kobeisi outlines several problems with the 
reform of education in Qatar at the very beginning of the article in bullet point format: 
o The incorrect implementation of the system of Independent schools has changed 
it into a profit making institution. 
o The arrival of a world class system of education is merely the claim of the 
Evaluation Institute. 
o The philosophy of the system of instruction is absent and the strategy ambiguous 
o Leaving the assessment and procurement of the textbooks to the whims of 
people is a pedagogical disadvantage 
o The effect is dangerous of depending on English in teaching Science and Maths.  
o Is departing from the official language in the system of education permitted in 
the constitution?   
o There is no justification for making mandatory an experimental system in 
exchange for the system of education. 
o Supporting one school over another threatens the absence of a principal of 
individual equality among students. 
 
(Turk Al-Salih 2008, translated by author and emphasis added) 
 
 Al-Kobeisi’s first and last criticisms focus on the economic inequality that could be created by 
making education a “profit making institution.”  In the middle, he focuses on curriculum, the 





language” and make English the language of instruction in math and science.  In summary, al-
Kobesi does not understand why Qatar should adopt a charter school model, whose purpose is 
to create competition and is based on privatization and profit, in the place of a national system 
of education. Other issues he addresses in the article are the lack of standards for geography, 
Islamic studies and history, all of which he suggests provide the essential elements for giving 
children a sense of their “tradition.”  This article was posted on several Arabic blogs and 
discussed by Arabic speakers who expressed approval of al-Kobeisi’s points. It was unclear 
though whether or not this caused any serious threat to the growing reform movement, 
although in a visit to the Dean of QU’s College of Education, the secretary asked me if I would 
be interested in a copy of al-Kobeisi’s articles on the subject.  It appeared that they were being 
distributed, although to what effect was unclear. 27  Of the following criticisms of the reform 
mentioned by al-Kobeisi, several center on the neoliberal bent of the charter school model 
presented in the RAND analysis, which the author also lambasts as a westernizing agent only 
invested in the interests of the United States.  The overall message is that this new education 
reform is not an awakening of tradition, but an agent of westernization that will destroy the 
country’s education system and cultural roots.28  
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 Forming groups, unions and any associations is subject to approval by the Qatari government. Thus there are no 
unions and opposition groups who protest or voice loud opposition to government policies (they may do so quietly). 
Sheikh Hamad and Sheikha Mozah have created venues for citizens and residents to debate social issues, such as 
Doha Debates, which is produced in Education City at the Qatar Foundation head quarters. Another program, lakum 
al qarar (The Decision is Yours) is in Arabic and discusses issues of importance to Qataris, like school reform. A 
discussion of the reform on one show, where students were allowed to share their experiences with Sabah Al-
Haidoos, the head of the Supreme Education Council in charge of the reforms, showed the publics frustration with 
the reforms measures which left teachers without textbooks, curriculum or guidance to create curriculums by 
themselves. Students expressed problems with the lack of set curriculum, citing use of copies in place of textbooks 
as a major issue.  
28





  In addition to RAND’s advocacy of a neoliberal education system for Qatar, was its 
insistence on standards-based education.  This led to many western agencies being contracted 
to help implement standards for core subjects of English, Arabic, Math and Science and to hire 
testing institutions to evaluate the competency of students in these standards on a yearly basis. 
The Center for British Teachers and the Education Testing Service worked with the new 
Supreme Education Council to help Qatari teachers develop the tools for the new charter 
school model. The creation of the Supreme Education Council was a suggestion of the RAND 
report and was supposed to evaluate and develop the reform process, whose core was 
standards based curriculum.  In regards to the Arabic standards, the RAND analysts write about 
the challenges that the SEC faced: 
 As the national language, Arabic was an obvious choice. English was deemed 
important for use in the labor market and prepare students for post-secondary 
education abroad [and at EC schools]. Mathematics and science were seen as important 
because of the modern world’s emphasis on the sciences and technology. In addition, 
the design team anticipated that the standards development process would be far less 
controversial for mathematics and science than for the social sciences and humanities 
…Limiting the standards development to these four subjects initially met with some 
resistance. The most frequently voiced concern was over the exclusion of Islamic 
Studies (Sharia)…. The SEC, in fact, mandated that all Independent schools offer 
Islamic Studies.  
Although it was controversial to do so, the Institute leadership and the Arabic working 
group concurred with the plan and agreed that the Arabic standards represented a 
qualitative advance in both Arabic education and the use of language as a tool for 
learning and cognitive development.   
The novelty of the approach and the potential sensitivity meant that Arabic standards 
development took somewhat longer than standards development for other subjects.  In 
addition, implementing the Arabic standards would require more work than 





1. The needed texts, textbooks and other instrumental resources were less readily 
available and therefore might need to be developed.  
2. Teachers would need focused pedagogical support to develop new teaching 
approaches because they might find it more comfortable or be pressured to teach 
Arabic in traditional ways. 
3. A clear, but sensitive distinction between the teaching of religion as a separate subject 
and the teaching of Arabic needed to be spelled out in the standards document. 
(Brewer et. al. 2007:100-104, emphasis added) 
 
The highlighted segments of this passage indicate several key areas where RAND and Qatar 
Foundation’s vision have conflicted with critics. This section also emphasizes a recurring 
ideology of English, which “is deemed important for use in the labor market and prepare 
students for post-secondary education aboard [and at EC schools].”  Many individuals including 
al-Kobeisi above, find the lack of emphasis on Arabic and Islamic studies problematic. On the 
other hand, the writers of the RAND report find the general Ministry system and especially the 
Arabic and Islamic-Studies curriculums to be problematic.  Why this disjuncture?  For the RAND 
analysts from America: 
The Arabic standards embodied a new approach to teaching Arabic as a native language. 
While the traditional study of Arabic includes memorization and recitation of the Qur’an 
and emphasizes complex grammatical rules, the new approach emphasizes a variety of 
texts and applications to stimulate students to use their language as a practice tool for 
communication.  In addition, by separating the teaching of Islam and Qur’an from the 
teaching of Arabic language, students are free to criticize the texts presented and 
therefore to acquire valuable reasoning skills in their native language (Brewer et al. 
2006) 
The section is particularly interesting for its attitude towards Arabic language standards.  It 
reflects an ideology of Arabic that considers its connection to religious education as prohibitive 
of “critical thinking” and “reasoning skills.”  This attitude towards Arabic predominated towards 
the colonial period and has been critiqued by several scholars (Boyle 2004; 2006 Mitchell 1998; 





standards looked to English standards as a model, standards which did not depend on religious 
texts for language education.  The emphasis placed on restricting religious instruction and 
language instruction is also indicative of an autonomous model of literacy (Street 1986), one in 
which literacy is important for “cognitive development,” not spiritual or moral development.  
These opposing views of the reform process are notable for their focus on different elements of 
the education system in Qatar.  RAND perceives itself as an unbiased consulting agency that 
seeks to provide quality services to the Qatari leadership and to align K-12 education with the 
new “world class” universities of Qatar Foundation and Education City.   While the RAND 
writers view the Ministry of Education model of education as lacking in rigor and standards, al-
Kobeisi faults RAND for having no clear philosophy  when he says “the philosophy of the system 
of instruction is absent and the strategy ambiguous.”  Al-Kobeisi, who represents the 
“traditional ways” of the Ministry so disliked by the RAND writers, suggests that it is RAND that 
has no understanding of what the purpose of education in Qatar should be.  For Al-Kobeisi, 
schools in Qatar were designed to teach Qataris their culture, their traditions and their 
language, in addition to teaching them math, science and technology.  These varying 
interpretations on the role of education in Qatar have resulted in several strands or networks of 
schools opening up in Qatar that will be detailed in chapter 3.  In the following diagram, I 
outline the “knowledge economy” that Sheikha Mozha and Qatar Foundation have tried to 
create in recent years.  It includes RAND, Education City and its American universities, the old 







Hazawi of Actor-Networks of the Knowledge Economy 
 
 
In order to continue tracing the ANT, I met with several of Sheikha Mozah’s key advisers at the 
Qatar Foundation.  The following stories illustrate how important English has become to the 
“knowledge economy” project.  Both Ali Al Attiya and Naveen Ahmed agree that English has 
become important to the ruling family’s vision for the Qatari state.  The conclusion is that in 







 “How fast can they pick up English?” 
 
I visited Qatar Foundation’s headquarters three times during my stay in Qatar and was 
in contact through email with a few members of the board of directors. The Foundation is the 
organizing umbrella for Education City, Qatar Academy, Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel, Doha 
Debates and many more schools, organizations and programs (see Appendix 3 for a full list of 
organizations).  Qatar Foundation is also involved in healthcare and building new private 
hospitals, they fund an Arabian horse breeding center and a new state of the art convention 
center and they also recently began a space exploration program.  The unifying element among 
these projects is that the Sheikha and her board approve each venture as being helpful to 
developing Qatar’s “knowledge economy.” Qatar Foundations stated mission is as follows: 
Qatar Foundation's mission is to prepare the people of Qatar and the region to meet the 
challenges of an ever-changing world, and to make Qatar a leader in innovative 
education and research. To achieve that mission, QF supports a network of centers and 
partnerships with elite institutions, all committed to the principle that a nation's 
greatest natural resource is its people. Education City, Qatar Foundation's flagship 
project is envisioned as a Center of Excellence in education and research that will help 
transform Qatar into a knowledge-based society. 
In an interview with Dr. Naveen Ahmad, Science and Technology Advisor to Sheikha Mozah, I 
learned more about the vision of Qatar Foundation.  He spoke a little about his own personal 
experiences, being the son of Indians who lived under British rule and traveled to Kenya to help 
run the British Empire.  He believes that “Arabs, Africans and South Asians must have a deep 
knowledge and own intellectual property, not just do projects” otherwise they will continue to 
be “modern slaves.”  In describing Qatar Foundation, he says, “It was the idea of Her Highness 





is better to put money into these things than into cars.”  He then described the challenges the 
administration will face in the long run with healthcare, energy and population control.  He 
expressed some frustration with the lack of graduate institutions and a research culture, saying 
“there is no history or tradition” of these things.  He also said that Qataris will have to make 
trade-offs, meaning will have to do without maids, cleaners, car washers and other menial labor 
in order to create the “knowledge based economy” that is needed.  In order for development to 
occur, Dr. Ahmad said the ratio of foreigners to nationals will have to decline, primarily through 
reductions in the largest population of expatriates (the low-class, “un-educated” sector) not the 
white collar workers, which they will need more of in order to fuel their economy.  He also 
highlighted the important role that women play, saying that “men deal with them equally” and 
this is largely a result of the influence of Sheikha Mozah.   
As for issues of language and cultural change, Dr. Ahmad related that “the Qataris are 
very concerned about keeping their culture” and that “there are a lot of programs being 
developed in order to do just that.”  The concern now is “how fast they can pick up English” and 
that they want to “accelerate the westernization.”  He described the nearest analogy to Qatar’s 
vision for the future as that of Switzerland where everyone speaks 2-3 languages at least. The 
problem, in Dr. Ahmad’s opinion, is extremists who use language “as an excuse” to slow down 
development; by this he meant those who complained about the heavy use of English language 
and the rise in status of the white collar expatriates he refers to as “fuel” for the economy  





In the following interview with Dr. Al-Attiya, chief assistant to Sheikha Mozah, and the 
father of one of my former students, it becomes clear how important English has become to the 
Qatari elite involved in Qatar Foundation’s project to build a “knowledge economy”.  Dr. Al-
Attiya received his undergraduate degree at Qatar University and his PhD from a university in 
the UK.  When we met in the summer of 2007, he and I discussed why I was in a PhD program 
and not working in the schools, telling me, “Phd’s are easy, you just have to put some things 
together.”  Every time I met Dr. Al-Attiya, he was always in Qatari national dress (a white thobe, 
black agal which holds either a white or red checkered gutra on the head) and on this day, I 
noticed that he had a prayer rug tucked away in the corner of his office.  He informed me that 
he would be taking his children, including Maryam, to Disneyland the next day.  He asked me 
candidly what I thought he should do with Maryam: “I was speaking with Hind [the daughter of 
the Emir] about my children and I told her that Maryam goes to Gulf English.  She was surprised 
and said, ’Why don’t you send them to Qatar Academy?  There English will be much better’”. 
He continued onto say, “But I don’t like to take her out of Gulf English because she likes it there 
and she has lots of relatives and friends in the school.  She will be fine right?” (Interview, June 
13, 2007).  Dr. Al-Attiya is worried that his children (majority of whom attend the British Gulf 
English School) will not acquire English as well as those Qataris who attend Qatar Academy and 
other private schools in Doha.  This concern is brought about by the Emir’s daughter who feels 
Qataris should learn English well. The emphasis, on the part of the ruling family of Al-Thanis, is 
for Qataris to acquire English in order to participate in the “knowledge economy” project.  I 





she would most likely speak, read and write English equal to or better than she would be able 
to in Standard Arabic.  
Education City:  Education for the Elites  
 
I think it is supposed to be connected- it is all part of the reform. Qatar University, at the 
independent schools, at education city is part of the reform and the same people have 
their hands in them. Dr. Sheikha (Abdulla, QU’s president) is on the board of QF and 
Sheikha Mozah is on the board of Supreme Education Council.  It is all pieces of the 
same puzzle.  Certainly there is a big push to try to get more and more students, Qatari 
students qualified for EC universities while Qatar Academy was another experimental 
part of the Education reform 
---Kim, Admissions at Education City  
 
Another essential element of Qatar Foundation’s vision for a “knowledge economy” is 
Education City, the brainchild of Sheikha Mozah and Qatar Foundation’s Board of Directors.  In 
2009, Education City opened the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, the only indigenously created 
institution of higher education in Education City.  Education City consists currently of six 
American universities, one British University, one French lycee, a high school (Qatar Academy) 
and several other educational and social services.  This part of the “knowledge economy” runs 
very differently than the other two parts (K-12 schooling and Qatar University) because its 
curriculum, staff and organization comes primarily from the U.S.  Its student body is made up 
equally of Qataris and expatriates.  However, from conversations with Kim, a director of 
admissions of one the American universities, it was clear that it was extremely difficult to find 






  Kim, the speaker of the above quote, had worked in admissions at the American 
university for several years prior to moving to Qatar to help the fledgling branch campus.  We 
had many conversations over the summer of 2007 and during the 2009-2010 school year about 
schools in Qatar.  She paid close attention to the changes in the country because of her job.  
Her husband also worked at Qatar University, so she knew a bit about the changes occurring 
there.  She had originally sent her daughter to Qatar Academy, but she took her out because it 
was becoming a “Qatari” school and no longer “international.”  She also noted, “The Qataris (at 
Education City) all know each other, they are all from the same two or three families.” She 
spoke highly of a number of Qatari students, but told me that it was difficult to find enough 
Qataris with the English, Math and critical thinking skills needed to attend Georgetown.  This 
frustration came out over discussions about the independent schools and their attempts to 
meet the admissions requirements set by EC schools: 
Problem I see with the Independent schools is when I go in there to do presentations 
even when they have great principals, teachers, who are really enthusiastic and really 
want the best for their students, they call all the admissions directors in and they ask us 
what do you guys want because we’ll make an engineering track, a pre-med track, an IF 
track, etc. business track,… NO NO NO.. if you really want to prepare your students 
make them all take math up to the last level, art, science, English. They are still in track 
mode. So then we get the students from the art track apply to us, but they don’t have 
the math so they can’t do economics. It is a problem. The Ministry of Education schools- 
they still track Arts, Sciences, and French.  English is there even in the Arts schools, but it 
is very very basic [Interview September 2009] 
Kim also informed me why the school reform movement was not conducted through the 
Ministry of Education (MOE), explaining that “it was not cooperating” and had “loyalties to the 
old system,” (a strong Arabic and Islamic studies curriculum and centralized control of all 





City is conflicted.  Since everything is connected to the “knowledge economy” concept, or 
supposed to be, the new independent schools are ideally supposed to be feeder schools for 
Education City and a reformed Qatar University, but the results (standardized test scores) of the 
independent school students are still not high enough in English, math and science.  Kim noted 
that Qatari students who attend EC schools are usually products of the science and technology 
magnet schools, which opened prior to the Independent schools under the Ministry of 
Education (Brewer et al. 2003).  They draw the best Qatari public school students and have 
strong curriculums in math, science, English and Arabic.  “These students usually prefer 
Cornell’s medical program or Carnegie Mellon’s engineering program” said Kim (Interview, 
September 2009).   
 The Education City schools relationship to projects of education reform is directly 
connected to the neoliberal “knowledge economy” construct.  The universities create a 
hierarchy, where private English education is at the very top of the “world class” education that 
Qataris can attain. But in order to attain the status and privilege of attending one of these 
institutions, one must be from an affluent and elite Qatari family and a product of private 
English language education.  Language ideologies emerge based on models of education which 
posit English as “global” and Arabic as irrelevant to the global economy. These issues and many 
more are more obvious in Qatar University’s (QU) relationship to the ongoing reforms to 








Qatar University: Reform from the “Top-Down” 
 
There are some discussions on where is education going, about modernizing, 
competition. There are some who are defensive about the larger changes, worried 
about losing traditional values and it is the governments fault because they have framed 
it like that: education has to be reformed, Qatar must be competitive. 
-Sayyida, teacher in International Affairs Program at QU 
I had first stumbled onto the issue of school reform when I met the Vice President of 
Academic Affairs, Sheikha Jabor Al-Thani, at Qatar University in May of 2007.  The university 
plays an important role in formulating the identity of Qatar and several faculty members have 
been vocal about their displeasure with the direction of education reform in the country.  This 
was made explicit in the criticisms made by al-Kobeisi in the newspaper Al Raya, but also shows 
up in conferences and talks about “preserving” Qatar’s culture and traditions.  The current 
president, Sheikha Abdulla Al Missned is the first female to head the university.  As her last 
name might indicate, she is related to Sheikha Mozah and is her aunt. Sheika Abdulla’s 
presidency at Qatar University coincided with the reforms to K-12 education and the creation of 
Education City and Qatar Academy.  She serves on the boards of the Qatar Foundation, 
Supreme Education Council and Qatar Academy.  Sheikha Abdulla’s right hand at the university 
is Sheikha Jabor Al Thani who is known throughout the faculty and staff as an exceptionally 
intelligent and motivated woman.  Sheikha Jabor is a Qatari woman from the tribe of Al-Thani, 
as many departmental heads at Qatar University commonly are (both Qatari and female, not al-
Thani).29  Sheikha Jabor cooperated with RAND in their 2009 report about Qatar University’s 
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reform efforts, which acknowledged that the pace of the reforms was too quick for many and 
had some repercussions which were unfortunate.  This report was a confirmation of my own 
personal meeting with Sheikha Jabor in 2007. 
Shaikha Jabor’s black abaya hung from a coat rack in the corner of the room and she 
greeted my husband and I wearing a navy blue skirt, shirt and black scarf. We began 
with a discussion of our school and program affiliations in the U.S. and upon hearing 
about my background in teaching, she recommended a course on school reform in 
Qatar that was “based on the facts, not on what is being said in the media.” Frustration 
was clear in the Dean’s voice and words, particularly at those who saw the reforms of 
Qatar University and in K-12 schooling as an attack on Qatari culture and language.  
Upon discussion of the op-ed that my husband would write about the Arabic program at 
Qatar University, she smiled and said, “that would give us some good publicity.” The 
Dean proceeded to pinpoint some of the major controversies in the reforms: the 
increase in foreign influence on school policy, the focus on English and the resulting 
increase in the foreign population [Field notes, June 17th, 2007]  
Following my initial meeting with Sheikha Jabor, I interviewed several professors at Qatar 
University regarding the reforms and how they were tied to Qatar Foundation and Arabic and 
Islamic culture at the university.  The idea that reform at Qatar University was a “top-down” 
process was reiterated by several individuals.  While many felt reform was necessary, they 
disagreed with the way it was being framed.  Mona in the Sociology Department shared with 
me some of her experiences with the reforms effects: 
The only program that will be totally in Arabic will be the Shariah (Islamic Law) program- 
from humanities, social sciences. The university is raising the bar, but the students are 
not catching up- many students feel it is unfair- they are shocked- they never have 
exposure to English and all of a sudden- they are expected to know English.  Perhaps if 
there are more independent schools, more international schools they will graduate 
better students. Some people feel it is good competition. They welcome it. Among the 
students there are distinct categories, some who want the American degree, but others 
are more secure in their Arab identity, they are shocked even when they come to QU 
and see the reforms. Some students ask-“Why are we imitating?” I think we should 





preceding them. There is a huge debate about independent schools in Qatar- about 
their status, what are they? Are they a threat?  (Interview, July 12, 2008) 
 
Mona implied that the independent schools suggested by RAND and implemented by the 
government were a particular point of controversy.  She also tells of students who come to 
Qatar University expecting a setting situated in Arabic and Islamic norms, but find English to be 
placed in a position of great importance.  These students struggle to pick up English, being 
forced to take remedial classes if they do not pass the entrance exams.  Mona sympathizes with 
these students, but suggests that they are necessary changes that are “raising the bar.”  The 
main contention seems to be over language, but others along the lines of culture, tradition and 
religion also appear. 
Sayyida, who is quoted in the introduction to this section, is a lecturer in the 
International Affairs department and teaches classes of Qatari men remedial English and basic 
political theory.30  She says about the reform: 
There are two trends at play. The first is the top down nature of these reforms. Qatar 
Foundation and Shaikha Mozah are pushing them. You’ll see in the school the two 
trends in the lectures of the professors- one side emphasizes modernization of 
education and the other has a very traditional interpretation- in terms of a protest 
against Qatar Foundation- it usually surfaces at international conferences- during the 
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discussion time- for example at the Innovation in Islam conferences. (emphasis added, 
Interview, July 25, 2007)   
Sayyida also sees similar concerns amongst her students, mostly Qatari males, who feel 
alienated by the linguistic turn and the strong emphasis on English in the economy.  Language 
appears again to be a primary issue in an article in the Arabic magazine, لايجا, or Generations, 
about the Foundation Program at QU, which is a program created to ensure incoming students 
have competency in subjects such as English, Math, Science and Arabic.  This article gives us a 
student perspective and the administrative response to the new requirements for students. 
“My Language is French”  
 From his viewpoint, student Al Hadi, son of Muhammad Abd Allah, says he was 
completely astonished by the foundation program in Qatar University, ‘I never studied 
the English language before because I came from Mauritania where they consider the 
second official language the French language, and we never studied English there 
because it was not given a very big preference in our curriculum and for that reason I 
was very surprised by the program and what increased my astonishment on top of the 
hardship of the resolution was the high average percentage requested from the 
student- 75%. I don’t understand why such a high percentage is requested and why they 
separate us from the rest of the students’. 
From the University 
The university wants to be included in the contemporary modern society- you know 
that the market economy today asks that knowledge of the English language as all the 
academic research and the internet uses English – and so this language has become a 
necessity in the modern age. And it is a responsibility on the university to graduate 
talented students who are able to compete in the work place and able to follow studies 
outside without any problems and so this Foundation Program came to be the first step 
in this direction and I think it is an important one. [Ajyal 2009: 6] 
The student is frustrated that he is being asked to learn English when he already has 
competency in Arabic and French.  He questions why he would need to know English in order to 





that English has become a necessity in the “modern age” where the economy and technology 
demand knowledge of English.  
Jenny, a Georgetown student working in International Affairs31 program summarizes the 
contestations at Qatar University in the following comments: 
Qatar University is a tough place to work, especially if you are not covered. I used to go 
to the administration building and they would say we know who you are. Now it is 
easier because there are more women from the West.  Qatar Foundation is focused on 
English and bringing in native-speakers. 
The university has also started this new two year remedial program called the 
Foundation Program for students to help them with English. So you do English for two 
years- before your BA- focusing on English and Math. This new department (Foundation 
Program) has a lot of faculty and is by far the biggest department- so now there are 
more westerners. The students in the remedial programs have special activities and get 
seats at the Doha Debates. 
It’s a huge department and it makes things different at QU. Like I went to the 
introduction program for the department and there was a woman wearing short 
sleeves and a wrap dress! 
This university is really conservative.  The doors have to be locked- even hallways that 
are used by both men and women are avoided by Qatari girls.  The shariah (Islamic Law) 
boys will tell some of my girls to cover, call them sluts, tell them to take off their make-
up, one guy was terrorizing my students - telling the girls they shouldn’t be studying. .. 
There is a lot of music at Education City-at Georgetown. The boys and girls spend time in 
the halls, in the lounges, talking, listening to music-dancing together, Farzhana is 
starting an Asian Society - they are doing dances - it is totally different. [Interview July 
23, 2007]  
Jenny mentions Qatar Foundation and Sheikha Mozah as being particularly interested in 
bringing “native-speakers” of English to Qatar to teach Qataris English.  She also mentions 
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another important symbol of reform for individuals in Qatar, Education City.  Education City 
schools are gender mixed in every aspect of their schooling, while Qatari University is gender 
segregated and religiously conservative.  Jenny connects Sheikha Mozah, Qatar Foundation and 
Education City as influential in Qatar University’s recent changes and reforms.  She also 
emphasizes how the increase in westerners on campus and the increasing emphasis on English 
is causing reactions on the part of students, particularly religious ones, who see the changes in 
language, dress and behavior as problematic.  
 The tension at Qatar University, apparent in these narratives of Qatari faculty and staff, 
are also manifested in complaints about the production of official documents and emails in 
English, sometimes without Arabic translation, the increasing numbers of English only speaking 
faculty, the increasing movement of women on the men’s campus and the increasing presence 
of unveiled women, Muslim and non-Muslim on both campuses.  The rising emphasis on English 
at Qatar University is connected to the reforms at large within Qatar’s education systems.  As 
Johara says: 
Reform of Qatar University, which also her highness asked RAND to do is basically the 
same things- reform curriculum, reform staff- there is now a two year foundation 
program- which you’ve probably heard of- English, Computer science and math, I 
believe and you can test out of it- but only a few do- a very small percentage. Most 
people don’t, like one percent. There was a bit of criticism- that people can’t get into 
Education City and now they can’t get admission to QU. They raised the admissions 
criteria- the GPA is higher-so where are they supposed to go? And everything is in 
English so the people who didn’t catch up  and didn’t go through the independent 
schools- they don’t have that background in English – the basic criticism is how can you 





Johara emphasizes the difficult situation that Qatari students who have never been in English 
language schools face when entering universities, both public and private, in Qatar.  At Qatar 
University, they are now required to take English proficiency tests and are not allowed to take 
courses at the university until they receive a certain score on the TOEFL.  Whether at the newly 
designed education model at Education City and the Independent Schools or at the state 
university, students are being required by a new set of networks to test well in English, while 
the same is not required for Arabic.    
Conclusion: Linguistic Catch-22 of the Knowledge Economy 
 
 In the Spring of 2010, a year after one of Sheikha Mozah’s son had graduated from 
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, the Sheikha met with the senior 
officials at the university.  The Sheikha purportedly told the Dean that her son was not able to 
give a speech in fusha, the official state language of Qatar, and this was a problem for a 
program which was ideally supposed to educate students in the skills of the Foreign Service.  
She told the Dean that the Arabic teachers at Georgetown should be given greater resources 
and time in order to graduate Qatari students who were fluent in Standard Arabic.  Sheikha 
Mozah’s own son’s inability to give a speech in Arabic after attending Qatar Academy and 
Georgetown University, both institutions of the Sheikha’s own Education City, reflect a catch-22 
that is produced by the “knowledge economy” model.  While Qataris are encouraged to be 
Qatari and global citizens, they are caught in new networks of schooling that place English as 
the language of the “global” citizen.  At the same time, they are being asked by the Qatari 





gives Qataris privileged access to a “knowledge economy,” Standard and Qatari Arabic are still 
necessary prerequisites of Qatari national citizenship. 
 The “knowledge economy”’s directional challenges are not a simple question of Arabic 
versus English or بيرغت/taghrib versus بيرعت/ta’reeb (westernization versus Arabization), but 
rather the entanglement of these spaces and individuals through private, corporate and 
international interests in Qatar’s education sector.  The dependency created by the leaders of 
Qatar upon international development rubrics and standards and on American companies and 
universities, has positioned these bodies (and their language of English) as the purveyors of 
“quality” education. The “Arab and Islamic” vision touted by the government is not in the 
interests of the numerous agencies, universities and individuals who are profiting off the 
“knowledge economy” being created by the Qatari government’s dependence on their 
languages and skills.   
The leadership of Qatar has adopted a development hierarchy in which English is a 
standard or model language for education and this ideology has been implemented in schools 
throughout Qatar.  While the rhetoric of the reform boasts of an awakening of Arab(ic) culture, 
the identifiable language of that culture has been placed in an awkward position, relegated to 
less and less time in the curriculum.  This inconsistency in approach, one focused on cultural 
revival and the other economic, can be traced back to the “knowledge economy” concept of 
agencies like the United Nations Development Program and its publications such as the Arab 
Human Development Reports and the policy recommendations of think tanks such as the RAND 





expense of local issues and cultural variation, hoping that whatever incongruencies that arise 
out of their policies will be resolved by implementation on the local level. Their influence can be 
seen in the speeches of Sheikha Mozah and the language of the education reform movment.   
Culture, language and other forms of “local knowledge” are often paid lip service to or 
even considered obstacles to the success of their market based recommendations.  Blommaert 
(1994) argues in his work on language ideology in Tanzania that development ideology ranks 
languages and defines them as “underdeveloped” in relation to more “developed” languages 
such as English. In the case of Swahili, it is always found lacking in its attempts to catch up to 
the latest changes and developments in terminology in English.  This creates a hierarchy of 
linguistic achievement and capacity in which the less “developed” language is always struggling 
to catch up to the developed language.  This linguistic model has its equivalence in the notion 
of developed and developing countries so oft-repeated in the development discourse. 
Blommaert’s argument can be adapted to the Qatari context in which the focus on 
“development” ranks English as a priority and places Arabic in a secondary or peripheral 
position, one in which it is marked as “less developed.” 
Mazawi (2010) argues that the “knowledge society” (another term for a knowledge 
economy) rhetoric emerges from a particular constellation of international, regional and state 
power dynamics.  Although this is most pertinent to states which depend on foreign and 
international aid, Mazawi argues that it is also applicable to Gulf States which are restructuring 
their education systems to align with the global market. 
Within this broader context, it is fair to argue that dominant development discourses in 





international consultancies, aid and development agencies, and sponsored think tanks. 
The institutional assortment operates as a panacea network, interwoven with the 
apparatuses of the Arab state at various levels of policy making (Mazawi 2010: 217) . 
Mazawi’s analysis is useful to understanding the ways in which the actor-networks of Qatar’s 
“knowledge economy” have developed.  Mazawi also argues that the neoliberal models 
proposed by international agencies in order to create knowledge economies play on the 
imbalance of power between large international bodies and economically developing states. 
Another criticism posed by Mazawi is that the international development discourse on the 
knowledge economy is disinterested in “local knowledge.” Development discourse is used by 
states to direct their populations towards meeting “international” standards, but often 
disregards the interests and needs of their target interest groups (children, women, minorities, 
etc.).  Bayat (2005) also argues that the knowledge economy is really a set of strategies that 
primarily benefits the state and corporations and arises out of “highly developed market forces 
in post-industrial societies” (200). These scholars contend that agencies and policies which 
argue for neoliberal reforms of education (free market, charter schools, vouchers, choice, etc.) 
open up schools to the pressures of pleasing the market, as opposed to ensuring “quality” 
education. 
Munir Bashshrur (2010), in the same volume as Mazawi, compares education reform in 
Qatar to Muhammad Ali’s efforts as the ruler of Egypt in the early 19th century to reform 
education.  Muhammad Ali’s initial focus on importing European models and teachers is 
juxtaposed against the Jesuit and Presbyterian missionary schools in Lebanon who used Arabic 
as the language of instruction.  Where Muhammad Ali’s reforms failed, the missionary schools 





universities in the region today (e.g., The American University of Beirut).  Bashshur argues that 
what is happening in Qatar is grander in scale and in vision to that of Muhammad Ali.  Bashshur 
is concerned that a cultural revolution is actually being suppressed by the reforms in Qatar 
because of two reasons: the standardization of Arabic language education along the lines of an 
American model of education and the lack of co-operation between these new institutions in 
Qatar and older bodies such as Qatar University.   He quotes from the RAND report on K-12 
schools on their efforts to create Arabic language standards; something the agency claimed was 
the first attempt of its kind in the region.  Bashshur is not impressed by the effort to create 
Arabic language standards, which he sees as very similar to those developed in Egypt and he 
fears that the separation between religion and language will extend to one between language 
and culture (2010:261).  Bashrur draws important parallels between Egypt and Qatar in their 
attempts to create a cultural awakening through borrowed models, to which he concludes, 
“could it be that we are replicating [in Qatar], in some form or another, Muhammad Ali’s 
experience in the early part of the nineteenth century, where he superimposed a new layer of 
‘modern’ schools on an older layer of traditional schools, with the two kinds never really 
reconciling?” (2010:268).  
The supporters of the “knowledge economy” model at Qatar Foundation are pushing 
public schools and Qatar University to adopt neoliberal education strategies that would support 
“variety” and “choice” and connect education with the market.  The relationship drawn by 
Sheikha Mozah between the “knowledge economy” model with a cultural and religious revival 
is actually placing Qataris and Arabic in a catch-22, one in which it is responsible for a cultural 





viewed as inferior, although fluency in Standard Arabic is a requisite for cultural and political 
success within the Arabic speaking part of Qatari society. The imposition of a “knowledge 
economy” also furthers linguistic divisions in the society as individuals must overcome class, 
educational testing and racial and ethnic divisions (between Qataris and expatriates) to arrive 
at a position of authority as “global” and “local” citizens. 
Globalization is often presented as a tidal wave that sweeps through and dramatically 
changes the way societies are connected.  In studying a “close encounter” between the “global” 
project of the “knowledge economy” and its “local” implementation in Doha, this chapter 
illustrates how exactly actor-networks are formed through these encounters and what struggles 
arise as a result.  Through tracing the local interactions and movements of individuals and 
ideas, we can see how this “globalizing” force is actually shifting the terrain, rather than 
assuming its power to wipe out everything in its path.  In the following chapter, the shifting 
waterways are forcing Arabic teachers in K-12 schools to reaffirm the value of Arabic in a 
country where English is being heavily prioritized.  In order to defend Arabic, these teachers 
often turn to the ideology of Arabic as the language of religion and pan-Arab culture to support 








Chapter 3: “The weak in the first, is weak in the second language” 
  
In the previous three chapters, I outlined the history and actor-networks of the Qatari 
state’s “knowledge economy” project and some of the debates that it has brought up among 
Qataris and expatriates living in Doha about English and Arabic.  I demonstrated how the 
creation of actor-networks of education reform in Qatar has shifted focus from Arabic to 
English in schools and the economy by de-localizing English and placing Arabic on a 
development hierarchy.  The result has been a pushback from Qataris to evaluate and mitigate 
the effects of Qatar’s new educational system on Arabic language and Qatari cultural identity.   
These narratives have highlighted the power of English and Qatari Arabic in creating “Qatari” 
and “International” citizens, but they have only touched upon the language ideologies 
associated with Standard Arabic or fusha. The following three chapters delve into the question 
of how proponents of fusha create a space for the language by framing it against English and 
dialects of Arabic.  While some have argued that the “failure” of Arab societies to modernize is 
linked to its dependence on fusha, a language they argue no one speaks, I contend that this 
argument rises from a simplified understanding of religion and its opposite, the secular, and 
from languages as either literate or oral, not simultaneously capable of co-existing (Haeri 2003; 
Salameh 2010).  It also rests on the idea that modernity is a way of life, rather than a series of 
projects that attempt to disconnect nature and language from society (Bauman and Briggs 





 This chapter is based on interviews and observations of Arabic teachers in Qatar’s K-12 
schools who view their own Arabic language practices as relational and social and see Arabic 
language use and literacy as directly affected by changes to the economic values of Standard 
English and Standard Arabic in Qatari society. Street (2003) argues that “ the ways in which 
teachers or facilitators and their students interact is already a social practice that affects the 
nature of the literacy being learned and the ideas about literacy held by the participants, 
especially the new learners and their position in relations of power” (78).   Street gives the term 
“social literacies” to this process, which holds true for students, teachers and administrators in 
Qatar who have to interact and respond to efforts on the part of the government to create a 
“knowledge economy.”  What gets relayed through social literacies and language ideologies is 
the message that English is a valuable commodity in Qatar’s “knowledge economy” project, 
while Arabic is relegated to the realm of religion and culture. 
 In order to respond, these individuals who are given the responsibility of teaching 
literacy in a Standard Arabic, must use the most persuasive language ideologies they have in 
convincing others of the value of this Arabic. This is the ideology of Arabic as the language of 
Islam and the epitome of Arab culture.  Why does this ideology of language resonate with 
Arabic teachers as opposed to the one Haeri proposes is the real “mother tongue”of Arabs 
(their dialects)?   It is because there is no desire to distinguish between literary and oral Arabic 
within the lives of Arabic teachers I interviewed and observed.  These individuals saw no 
conflict between fusha and their dialects of Arabic because they were both integrated into their 
lives and speech communities through a variety of oral and literary forms. While Qatari Arabic 





reading Qur’an and for oratory. As Shirley Brice Heath has noted so eruditely, “literacy has 
different meanings for members of different groups, with a corresponding variety of acquisition 
modes, functions and uses; these differences have yet to be taken into account by policy-
makers” (1986:25).  As we will see in the following schools and experiences of Arabic teachers, 
the policymakers of Qatar’s school system are disconnected from the ways in which literacy is 
engaged with by Qataris and Arabs.  By imposing the “knowledge economy” as a model of 
education, schools are now focused on the autonomous model of literacy promoted by 
organizations unfamiliar with Qatari society and language. As shown in the previous chapter, 
the result is organizations such as RAND misunderstanding the relationship Qataris have to 
Arabic.  
 I start with a background on Arabic teachers in Qatar and then turn to the story of 
Ikhlas, one of my major interlocutors in Qatar, and her experiences as an Arabic teacher living 
and working in Doha all her life. Then I break down schools in Qatar according to their status 
within the “knowledge economy,” looking first at the independent and minisitry schools 
designed to fit into the evolving actor-networks of the “knowledge economy” and then at so-
called “international” institutions such as Qatar Academy and American School of Doha and 
then to newer private schools competing for Qatari students and the government money that 
comes with their enrollment.  I conclude with an analysis of why Arabic teachers are returning 
to the Minsitry of Education curriculum and style of teaching Arabic, despite the “caution” of 







Between the Local and the Global: Arabics Regional Flows 
 
Qatari and Non-Qatari Arabic teachers in public and private schools find themselves in 
an interesting position between the “global” and the “local”, as they are often from regional 
states which share a long history of Islam and Pan-Arab nationalism with Qatar.  In schools 
throughout Doha, you will find Arabic teachers who are pushing their students to speak, read 
and write in standard Arabic, the language of the Qatari state and its official religion (Islam), 
while teaching and conversing in their own regional dialects. They face the knowledge that 
Arabic is less and less important in Qatar as institutions of schooling have progressively 
increased their English language programs and curriculums while decreasing instruction in 
Arabic. At any given Arabic department, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, Moroccans and Tunisians 
support the education and instruction of standard Arabic, or fusha.  Teachers of Qatari 
nationality are usually to be found in the public/charter schools and at Qatar University.  
Communication between these Arabs from various nations is made possible by their shared 
knowledge of Standard Arabic.  The range of dialects in Arabic are crosscut by the use of 
vocabulary from fusha and sometimes it is necessary to ask someone what they mean by a 
particular word or to repeat themselves because the word in the dialect means something 
different to both individuals.  In the regional flows of Arabic, Egyptian and the Levantine 
dialects are more easily understood due to their use in media and film, while Moroccan, 






As noted in the introduction, Arabs from Egypt, Jordan and Palestine have played 
influential roles in developing Qatar’s Ministry of Education curriculum and continue to be 
teachers throughout school system.  Johara related in a conversation that after a period of 
Egyptian dominance, many Palestinians and Jordanians came to teach and work in the schools 
of Qatar (Field Notes March 8, 2010).  Today, there are increasing numbers of Tunisians and 
Moroccans in Qatar who work in the education and media sectors, doing translation and 
teaching.  The religious networks across the Arab and Muslim world also support the 
immigration of Arabs and Muslims to be Imams (prayer leaders and caretakers of the mosque) 
and teachers in the religious schools throughout Qatar.  These individuals are required to be 
hafiz  of the Qur’an, meaning that they have dedicated the religious text to memory, and have 
sufficient training in the religious sciences of fiqh (jurisprudence), hadith(the life and sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad) and Islamic history.   While many Arabs fill these roles throughout the 
city, there are a number of Pakistanis and Bangladeshies who serve smaller mosques.  They 
reflect the non-Arab Muslim population in Qatar that is engaged in learning and teaching Arabic 
for primarily religious purposes.  The Sudanese and Muaritanian communities also play a 
significant role in the religious institutions of the country and the police force.  These trends 
have their roots in historical patterns of relations between the Gulf and other parts of the 
world, but they also reflect the networks of relationships and kinship through which migration 
normally occurs. 32 
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 In Khalaf and AlKhobeisi’s 1999 article, they relate the story of one such immigrant from Egypt,Ahmed, who 
travels to the United Arab Emirates and brings along with him two of his brothers. He becomes a teacher in the 
Ministry of Education and makes money through private tuition only be caught, fired and sent home. But through 





With the institution of Qatarization policies, schools funded by the government are 
increasingly favoring Qatari citizens for positions that were once held by non-Qatari Arabs.  The 
network of migration and interaction between Qatar and neighboring Arab states is also facing 
competition from migrants from predominantly western states.  At the Gulf English School, 
teachers from regional Arab state were paid a third of the salary of their colleagues from 
western states such as America, Britain, Australia and South America.  This produced inequality 
between these populations in the school and resulted in unspoken animosity between some 
Arabic teachers and English teachers.  One of my colleagues would complain about the ways in 
which the Arabic teacher for her class would teach and discipline the students, saying that she 
just sat in her chair and yelled at the kids the whole class period.  One can understand why 
Arabic teachers might feel less motivated if they knew they were being paid much less than 
their English speaking colleagues. This is a blatant problem identified by a student at Qatar 
Academy, Abdullah.  In this response to questions about Arabic teachers at his school, he 
writes: 
 
My teachers are... well they make the curriculum (they actually take extracts from the 
Qatar curriculum). There is no Arabic IB (International Baccalaureate) curriculum. We 
have Semi-qualified Arab teachers. What I mean by semi-qualified is that even though 
they are excellent they do not have the skills such as the remaining teachers to fit the 
picture of a prestigious school. In Arabic we are usually treated/assessed differentially 
than all of our other subjects. [Correspondence, August 8, 2007, emphasis added] 
                                                                                                                                                                           
town away from the officials at the MOE. Ahmed is able to make a much better salary than in his home country and 
takes on extra (official) work in an illiteracy campaign in the rural village.  There are several other stories in Khalaf 
and Alkhobeisi’s article which detail the large network and support structures of immigrants in the Gulf who have to 
use various strategies in order to circumvent some of the laws and regulations of labor.  The situation is very similar 
to that of Qatar, in which these “guest” workers often become permanent residents and are able to bring many 
family and friends to live with them if they are financially successful.  This is more often the case for Arabic 





In the longer interview, Abdulla states that Qatar Academy is an English school, which explains 
its lack of focus on Arabic.  He also describes his fellow students as very limited in their 
knowledge and functional usage of Arabic in the classroom.  As he writes above, this is mainly 
to do with the poor quality of Arabic instruction.  Abdulla also notes that “Arabic is not a 
priority, but angry parents are making it one” (Correspondence, July 8, 2007).  
Abdulla’s thoughts on Arabic teachers are important in the context of regional and 
global flows that are bringing non-Qataris into the country to support the schooling of Arabic 
and English.   In another response, he notes that Qatari students cannot read and write Arabic 
and have to sound out letters slowly.  
I did not learn English in my first school (I was in Iraq) but I have been learning English 
since Grade 3. I am very fluent in Arabic, whether it is reading or writing or speech. Most 
of my fellow classmates do not, regardless of nationality.  For example, when reading, 
they spell out the words.  So when reading most of them read like this: Çáá-ã-Ï-Ñ-Óå--É . 
I do not know whether you know Arabic but it is something like this: s-cc-ho-aoo-l, some 
even worse. In writing, the worse of my classmates produce unreadable work (with 
words that are not Arabic nor English nor anything.) 
Abdulla highlights one of the major challenges that teachers are facing with students in Qatar. 
Many are unable to read and write in either English or Arabic after several years of schooling. 
Although parents, students and teachers in the following chapter recognize the importance of 
Arabic literacy, they are contending with many challenges, the primary being the prioritization 
of English over Arabic.  In order to support their profession and Arabic, teachers such as Abed 
Shukri, a Palestinian Arabic teacher at Gulf English School are arguing that, “the weak in the 






Hierarchy of Schools in Qatar 
 
 Within the actor-networks described in the previous chapter, private schools are the 
most important sources of the “human capital” required for the” knowledge economy.”  As 
noted by Kim, from Georgetown admissions, Qatar Academy was specifically created to teach 
the children of Qatar’s elite.  In the following diagram, private schools such as Qatar Academy 
and the more expensive American School of Doha are at the top of the private school branch of 
Qatar’s education system. At the bottom are all-Arabic Ministry of Education schools, which 
from 2004-2012 were slowly closed down and turned into independent schools (at the time of 
my research there were several ministry schools still open).  In the middle are the new 
independent schools which are operating with a bilingual curriculum and a predominantly 
Qatari population of students and teachers.  Private schools are connected to the growing 
“knowledge economy,” in that their growth has coincided with the increase in expatriate 
population and the education reforms of the most recent Qatari government.  
On the public school side is the term pan-Arabism, to denote both the historical 
movement in the region that coincided with the creation of public education and the 
population of Arab expatriates who came to Qatar to help develop it.  Demographically, the 
independent and ministry schools in Qatar are attended by Qatari youth and mainly employ 
Qataris to teach major subjects.  In the shift to the independent school model, native English 
teachers were sought after to teach the new math, science and English curricula.  One of my 
closest colleagues at Gulf English School left the private school to work at a new independent 





a month to teach at Qatar’s new independent schools (Fieldnotes April 12th, 2010).  There is a 
fourth type of school in Qatar which I did not focus on, but did encounter several individuals 
who worked or attended these schools.  These are the “community” schools which serve 
expatriate populations and use the curriculum of their home countries to teach subject matter.  
This diagram does not include the programs run by the Awqaf, the endowments supported by 
the charitable contributions of Muslims.  The Awqaf is responsible for programs throughout the 
country that teach Qur’anic literacy and memorization.  These services are provided almost free 
to the general public.  
 






Hazawi of Ikhlas and the “Big Failure” of Independent Schools 
 
I met Ikhlas through Maryam Al-Attiya, whose family used Ikhlas as a private Arabic 
tutor.  Ikhlas was my Arabic tutor, interlocutor and friend for the duration of my field research 
in Doha.  I would tutor her children in English in exchange for free tutoring in Arabic.  Ikhlas’s 
family is originally from Syria, but she was born and raised in Doha and considers herself to be 
settled in the country.  Her husband is Lebanese and she has four children.  She attended Qatar 
University and has her Bachelor’s in Arabic and over 15 years of teaching experience in Qatar’s 
ministry and independent schools.  Over the course of two years, Ikhlas had received a 
promotion and a raise to become the munasikat al lugat al arabiya “ ةخسنم ةغللا ةيبرعلا" ” (Arabic 
Language Coordinator) at her school.  She and her family moved from a run-down two bedroom 
apartment in the city to a brand new two floor townhouse, which she shared with her brother 
and his family. 
Over tea and biscuits, I would talk to Ikhlas about her work as a teacher in Qatar’s public 
schools and how she felt the children were doing.  Ikhlas complained regularly about student’s 
inattention, her pinching, reprimanding and punishing of her male students (she taught at a 
boy’s school) and her general ennui about attempts to change the system and styles of 
teaching.33 She routinely disparaged her children’s English skills, saying that they had not 
improved at all since I last tutored them and that the schools were doing a horrible job of 
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teaching the children English.  On most Saturday mornings we would gather together and I 
would help the girls with their homework - a total of three - Maryam, the daughter of Ikhlas, 
and Sara and Maysoon, the daughters of Rima (Ikhlas’ sister-in-law).  The materials sent from 
school were usually packets stapled together of materials as a result of the new standards 
based model imposed by the Supreme Education Council and RAND. 
 The children seemed to find the most pleasure in playing or fighting with each other, 
visiting their neighbors and playing outside.  Ikhlas, usually tired from working, would force the 
children to finish their homework before enjoying other activities such as playing computer 
games or watching cartoons.  Ikhlas hated the lack of discipline she saw in her own children and 
those at school, but she herself seemed to enjoy similar activities to those of the children; 
spending time chatting with friends, watching Syrian dramas, drinking tea, preparing dinner and 
going out to run errands.  She never refused a visit from me if she was home and would seem 
most comfortable sitting on the sofa, relaxing after work.  I never witnessed her pleasure 
reading or engaged in literacy events outside of homework and the occasional Qur’an 
memorization, which the children engaged in, although she could have been reading at other 
times when I was not present. 
Ikhlas had chosen to place Duha, the youngest, in a new English medium school (Oxford 
English School) near her home.  Duha, according to Ikhlas, had the best English of her children 
and was doing better academically.  She would say of Duha that “tarif taqra, tariff taktub wa 
tariff tatakallam”, that, “she knows how to read, write and speak” English well.  Omran, her 





class, but Ikhlas wasn’t sure if the teachers’ were correct in their assessment, “I don't know 
why, he never studies.  If Omran is first, than there must be something wrong with the school”. 
According to Ikhlas, the students in the independent schools were not very good at English or 
Arabic.  She placed the blame on the children and their parents saying, “The kids these days are 
not well behaved, they have no discipline.  You can't hit them, you can't touch them, you can't 
yell at them - they say I will call the majlis al a'la (Supreme Education Council) and tell them, 
even the parents are not well-mannered (mu'adib)” (Fieldnotes, April 2, 2007 and November 
2009). 
Throughout my conversations with Ikhlas regarding the public schools and the status of 
Arabic within them, Ikhlas maintained that the reform movement and the independent schools 
were fashl kabeer, or “a big failure.”  The major problem that she and other teachers would 
note is that the reforms were ineffective in providing the quality education promised. For 
Arabic teachers, it would be alright if their students (and children) were learning English, but 
that didn’t appear to be the outcome.  Perhaps because she is an Arabic teacher, Ikhlas was 
worried that she could not provide her children training in the language of the “knowledge 
economy.” She could, however, provide them with access to the literacy practices that are 
important for Arabs: basic reading and writing in Arabic, memorization of the Qur’an and 
spoken fluency in a dialect of Arabic.  Ikhlas did not see these literary and oral practices in 
Arabic as incongruous (as the RAND writers would), because they were normative language and 





  Ikhlas’s networks illustrate the ways in which Arabic teachers are adapting to the 
changing models of education in Qatar.  She and her family have been successful at finding 
ways to build professional, cultural and economic connections in Qatar. This has depended on 
partnerships with Qataris over their shared Arabic and Islamic roots both in schools and in 
homes, through private tutoring.  Ikhlas’s home environment is similar to the living rooms 
observed by Heath in Trackton in which literacy events were the primary areas around which 
reading and writing occurred (1983). A literacy event is described by Heath as “any occasion in 
which a piece of writing is integral to the nature of participants’ interactions and their 
interpretive processes” (93).  The children and the adults in Ikhlas’s home were rarely found 
reading and writing for pleasure, but more often as a result of homework, school 
announcements or doctor and medical slips.  Homework was a painful chore and a source of 
strain between Ikhlas and her children.34 The most recurring use of literacy was in cell phone 
use and reading television subtitles (in Arabic), although many programs were dubbed.  Heath 
does not distinguish between literate and oral societies, but argues that individuals and 
communities have different practices which engage each linguistic method variably.  I found 
this to be the case in Ikhlas’s home and several others I visited.  In addition to homework, the 
most active use of Arabic literacy was in Qur’an reading.  The children were required to read 
and memorize sections of the Qur’an for lessons with their teacher at a local mosque. 
Ikhlas’s home life intersected easily with her role as a teacher in the independent 
schools.  The majority female Arabic teachers I interviewed were able to create a comfortable 
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continuum between home and the public school system (ministry and independent). Part of 
this comfort was in the predominance of Arab and Islamic cultural norms.  In the public schools, 
Arabic is still widely used and gender segregation allows female teachers to remove their outer 
garments and hijabs in the school building. While English is being pushed in the new 
“knowledge economy”, Arabic is still the major language spoken throughout public schools. In 
the transition from ministry to independent schools, this Arabic language environment has not 
changed, but in the increasing emphasis placed on English literacy has not left these teachers 
untouched.  As seen in Ikhlas’s case, she wants her children to have access to the economic 
benefits that are being connected to knowledge of English in Qatar’s economy.  
Hazawi of the Public Schools: Ministry, Scientific and Independent 
 
Figure 12: Independent Schools I visited     Figure 13: Al-Shaima was closed down in 2010 
 
The complexity of Qatar’s current schooling system lies in the transition from the 
Ministry of Education, whose history is outlined in chapter one, to the system of privately run, 
but publically funded schools called Independent schools, which are overseen by the Supreme 





began with a  set of schools called Al Bayyan and Omar bin Khattab Scientific schools, the 
former for girls and the latter for boys, which were magnet schools that took the best students 
and prepared them for jobs in medicine, science, engineering and technology.  The demand for 
these schools was high and it coincided with the government’s desire to create a “world-class” 
education system, resulting in the new system of independent schools (Brewer et al. 2003).  
This section details five schools across the public school range:  one ministry school (Al Shaima), 
two scientific schools (Al Bayyan and Omar bin al Khattab) and two independent schools 
(Amnah Bint Wahab and Khadija Elementary).  Each is known for excellence in its own ways - Al 
Shaima having excelled in Arabic language education, the two scientific schools being known for 
their ability to graduate students who can enter Education City schools, and the independent 
school of Amnah bint Wahab falling somewhere in the middle.  The following pictures highlight 
the difference between the Al Shaima, a ministry school, and Al-Bayan, a scientific school. 
 
 
Figure 14: Entrance to Al-Shaima, picture taken by Author 








Ministry School: Al-Shaima Preparatory School for Girls 
 
The contrast between the science schools of Al Bayyan Preparatory and the older 
ministry of education school, Al Shaima was stark, especially as they are neighbors from 
one another.  At the older Shaima Preparatory School, which was due to close down in a 
few months, the walls were littered with Arabic sayings from the Qur’an, poetry and 
other literature.  It was difficult to find a word of English anywhere, although I did find 
some pieces written by students in English.  This school was in its last year as a Ministry 
school and would be transformed into an Independent school the next year.  Students 
and staff would be redistributed amongst the other independent schools.  It would open 
again under the independent school model and with a new name and principal in a year 
or so.  
I found an elderly Qatari woman in the secretary’s office.  When I explained that I would 
like to speak to the Arabic staff, she led me through the school’s campus to the library.  
Laila, the head of the Arabic department had been designing and pushing forward 
different projects and competitions to encourage students to develop Arabic. Laila was 
luckily in school at the time, as she informed me that she had just returned from nursing 
her daughter. Laila informed me of the regional award the school had received several 
years ago for being one of the best schools in the region.  The library was filled with 
several women from different backgrounds, some Qatari and others Jordanian and 
Egyptian, who had discarded their abayas and wore skirts and blouses. I sat with the 
Arabic teaching staff and we discussed the changes that would take place in the school 





and those that were taking place throughout Doha.  Overwhelmingly, the teachers felt 
that Arabic should be emphasized more, but that the economy and the government 
were pushing for changes that were considered essential to Qatar’s future.  The women 
were ambivalent about the changes, feeling they were inevitable and that there was 
nothing for them to do but be subject to them.  One woman said, “That’s just the way 
things are going.  The government wants it that way”.  As Al-Shaima was being shut 
down, these women had resigned themselves to the changes in the schooling system. 
[Fieldnotes, April 20, 2010].   
Al-Bayan Scientific School for Girls 
 
Right next door to Al-Shaima is Bayan Scientific School for Girls.  Bayan is in a brand new 
building with signs that welcome you to the world of bilingual education.  The school is 
known for excellent test results in all subjects, including Arabic, and recently received 
the “Excellent School Award” in 2011 (SEC Website).35  When I walked into the school 
and entered the secretary’s office, I was asked by the principal about my affiliation with 
Georgetown University.  She was interested in having her son attend Georgetown and 
had been trying to get contacts which would help his way in.  When I suggested the 
Admission’s office, she dismissed it, implying that she wanted inside connections which 
would help her son.  The principal spoke to me in English and once she realized I could 
not help her, left abruptly.  I then met with Amna, in her early 20s, who was the head of 
the Arabic department.  She spoke to me in Standard Arabic and shared with me her 
strategies and concerns about teaching Arabic in Qatar’s schools.  Amna from Al Bayyan 
was very positive about the direction of the reforms and felt that she could teach her 
students Arabic very well as long as she used the best teaching techniques and had high 
standards.  She liked the direction of the reforms and felt many teachers complained 
too much about them. In regards to her students she said “they learn Arabic very well 
here because we use a lot of different techniques, such as writing competitions.  While 
some Arabic teachers say that students don’t care, I think it is the teacher’s 
responsibility to make the subject more interesting.” Being a teacher at a scientific 
magnet school, Amna probably has the advantage of teaching students who are already 
used to doing very well in their subjects. [Fieldnotes, April 20, 2010] 
In these vignette’s, developed from field notes that I took of my visits to these schools, I 
want to illustrate the vision of the “knowledge economy” in its most contrasting pair.  Al-
Shaima represents the older ministry school in its heyday.  Al-Bayan is a magnet school which 
                                                     
35
 The admissions director at Georgetown SFS-Qatar also told me that most of the students who come to Education 
City schools from public schools attend Al Bayyan or its male counterpart, Omar bin Khattab, because they are 
schools that focus on teaching math, science and technology in English. The Arabic teacher at Carnegie Mellon 
University in Qatar also said that these individuals’ Arabic was very good, especially in comparison to the students 





graduated students who could attend Education City schools and English schools abroad (if 
these young women were permitted by their parents).  Al-Bayan had a principal eager to send 
her son to an Education City school and an Arabic head teacher who felt that with enough 
effort, students could be taught the necessary Arabic and English skills to be “global” and 
“Qatari” citizens.  In contrast, the older teachers at Al-Shaima were resigned to the reforms, 
seeing them as inevitable and a sign of the new direction of the country, in which their 
involvement was uncertain.  Many of these teachers would be unemployed in the coming year 
and be supported by the Central Fund, called the band al markazi, in which they would be paid 
a regular salary to receive training in the new curriculum standards and technology, and then 
potentially reinstated, into a new independent school. This was the Qatari government’s 
strategy for reducing resistance to the reforms on the part of teachers and staff.  In the 
following three independent schools, which are in the middle of the reform process, teachers 
are struggling with the demands to teach both English and Arabic through a standards based 
model and are finding ways to incorporate Islamic and Arab identity into the language arts 
curriculum. 
Independent School: Amnah Bint Wahab Preparatory School for Girls 
 
The hallways of Amnah bint Wahab were filled with young Qatari women in black 
abayas. Some students were asking a woman in an abaya and niqab questions about 
the upcoming Arabic exam. Amnah bint Wahab had the reputation of being a good 
school.  I met with the head of the Arabic department and two of her staff who shared 
the demands of an Arabic teacher at the school and in the new Supreme Education 
Council. Karima was of Syrian origin, but had worked in Qatar’s school system for over 
two decades and was now responsible for training other Arabic teachers through the 
Supreme Education Council.  She and her colleagues had developed their own Arabic 
textbook based on the Arabic language standards published by RAND and SEC.  Ms. 





schools curriculum and felt that it could be the medium of teaching math and science. 
“Wasn’t Arabic the language of math and science during the time of the Abbasids and 
Ummayads and in the Middle Ages?” Jamilah had to leave for a meeting at the SEC, but 
introduced me to two of her Arabic teachers, Reem and Lulwa. They told me stories 
about students who did not take their lessons seriously, often coming late or not coming 
at all. Lulwa asked me rhetorically, “isn’t Arabic the language of the Qur’an” and “don’t 
Arabs and Muslims have the responsibility of learning and protecting the language?”.  In 
addition, they felt there was too much emphasis given to English in the school at the 
expense of Arabic. “Students are busy studying for tests in math, science and English 
and getting ready to take SATs and TOEFL” said Reem. Many of the young women at 
Amnah bint Wahab would go on to both Qatar University and Education City schools in 
the country [April 4th, 2010]. 
Scientific School: Omar Bin Khattab Elementary School 
 
The last school I would like to describe is Ikhlas’s school, Omar bin al Khattab.  The day I 
visited, classes had ended and the students were running around in the open space 
meeting area, twirling their bags and laughing, running everywhere. Outside, cars were 
lined up waiting for the kids to emerge. Nannies from various countries and mothers 
entered the school to receive the children. Drivers, mainly South Asian, were waiting 
outside in large sedans and land cruisers.  I had been sitting in the reception area of the 
school when a Qatari mother walked up and told the receptionist - “I have an 
appointment - I’m late for my meeting.  Why are the kids taking so long?”  The mother 
also asked the receptionist for water.  The receptionist gave the woman a look to say 
that she did not know why her child was late and that was not her responsibility.  The 
mother began to get very upset with the woman for not respecting her. “Lesh 
ta’akharat? Why are you delaying? I have an appointment with the doctor.”  Things 
escalated as the mother began to yell at the young woman calling her “ya haiwana, inti 
haiwana”(you animal, you animal) and was moved to the principal’s room where the 
mother continued to scream and the young woman continued to stand her ground that 
she would not speak to the woman unless she treated her with respect.36  
Ikhlas ignored this scene, telling me it was a common occurrence and that parents often 
disrespected teachers and staff, and we continued upstairs to the Arabic teacher’s room 
where she asked me to introduce myself and what I was doing.  I then spoke with some 
of the Arabic teachers and assistants at the school about education reform and how 
they used to teach - and what it was like when they were students in Qatar’s schools. 
The most senior teacher who had taught in the old Ministry system for many years told 
me that “the education is going in circles - it is beginning to return to the ministry 
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maha- lazim ihtiram,gair akhlaq, ma fi akhlaq.  Translation: “She can’t talk to me like that. There should be respect. 





system again.”  She argued that the reform was going to go back to the old system 
because it worked. Ikhlas was proud of her team of teachers and felt they were doing 
the best job they could of teaching students.  Many of the teachers felt that the move 
towards English was important, but not well done and that students were not being 
given good skills in either English or Arabic.  During the discussion, I asked if they felt 
parents care about teaching Arabic to their kids.  Although Ikhlas felt that the parents 
cared much more about Arabic than English, several of the Qatari teachers defended the 
Qatari parents and said that they did care about Arabic, but they also wanted to teach 
their children English [Field Notes May 2nd, 2010]. 
   
Independent School: Khadija Elementary 
I visited Khadija Elementary after school had ended on a Wednesday afternoon. I met 
with the Principal of the school who responded to my research with the information 
that the school was asking for longer hours of instruction in Arabic for the coming school 
year and that the Supreme Education Council was responding to concerns on the part of 
parents that Arabic and Islamic Studies were being reduced in the curriculum.  I then 
proceeded to the teacher’s meeting room where I met with four teachers from various 
parts of the Arab world.  Two were from Jordan, one was Egyptian and the last was an 
Emirati woman who had married a Qatari and had settled in Qatar with her husband.   
The teachers were meeting to discuss the upcoming end of the year ceremony.  The 
English language teachers (one of the Jordanian women and the Emirati woman) were 
responsible for the part of the program in which students would have to sing a song in 
English. The Arabic teachers (one of the Jordanian women and the Egyptian woman) 
would choose a student each to recite Qur’an and greet the parents in Arabic.  Following 
the meeting, I spoke with the Emirati teacher and the Egyptian teacher about my 
research and asked them some questions about the students.  The Emirati teacher said 
that although she teaches English, she is very strict at home with her kids in Arabic. “We 
have a time in the family when everyone is only supposed to speak fusha (Standard 
Arabic). I love Arabic and I want my children to love it too.”  The Egyptian teacher felt 
that the students were getting exposure to both languages at home and at the school. 
She believed, “it is the parents’ interest, if they focus at home on Arabic, then the child 
also focuses at school”. The Emirati teacher said, “It is important to teach English now, 
students have to get jobs and go to university in English. But we should also emphasize 
how important Arabic is”.  The Egyptian teacher agreed, saying “English is important for 
kids to know, but we have to be proud of our Arabic and Islamic identity” [Field notes 
April 16, 2010]. 





Throughout my interviews with teachers at these public schools, there was a recurring 
theme of the importance of Arabic to Islam and Arab culture and the importance of English to 
future economic and educational success.  Teachers at Amnah bint Wahab focused on Arabic as 
the ‘language of Qur’an” and Islamic history and teachers at Khadija Elementary felt that Arabic 
was a beautiful language with a rich heritage necessary of study.  At Umar Bin Khattab, teachers 
felt that things were going back to the Ministry model of teaching Arabic instead of the 
Standards based one imposed by the SEC.  This was similar to Jamilah’s approach at Amnah Bint 
Wahab, in which she and her colleagues created a textbook based on the standards which 
incorporated the older methods of the Ministry (using religious and cultural texts) with the 
required skill sets of the standards.  While there as some disagreement on the part of Ikhlas and 
Qatari teachers on the role of parents in encouraging students to learn Arabic, the teachers 
above recognized that parents wanted both languages for their students, although English was 
taking more a priority because of the reforms, new testing requirements and the new 
universities in Qatar.  Because of the reforms, testing has become a very important part of 
schooling and students are now ranked using “international” tests such as SAT, ACT, PISA and 
the TOEFL.  Qatari test scores are very low when compared against students in other countries 
using the PISA test for literacy, math and science.  Part of the problem is that many of these 
tests are translated into Arabic or left in English (math and science) and often reflects student’s 
literacy in English rather than their understanding of the content material.  This is a widespread 
problem in using testing materials usually designed for a certain class and culture.   
In regards to test scores and the new system of university education, those schools with 





Bayyan and Omar Bin Khattab, are successful at getting their students into English language 
universities with relatively strong Arabic skills.  Schools such as Amnah Bint Wahab and Al 
Shaima reflect the historical relationship the school system in Qatar has had with a strong 
Arabic curriculum; therefore students from these schools sometimes test poorly in 
“international” tests given in English.  This has more to do with what universities and programs 
the students will enter post-high school.  If students intend not to go into higher education, but 
instead get married or work immediately after school, reading and writing in English is not a 
high priority.  Those students who want to attend higher education in Qatar or abroad, must 
spend many more hours on improving their English language skills if they want to pass the 
TOEFL and SAT tests that are now required before entry into both Qatar University and the 
American universities in Education City.  
 Qataris who want to ensure that their children will get a “world class” education usually 
turn to private English schools in Qatar.  While Arabic is slightly marginalized by the reforms to 
the public/independent schools in Qatar, in private English schools it is almost entirely 
neglected or ignored.  Arabic teachers in private English schools are marginalized by the 
linguistic environment inside the school and by their reduced salaries and “prestige” in the 
“knowledge economy.” These teachers are often asked to teach both Arabic and Islamic Studies 
and are also very likely to use the ministry curriculum in their teaching.  There is also a 
hierarchy of private schools similar to that of public schools, in which those schools which 







Hazawi of Private and “International” Schools  
 
Figure 17: Arabic/Bilingual Schools to "International" Schools 
 
The above diagram represents the hierarchy of private schools in the country which 
Qataris and wealthy expatriates send their children to.  At the top right hand side is the 
“international” school model. These schools provide English language instruction at the hands 
of native speakers and foreign curriculums which will give students access to “international” 
education.  In the middle lie schools which attempt to provide a synthesis of Arabic and Islamic 
education for Qataris along with solid English language skills.  Many of these schools have been 
opened by wealthy Qataris who see a market for private English education with a Qatari and 





by Qataris or Emiratis, but attended by a higher ratio of non-Qataris to Qataris because of their 
focus on bilingualism. 37 
I will begin with the private ‘international” schools of Qatar Academy and American 
School of Doha. These schools have a reputation of catering to two of the wealthiest 
populations in Qatar: the ruling Al-Thani family and American and British families who work in 
oil, gas, government and military sectors.  This is followed by a set of schools which have a 
status of being “the best of the worst” in their deference to some elements of Qatari, Arab and 
Islamic culture.  The last set of private schools are attempting to appeal to the market for 
“bilingual” education designed to give parents and students some “satisfaction” regarding 
Qatari and Arab culture and identity.  Arabic instruction is least important in the first type of 
school and increasingly important in the latter two types of schools that attempt to balance the 
requirements for “world class” English language instruction with “local” demand for Arabic and 
Islamic studies instruction.  
Hazawi of Private “International” Schools 
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 There is a fourth category of schools which caters to non-Qataris and whose curriculums are based on a home 
curriculum.  These are  called “community” schools and are very nationally and ethnically segregated. 
Qatar Academy Mission Statement: It is 
the mission of Qatar Academy (QA) to 
provide internationally accepted, 
comprehensive, English medium 
programs, plus Arabic and Islamic 
Studies from pre-school through to 
secondary graduation. QA develops 
independent critical thinkers, lifelong 
learners, and responsible citizens and 
empowers students to gain entrance to 






The school created to fit into Qatar Foundation’s vision of a “knowledge economy” is 
Qatar Academy, which was intended to teach both children of expatriates (teachers and staff in 
EC schools) and Qatari students.  It is located in the Education City campus and is supposed to 
be a major feeder school for the American universities in Qatar.  In comparison to its 
counterparts in the next category of private schools, “the best of the worst,” Qatar Academy 
has the support of the ruling family of Al-Thanis who send many of their children there as the 
school was started by the Emir and his wife, Sheikha Mozah.  
Notable for their poor or non-existent Arabic curriculums, private “international” 
schools like Qatar Academy are difficult to get admission to and serve the elites of Qatar, both 
national and ex-pat.  Kim had enrolled her daughter at Qatar Academy when she arrived in 
Doha in 2006, but with the increasing numbers of Qataris, she felt the school climate had a 
negative effect on her daughter and she withdrew her.38  She argued that Qatar Academy was 
not an “international” school anymore because it was being taken over by Qataris.  While there 
is some controversy over whether Qatar Academy can be called an “international” school 
because of its heavy Qatari population, its status and placement in Education City is supposed 
to indicate its’ focus on the  “knowledge economy” and its global parameters.39   
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 Children of wealthy expatriates, such as Kim in the last chapter, often send their children to other “international” 
schools such as Cambridge School, Doha English School and Doha College.  These last three follow the British 
curriculum and represent the longer history the country has had with Britain and the British style of education. 
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 Several schools were opened recently by Qatar Foundation to increase “high quality” options for Qataris and 
expatriates.  These are the International School of London, the Sherborne Academy and the Michael E. DeBakey 
School for Health Professionals, all of which were in the opening stages at the end of my fieldwork.  The state has 
also started a voucher program based on RAND-Qatar’s recommendations so that Qataris may send their children to 





I had the opportunity to interview and meet teachers and students from Qatar 
Academy, Doha College and American School of Doha.  The general consensus was that these 
schools did not put much time, effort or importance on learning Arabic, but offered excellent 
English language education and curriculums to get students into top notch universities abroad 
and in Qatar.  Here are several written statements made by teachers at Qatar Academy in 
response to a survey: 
It is unfortunate that the focus in the household has become on teaching the child the 
second language (English) before (Arabic) and if it continues, the child will lose his mother 
tongue because of parental neglect. [Interview with Reem, May 14, 2010] 
The focus on the English language in all the subjects except the Arabic and Islamic 
education lesson leads to the lack of any support for the Arabic language outside the limits 
of the lesson and also sometimes creates students who have weaknesses. [Interview with 
Maysoon, May 12, 2010] 
 (Translated from Arabic) 
Reem and Maysoon were respectively Jordanian and Palestinian and each had taught Arabic for 
over a decade. They shared concerns about the emphasis and support given to English in both 
the school environment and at home, arguing that this favoritism was making students “weak” 
in Arabic.  They suggested several ways to combat this inequality, from pedagogical strategies 
to more time in the curriculum and to greater respect and emphasis on Arabic from parents.  In 
my meeting with the Arabic head of the school, a Qatari woman with a long history in 
education, she emphasized that the school was trying to bring the Arabic level of their students 
up, but that it was challenging given the structures of the school around the English language 
curriculum.  Like her colleagues, she felt that Qatari parents were more concerned that their 
children learn English well and get into English universities.  At Qatar Academy’s high school, 





 In a discussion at Johara’s home, a debate regarding the quality of private schools in 
Doha placed Qatar Academy behind that of the American School of Doha (ASD), particularly in 
its ability to graduate students who could go to private English universities abroad.  Johara and 
her best friend Al-Anoud had both attended American School of Doha and Johara’s sister, Layal, 
was still a student at the time.  There are only a handful of Qataris at the ASD, whose 
population and teaching staff are predominantly American.  Johara said, “Qatar Academy is not 
a very good school.  Neither is the Middle East International.”  Al-Anoud disagreed, “No, Qatar 
Academy is a good school, and students who go there can go to universities in Great Britain and 
America.” Layal added that “the American School is the best school in Doha. Doha College is 
also very good” (Fieldnotes, December 2, 2009).  In a conversation with Johara and 
Mohammad, a distant relative of Johara’s and current student at Georgetown SFS-Qatar, 
Muhammad shared his experiences learning Arabic at ASD: “There were several years in high 
school where we didn’t have to take Arabic at ASD.  This is why my Arabic is not very good” 
(Fieldnotes May 8, 2010).  
 The expectation was that students from these “international” schools would attend 
American Universities and therefore have very little need for Arabic literacy in higher 
education.  The “international” was equated with successful acquisition of literacy in British or 
American English.  Arabic in these schools was not deemed a priority.  Students at 
“international” schools in Doha did not attend these schools in order to improve their Arabic 
literacy skills. Instead, the focus at these types of schools was on making students fluent in 
English literacy.  Arabic teachers in these schools were heavily marginalized, reporting 





 “The Best of the Worst”: Gulf English School and Middle East International School 
 
In the following set of schools, we encounter a focus on the part of owners, staff and 
teachers to create a sense of “security” in the Qatari and Arab identity while also teaching 
students English language skills.  Having worked at Gulf English School (GES), I had several 
contacts and relationships which gave me access to the school and its English and Arabic staff.  
My closest friend, Gail, from my teaching days in 2005 had switched several schools during the 
course of my fieldwork.  She left GES to work at an independent school in the outskirts of the 
city as the English language coordinator for a much higher salary.  In an interview with Gail, she 
shared with me the sentiment of Qatari parents that GES was “the best of the worst” in that it 
provided a solid English education and created a comfortable culture for Qataris in their regards 
for gender segregation and their focus on Arabic and Islamic Studies.  GES is owned by one of 
the richest men in Qatar and his influence and name recognition also provides some comfort to 
Qataris, like Dr. Al-Attiya from the previous chapter, who send their children to the school.   
  Although I was no longer teaching at GES, the female Arabic teachers remembered me 
when I returned for my fieldwork, especially Hiba who was the Arabic teacher for my class the 
year I was there.  They asked me quite bluntly why I chose Qatar for my research site, implying 
that if I wanted to study Arabic, I should have picked a country where it was more widespread. 
The teachers were from Jordan, Egypt and Palestine.  Here is an excerpt of the transcript of my 
conversation with them regarding Arabic language education at Gulf English School: 
Hiba: We have mothers and fathers who aren’t remotely interested in Arabic 
Kauther:  But there are some students, for whose family Arabic is the most important 





Hiba: There is a difference between Qatar and other countries 
Kauther: They [Qatar] are most interested in English  
Hiba:  The mother tongue in Qatar is English. The first reason is because the number of 
Qataris is so small and in Qatar there are all these other nationalities.  Qatar has 
become a foreign country. Go to the mall and they speak English. Go to the street and 
they speak English and for that reason English has become more important than 
Arabic.  Qatar is also a “model” (style). It is shameful to speak Arabic because it shows 
your station/level.  There is a lot of “prestige”, you need to speak English- it’s what do 
you call it- “prestige” [Interview, February 5, 2010] (Trans. from Arabic by Author) 
 
Hiba and her colleagues continue onto talk about how little respect they get from their 
students, while the English teachers are treated with a sense of deference.  They also mention 
the relative pay scales in contrast to their English speaking colleagues.  They highlight how 
different life is in their home countries where everyone speaks Arabic and you really feel that it 
is an Arab country.  In addition to the deference given to English in the curriculum and the 
relative staffing and pay scales at the school, the society outside the school is described as 
unfriendly and unfair to Arabic speakers.  Hiba describes Qatar as a “model”, which in this 
context, means being stylish, unique, and high class, similar to a fashion model that everyone 
looks.  Hiba also describes how speaking Arabic is almost considered shameful, reiterating 
Mimi’s sentiment of “estrangement” from chapter one.  In conclusion, Hiba argues that 
speaking English gives one “prestige.” Notably, in talking about these new ideologies of English, 
Hiba uses the English words model and prestige.  
 Similar to Qatar Academy in the last section, the British administration at Gulf English 
School, although supportive of Arabic education because of the owners and the need to appeal 





interview, the Head of Secondary shared with me their efforts to draw more students from 
diverse backgrounds, or non-Qataris, to the school. They were also focusing on the 
International Baccalaureate program and publicizing GES as an “international” education that 
prepares students for “international” universities.  There was a sense of competition with other 
private British and American schools, each vying for the prestige of an “international” school.  
As we will see in the next set of schools, “international” school status is also connected to how 
successfully graduates of these high schools fared on admissions tests and entrance into English 
language universities.  
Middle East “International” School 
 
At the Middle East International School (MEIS), I met Principal Josh Haggar, a former 
superintendent of schools in America, who had relocated to Qatar during the new reform 
process.  He had experienced some fallout with the Supreme Education Council and was now 
working as a Principal at MEIS and a consultant for AMIDEAST (America-Middle East 
Educational and Testing Services, Inc.).  Dr. Haggar traveled a lot and was working on a novel at 
the time.  Like many wealthy expatriates, Dr. Haggar enjoyed the wealth and opportunity that 
living and working in Qatar afforded him.  Dr. Haggar and the owner of the school, a Qatari 
business man, were heavily invested in creating an “international” school which promised the 
many things that the new school reforms were failing to deliver. When I met with Dr. Haggar, 
he emphasized how many seniors from MEIS were going to American universities and how well 
students were performing on “international” tests.  “All of these kids - if they go to a US 





proficiency.”  He also told me that the owner of the school, Mr. Salem, “refuses to give the kids 
Arabic until first grade because of the importance of English.”  Dr. Haggar connected this 
directly to the “knowledge based economy” concept which requires this focus on English.  
When asked about Arabic, Dr. Haggar would repeatedly say that the kids “spoke Arabic all the 
time”, implying that the concern was for the students to speak English as often and fluently as 
they spoke Arabic, but not on literacy in Arabic at the level being promoted in English 
(Interview, April 2, 2010).  This focus in the school on English was confirmed by the Arabic 
teachers I interviewed at the school. 
Awatif and Zahra were taking surveys that the SEC had sent to the school and met with 
me during their break period.  Zahra said, “English takes first place in the school” and that up 
until last year, they only taught three lessons of Arabic and Islamic Studies a week.  This year, 
they were increasing to four.  “All of the subjects are in English” said Awatif.  Since students 
don’t begin formal Arabic instruction until first grade at the school, Awatif shared a story of a 
little girl who was afraid of Arabic (the Standard variety) when introduced to it.  They 
considered it a “shame upon the school” that Arabic was given such an insignificant role. 
Furthermore, Zahra mentioned that “parents thought it was easy to teach Arabic”, but it was 
actually very difficult for them as teachers to convey all the complexities of Standard Arabic in 
the few hours of instructional time given to the subject (Interviews April 2, 2010). 
These teachers felt similar to their counterparts at GES about the ways in which the 
school and society was focusing on English over Arabic.  As “first place” in the school, English 





introduced in First Grade.  While students spoke Arabic between class periods with one 
another, they were much more comfortable with their regional dialects of Arabic than with the 
Standard Arabic used for formal instruction.  This is seen in the story of the little girl who was 
afraid when teachers began to speak to her in Standard Arabic in first grade. The fierce desire 
on the part of the administration to produce students who could attend American universities 
and engage the “knowledge economy” was very clear in the mission and curriculum of the 
school.  They were actively adopting the ideology that English gave one access to the 
“international” and that Arabic was only useful as a spoken language of culture and the home. 
Bilingual Schools Try to “Satisfy” Parents 
 
In the last set of schools explored in this chapter, the “best of the worst” model is 
replaced by a focus on “bilingualism” and attempts to bridge the Arabic and English curriculums 
through staff and administration working together.  At the following schools, English and Arabic 
teachers actually communicated with one another and were told by the administration to 
reconcile and bring together the traditions of English and Arabic so that students would have a 
stronger Arabic and Islamic identity while also building their English language schools.  These 
last set of schools are the some of the newest to open their doors in Qatar and were operating 
in housing complexes.  They were also distinguished by their unusual principals, one Palestinian 








Oxord English Academy 
 
In order to provide a quality English education with an Arabic-Islamic cultural focus, 
Oxford English Academy (OEA) was opened.ٌٌMany staff at Gulf English School broke away and 
joined the new OEA after several years of withstanding the school administration run by Sheikh 
Faisal’s (the owner) wife (Interview Gail, September 8, 2009).   OEA was providing education in 
grades one through four when I visited it in 2009 and 2010.  It was placed on probation at the 
end of 2010 for failing to meet certain standards set by the Supreme Education Council.  My 
friend Gail, who worked at GES and an independent school, ended up at OEA in 2009, following 
a very brief stint at an independent school.  Hanaa, the head of Arabic while I taught at GES, 
also left to become the Principal of Oxford.  While most of the English schools in Doha are 
operated by British and American principals, OEA has an Arab principal.  Hanaa has been 
involved in the teaching of Arabic in schools throughout Qatar for decades and is fluent in 
English and Arabic.  In my discussion with her about the decision to open up OEA, she 
mentioned the following: 
I was with GES for 16 years and I communicated with parents.  For parents, the key was 
to educate their children in English, the language for the future, but they were also 
interested and keen to teach them the Arabic language.  They would always come to 
me and ask, “did you see this letter?” “What does it mean”? They were confused and 
they see me as the lady they can trust. They talk freely because I understand own 
culture, tradition and rules. I also understand western culture so I explain, ‘she didn’t 
mean it’.  For this school, there is a satisfying feeling for parents.  My target is to give 
opportunity to progress in English and maintain Arabic level.  Science says that if people 
speak properly their own language, they will learn second language better. .. Time to 
time I make presentation about how to important Arabic language is.  I try to show the 
whole picture, that they will respect you if you respect your own identity. [Interview, 





In this excerpt, Hanna talks about her time at GES during which she came to be a support 
system for Qatari parents who didn’t understand the cultural mores and language of the English 
teachers.  She would explain to them what the teachers meant and because she understands 
English and western culture, this eased their minds.  She took this experience to her new 
school, in which she wants parents to “have trust” and feel that the school understands and 
knows where they are coming from.  A large part of accomplishing this is emphasizing the 
Arabic identity of students.  It is also accomplished through a staff which is more Arab and 
Muslim than white and western.  The majority of the teachers were either Arab, American 
Arabs or married to Arabs themselves.  The success of the school has been undermined by the 
negative publicity mentioned earlier, which resulted in the school shutting down for a few 
weeks and then opening again.  The leadership of OEA is attempting to bridge the gap between 
Arabic and English language education in Qatar by arguing that knowledge of the first language 
(Arabic) will help student’s acquire English better.40 
Al-Hayat Bilingual Schools 
 
 The new Al-Hayat Bilingual Schools (HUBS) also had a vision of focusing on Arabic and 
Islamic identity, while providing a strong English language education.  HUBS is a private venture 
on the part of a Kuwaiti psychologist and popular media figure, Ibrahim al-Sulaiti, and Raja Al-
Saleh, a female Kuwaiti education specialist.  I was friends with the Principal of HUBS, John, and 
asked if I could visit the school and meet with the Arabic teachers. John was excited about the 
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 Hanaa’s emphasis on this point was reiterated by Abed Shukri, the director of Arabic as Second Language education and the IB Arabic 
curriculum at GES, and the female Arabic teachers at GES described above. Hiba and Kauther also agreed that the students who were weak in 
Arabic were also weak in English and students who were from bilingual households, meaning their mother or father was not Arabic speaking, had 





integration of a Canadian curriculum with the Arabic and Islamic Studies curriculum. Teachers 
at the school were encouraged to create a bilingual library and teach thematic units based on 
the Islamic calendar and important cultural and religious festivals.  I met with both, the heads 
of Arabic and English at the school.  Ms. Dalia, head of the English curriculum, shared with me 
that in order to achieve the bilingual vision of the school, “additional time was added onto the 
school day” and that they “make every effort to make sure every effort is bilingual”.  Finally, she 
said that the attitude of the school is of “world globetrotters”, individuals who can travel and 
take from different cultures and places (Interview March 14, 2010).   
 When I met with Hanaan, the director of Arabic, she shared Ms. Dalia’s concern that 
students see Arabic as a very relevant and important part of the school.  In order to accomplish 
that, she and her co-teachers were using technology, games and new strategies to make Arabic 
fun. But she felt that the home environment was central.  Similar to her colleagues throughout 
public and private schools in Doha, she argued that, “interest in the home is the first thing”.  
She also agreed with Dr. Hanaa from Oxford that “cultural advancement” could not be achieved 
by using an “outside language” and that it was important to study and learn Arabic, “the 
language of the Noble Quran” (Interview March 17, 2010).  This last sentiment was widely 
shared by the Arabic teachers I met.  My conversation with Hanaan brought up many of the 
recurring complaints that Arabic teachers shared. That of disinterested students and parents 
and a status shift in which English had replaced Arabic as a “first” language although Arabic was 





 I asked a friend of mine, Mena, who sent her children to HUBS about what she thought 
of the curriculum. This is her written response: 
HUBS is not a bilingual school (despite their name). They follow the Qatari curriculum in 
both Arabic and Islamic Studies but only subjects.  So the children take Arabic every day 
and also take Sharia (from a Qatari text) three times a week.  It is better than most other 
schools here, but in my opinion the ideal school is like Al Bayaan in Kuwait or in Saudi 
which are truly bilingual.  The children take English and three subjects taught IN English 
and then Arabic and three subjects taught IN Arabic. Only studying a language and 
studying IN a language can make you truly bilingual and not favoring either. 
Mena took her children out of HUBS and placed them in the newly opened ACS Doha 
International School.  Like many people throughout the city, Mena has always used private 
Arabic tutors to supplement her children’s literacy skills in Arabic.  Mena’s comment sheds light 
on the importance of actually using Arabic to teach subjects, instead of relegating it to teaching 
Arabic language and Islam.  She argues that it shows favoritism if you teach all subjects in 
English and only one or two in Arabic.  Mena raises an important theme running throughout the 
reported experiences of Qatar’s Arabic teachers.  When the school system and society reduces 
the emphasis on Arabic literacy and increases the emphasis placed on English literacy, there is a 
clear devaluing of Arabic literacy practices.  In order to defend Arabic, teachers turn back to the 
site of Arabic literacy and power, the Qur’an, religious traditions and political and historical 
texts about the power of the Arab and Islamic empire in the Golden Age of Islam.  
 Hizwi of Arabic and Islamic Studies Curriculum in Qatar’s Schools 
 
Numerous teachers I spoke to in Qatar’s schools defined Arabic’s importance by stating 
that “Arabic is the language of the Noble Qur’an.” For these individuals, the Arabic language is 





formal curriculum of the former Ministry of Education focused on religious principles 
throughout the curriculum, the current policy makers at RAND and SEC have tried to narrow 
teaching religion to the Islamic Studies class.  But religion continues to play a pivotal role in the 
promotion and encouragement of Arabic literacy. In the Arabic curriculum created by Dr. 
Jamillah and her colleagues at the Amna Bint Wahab Girls Preparatory School, they have placed 
chapters from the Qur’an in several important sections as primary texts to be studied to learn 
how to read and write in Arabic.  Although this goes against RAND’s suggestions to separate 
religion from the study of Arabic, the Arabic teachers at the school were primarily interested in 
creating a text which aligned with the value of Arabic literacy for their students.  They felt that 
Qur’anic texts were the best way to both teach the Arabic standards and to produce the type of 
student that reflected the school’s mission.41 They are not the only types of texts in the book, 
which include poetry, scientific and historical texts and newspaper articles, but they are 
prominent, leading each new section of the book.  The introduction begins in the name of God 
and with blessings on the Prophet Muhammad, a typical religious introduction. It follows with 
this: 
The Arabic language is the language of the Noble Qur’an, and we have taken it upon 
ourselves- the teachers of the Arabic language- the responsibility of transmitting it to 
the new generation in order to preserve its’ beauty and its’ splendor, this language was 
the language of science and literature on a world level once upon a time. Since our 
students have changed their way of thinking and their way of life from those before 
them, it was necessary to develop the perspective of Arabic language and to 
modernize ways of presenting it without compromising its origins.  
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 Mission of the Amnah Bin Wahab Preparatory School for Girls: To prepare a generation of scholars (people of 
knowledge) supported by the standards… all of them female students… excelling in critical thinking skills… 
equipped with knowledge and skills… Adapting with the world of technological development… holding onto their 
religion and its civilizational value and the most excellent of character…ready to serve their community and their 
country…and carry the responsibility…able to communicate globally with different cultures… 






The introduction proceeds to outline the structure of the curriculum, which includes the 
different types of texts that are recommended by the Arabic language standards put forward by 
the Supreme Education Council.  It also includes at the end a note on the development of 
Islamic and Arab character, nationalism and identity.   This type of text and introduction is a 
common occurrence in Arabic language programming throughout the country, whether in 
public or private schools.42   
Increasingly in schools throughout Qatar, the Arabic and Islamic studies curriculums are 
the only spaces for teaching Arabic, which make it inevitable that there will be cross pollination 
as the same teachers teach both subjects and have to instill a sense of Arab, Muslim and Qatari 
identity into their students within the span of six hours a week.  Add to this the responsibility of 
teaching grammar, syntax, vocabulary and critical thinking skills in a language which children 
don’t always speak in their homes, and you can understand the reason why Arabic teachers 
draw upon whatever resources and support that religion provides to Arabic language 
instructors.  While the Arabic teachers I interviewed are willing to move the teaching of Arabic 
into new forms and to use a variety of texts and skills, they are not willing to let go of the 
religious “origins” of Arabic literacy.  In creating textbooks, curricula and advocating the Arabic 
language, the Arabic language teacher uses whatever resources and support he/she has 
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 Another example of the tradition of beginning with Qur’an recitation occurred during an after school planning 
meeting for the end of the school year performance at Khadija Academy. The Arabic teachers were given the 
responsibility of starting the performances with Qur’an recitation.  They had to decide which child would be best 
and which Arabic teacher would give the opening introduction. This would be followed by an English teacher and a 
performance of an English song by students. The teachers wanted to showcase how well their students knew both 
languages and Qur’an recitation was considered a strong way to represent to parents how students are doing in the 





available to make the study of Arabic important in their own eyes and in the eyes of students 
and parents.  As witnessed in preceding chapters and within this chapter, the belief that Arabic 
is under attack by English, foreign language schools and the increasing presence of non-Arabs, 
requires that Arabic teachers and advocates be increasingly vigilante in their advocacy of fusha, 
through whatever means and discourses available to them.   
Conclusion: “On Mother and Other Tongues” 
 
In multilingual communities, it is challenging for any one language to meet the needs of 
all speakers.  Arabic teachers recognize this dilemma and are attempting to make Arabic 
competitive and appealing to their students by utilizing Arabic’s connection to the Qur’an and 
by referring to Arabic as a “mother tongue.”  At Qatar Academy, Reem argues that students will 
lose their “mother tongue” if parents continue to favor English over Arabic.  At HUBS Bilingual 
and Amnah Bint Wahab, Arabic is a language capable of religious and scientific expression.  For 
Abed Shukri and Hanaan, if you don’t learn your first language well, you won’t be able to learn 
a second language.  Teachers at GES argue that although Arabic is the language of the Qur’an, 
English is now the “mother tongue” of Qataris. These views of Arabic and English are grappling 
with the introduction of English into the speech and language community in Qatar.  Arabic 
teachers are aware that the balance of power is shifting towards English and they recognize the 
need to learn English. Many like Ikhlas, are sending their children to English language schools 
while maintaining the traditions of learning Arabic for Qur’an memorization and basic literacy.  
 
 Bentahila and Davies (1989; 1995; 2006) have conducted several studies of language 





argue that the terms mother tongue and native language are too simplistic in dealing with the 
range of experiences that multilingual have with the different languages they use in their daily 
life. In addition to Bentahila and Davies, Bonfiglio (2010) extensively critiques the concept of a 
mother tongue and its emergence in Europe around ideas of fertility, mother’s milk and the 
metaphor of a family tree. Bonfiglio argues that these attempts to connect one language to 
physical roots resulted in a history of racial and linguistic misunderstanding.  
 I bring up the terms mother tongue and native language because Arabic teachers use 
the idea that Arabic, as a mother or native tongue, should be favored over “other” languages. 
This is a popular idea and one that Haeri (2003) also uses to justify her argument that Egyptians 
should use their “mother tongue” Egyptian Arabic as the national language.  The idea that that 
there is one language that is more worthy of being used, learned or taught because of its origin 
story is found throughout debates and discussions about all languages, but perhaps especially 
in the case of Arabic, which also  has a unique connection to a religious text. For example, the 
authors of the Amnah Bint Wahab curriculum state, “it was necessary to develop the 
perspective of Arabic language and to modernize ways of presenting it without compromising 
its origins.”  Arabic, because of its relationship to the Qur’an has a very unique “origin” story, 
but it is not the same as that of the national languages that Davies and Bentahila and Bonfiglio 
have criticized. Its origin story is connected with the text/recitation of the Qur’an.  This 
distinguishing feature makes it possible for the Qur’an to continue to have a prominent place in 
the teaching of literacy in Qatari society, despite it being a different dialect of Arabic than the 





language the title of “mother” or “native” tongue, because individuals can have more than one 
language with which they associate a feeling of ownership. 
 I would also argue that despite discussions about mother tongues among my 
interlocutors, Arabic teachers did not hold the belief that only one language could meet all of 
their needs. The approach that many teachers took to language was to accept that both Arabic 
and English were becoming a necessity to life in Qatar. Each of the school systems mentioned 
were moving progressively closer to teaching English prominently in their curriculums.   The 
main area of contention arose when teachers felt that parents, the government and 
administrators were replacing Arabic with English, not if they were teaching both languages 
equally well to their children.  This position reflects the normal condition of multi-lingualism 
within the speech community. Because Arabs speak and use different varieties of Arabic 
(Standard and spoken), they are more likely to adapt to another language in the speech 
community. But within the language community of schools, Arabic teachers take the 
responsibility of teaching Arabic very seriously and they utilize religious, scientific and cultural 







Chapter 4: Orality and Literacy in Qatari Higher Education 
   
In this chapter on orality and literacy in Qatar higher education, I argue that the native 
Arabic speaker’s perspectives on the diversity between the oral dialects and Standard Arabic 
literacy is one of acceptance of variation within the speech community coupled with a desire to 
improve the unity of the language community under the banner of fusha.  This perspective is 
supported by ideologies of Arabic as primarily an oral language.  A discussion of “speech 
community’ and “language community” occurs in chapter one, but I will review the terms as 
they are essential to this chapter’s main argument.  A speech community exists when there are 
social norms, rather than linguistic forms, that define the boundaries of the community. A 
language community focuses on (a) language that is denotationally effective in referencing 
meaning within a community.  The language community is more concerned with defining the 
parameters of language and what is “proper” or “good” language use, whereas the speech 
community is more interested in in-group, out-group variation.  
Within the speech community in Qatar, Arabic dialects are used flexibly by speakers and 
there is an idea that oral and aural language is more important in the Arabic speech 
community. Within the language community in Qatar, the shift towards using “proper” or 
Standard English in schools and universities brings out already nascent issues in the acquisition 
of Standard Arabic.  One such issue is whether Arabic has too wide a range between its literary 





struggling to find a resolution to the needs of diversifying speech and language communities in 
Qatar.  While fusha is a recognized dialect of Arabic that has been used historically to 
standardize language in Qatar, English is beginning to take its place as the ideal standard 
language for higher education.  
To begin, I provide a review of higher education institutions in Qatar and their 
development under the “knowledge economy” model.  Following this, I delve into the 
experiences of a group of Arabic teachers researching Arabic language education in Qatar from 
a pedagogical perspective.  Their students also reflect upon the differences between Qatari 
Arabic and Standard Arabic, arguing that Arabic is primarily an oral language. This ideology of 
Arabic absolves these individuals of acquiring literary Arabic, because they find it easier to 
speak Qatari Arabic. These teachers and their student’s experiences are juxtaposed against the 
national university, QU, where an Arabic language program designed for “non-native speakers 
of Arabic” raises a related set of questions about the difficulty of using literary Arabic within the 
speech community in Doha.  In the last section, I relate the emergence of a hybrid language 
within the Qatari speech community, called Arabizi that incorporates Standard English, spoken 
Arabic dialects and Standard Arabic.  This again brings up questions of Standard Arabic’s ability 
to be relevant and useful in the daily lives of Arabic speakers.   I return to my argument that 
Arabic speakers in Qatar are aware of and accept the divergence between Arabic dialect and 
the register of Standard Arabic within the speech community, but are increasingly finding it to 
difficult to hold onto this variability in the face of English’s successful rise as a Standard 
Language of literacy in Qatar’s language community.   There is a desire, on the part of teachers 





competition with English in the language community, but this requires challenging English’s 
status as the ideal standard language of the language community. 
Background on Higher Education in Qatar 
 
 At the university level, Qatar’s language problem becomes compressed as children from 
public, private and community schools are channeled into a handful of universities.43  Prior to 
the creation of Education City and the incorporation of private American universities in Doha in 
2002, higher education options consisted of Qatar University, the national university, and a few 
small programs such as the Qatar Aeronautical College (previously the Civil Aviation College of 
the Gulf States).  Many elites send their children abroad to university and the children of the 
royal family, who are expected to serve the state, are sent to military colleges in Britain.44 
Across the region, it is popular to send children of the ruling family or monarchy to prominent 
U.S. and British universities for training.45  
The national university was created in 1973 by Emiri Decree from Khalifa bin Hamad Al 
Thani, followed some 22 years later by a decree from his son Hamad to create Qatar 
Foundation and Education City.  These two institutions now regulate the majority of higher 
education instruction in the country with the new Houston Community College of Qatar 
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 According to the Qatar Statistics Authority, there are over 200 primary schools in Qatar and 232 schools for 
secondary and preparatory. They do not list a number for universities and colleges, but according to my knowledge, 
there are now about 12 types of institutions serving the needs of students post-secondary.  These include technical 
colleges, military colleges, the Education City schools, Qatar University and the new Community College opened in 
2010.  
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 The Emir, Sheikha Hamad and his son, the current heir apparent Tamim, both attended the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst in Britain.  Tamim was also educated at British schools throughout his youth.  His younger 
brothers, Mohammad and Joaan, both attended Georgetown University in Qatar while his older sisters, Mayassa and 
Hind, attended Duke University in the US prior to Education City’s creation.     
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 The Jordanian Royal family has a history of sending the ruling family to Georgetown University’s Masters and 





(operated by Houston Community College from Texas) positioned to play an important role in 
the future.46  Qatar University continues to be controlled by majority Qataris and in recent 
years has undergone strong Qatarization policies to remove many Egyptian and other non-
Qatari heads of departments and colleges.47   
While working at both Qatar University and Georgetown University in SFS-Qatar, I was 
able to observe the ways in which language is used in these spaces.  As reflected by the 
vignettes in chapter two, these institutions represented disparate attitudes towards the role of 
English and Arabic in the proposed “knowledge economy.” The overwhelmingly Arab and 
Muslim population of Qatar University was struggling to catch up to the education reforms of 
the country while the majority English speaking, non-Muslim environment of Education City 
created another host of issues for Qatari-Non-Qatari relations and Arabic-English ideologies.  
These differences can most readily be observed in the treatment and creation of Arabic 
language curricula and the attitudes of teachers towards the language environment in their 
universities and throughout Qatar and in the responses of students to these programs.  From 
my associations with Arabic language instructors, I was able to observe the dynamics between 
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 The Community College was opening the summer after I left Qatar. I was able to attend their presentations at the 
school fair held at the Four Seasons Hotel.  In the presentation, the emphasis was placed on providing a median 
education between the liberal arts colleges of Education City and the technical specializations that Qatar University 
promised. This would allow students who did not have the test scores to enter Education City schools to develop 
their language and technical skills for professional and personal purposes. There was a recognition that the 
community college would help the older generation of Qataris who wanted to learn English and computer skills and 
to become up to date with the changes occurring in the country. 
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 Qatarization is a policy developed by the government in 2000 whose goal is to increase the Qatari workforce in all 
sectors, public and private, to 50%.  The policy is called Quality Qatarization, meaning they want qualified Qataris 
to take these jobs.  This is a controversial policy among ex-pats as it often means they are not promoted or their job 
is given to less qualified Qatari in order to meet the percentage goals for Qataris in the workforce and in schools.  





individual teachers and students, between staff and administration and between nationals and 
non-nationals. 
Hazawi of Arabic Students and Teachers at Georgetown SFS Qatar: “We are an oral culture” 
 
“We were an oral culture fil bidayah wa ma zal, (in the beginning and we still are)” said 
Muhammad in Professor Yusuf’s Arabic class at Georgetown University.  A product of 
the American School of Doha, Muhammad struggled to communicate in the Arabic class 
designed for Arab students whose level of proficiency in Standard Arabic was tested as 
low.  The teacher, Mr. Yusuf, would often lower the difficulty level of assignments in 
order to get student’s to pay attention and attend.  Muhammad’s comment regarding 
being from an oral culture was made during one of these moments when Mr. Yusuf was 
assigning a response to an article on the separation between religion and state.  
Muhammad wanted to express that using Standard Arabic was difficult for someone like 
himself who was from a tradition of oral speech practices.  He also wanted the 
assignment to be reduced or made easier.  Muhammad didn’t seem to be able to 
express himself fully in Qatari Arabic either, always falling back into English, as 
evidenced in his mixing of the two in the statement that “we are an oral culture.” Mr. 
Yusuf also often used Egyptian Arabic himself and discussed why Standard Arabic was 
important in some arenas (speeches, writing articles) and not in others (daily 
conversation).  The discussion ended with the Mr. Yusuf encouraging Muhammad to 
share his ideas and telling the students they could turn the assignment in later in the 
week. 48 [Fieldnotes, October 4, 2012] 
 
This incident took place in a classroom at Georgetown SFS-Qatar campus in Doha.  Mr. Yusuf, 
who was used to teaching non-Arab students Arabic, was trying to come up with ways to get 
Qataris and Arabs like Muhammad to improve their Standard Arabic skills.  These students, 
mostly Qatari with a handful of non-Qatari Arabs, were in the awkward position of having 
exposure to spoken Arabic at home, but little to poor skills in Standard Arabic because they had 
attended English language schools much of their lives.  Mr. Yusuf would try to engage the 
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students with topics such as defending Qatari and Muslim culture to westerners or playing 
word games and trivia, but in general the student response was lackluster. Many arrived late or 
left repeatedly to use the bathroom. 49  Homework assignments were turned in haphazardly and 
the students rarely felt comfortable using Standard Arabic in the classroom.  As in the story 
above, Mr. Yusuf would often try to combat their fear of Standard Arabic by encouraging 
students to use their dialect when necessary.  In another Arabic classroom at Georgetown, Ms. 
Asma took a different approach to teaching Arabic by pushing the students to use Standard 
Arabic as much as possible.   
Ms. Asma is originally from Lebanon, but has lived and taught in the U.S. in the Arabic 
literature departments (at Tufts University and Georgetown University).  She allowed me to sit 
in on her Beginners Arabic class and her Advanced Arabic Literature class.  I observed the 
following in her classrooms. 
Ms. Asma always used Standard Arabic in the classroom, although she was also fluent in 
French and English.  In her beginner’s class, there were similar problems to that of Mr. 
Yusuf’s Arabic class.  Students came late, reverted to English and dialect often and 
forgot homework assignments.  Ms. Asma tried to focus on their skills and worked on 
improving their understanding of grammar and syntax. In the advanced class, she used 
high level Arabic literature and encouraged discussion in Standard Arabic.  The students 
were more talkative and could have conversations in fusha. They were discussing novels 
written by prominent Egyptian, Lebanese and Moroccan writers. [Fieldnotes, October 
12, 2009]  
Ms. Asma placed the blame for students’ poor Standard Arabic on the Qatari government, 
administration and parents for not prioritizing Arabic language education, saying “parents are 
just as proud to speak English.”  She also said “students had false confidence” and that “in over 
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ten years of teaching, I have never had this situation and difference in level of knowing and not 
knowing” [Interview September 29, 2009].  She felt the problem was not that students were 
more comfortable in the oral, but that they didn’t realize when they were making mistakes or 
what the difference was between Standard Arabic and their dialect.  One of Ms. Asma’s 
advanced students, Abdullah, was of Kuwaiti nationality and had the following to say about 
some of his peers at Georgetown: 
Here I’ve noticed most people feel uncomfortable speaking Arabic, reading and writing.  
Many went to private schools and don’t feel comfortable speaking Arabic because they 
don’t know when they are making mistakes.  The Arabic we speak is different from 
fusha.  We learn Arabic for daily life.  Classical Arabic we learn in the schools and by 
studying the Qur’an. Y ou know this is very important - the Qur’an - understanding it is 
very important for the Arab. [Interview, May 12, 2010]   
Remarks made by Abdullah, Ms. Asma, Muhammad and Mr. Yusuf emphasize several concerns 
that both students and teachers have at the university level in Qatar.  In Muhammad and Mr. 
Yusuf’s class, emphasis is placed on oral speech practices of Arabs as being different from the 
Standard Arabic. This difficulty is seen as an obstacle to successful acquisition of Standard 
Arabic.  Ms. Asma and Abdulla emphasize that some students at Georgetown have been 
exposed to too much English language education in private schools that they do not feel 
comfortable with Standard Arabic, a language linked to Arabic literacy and to the Qur’an.  They 
also emphasize how spoken Arabic is different from the Standard Arabic of schooling, but they 
feel it is the responsibility of Arabs to learn how to distinguish these two variations and use 
them successfully.  This appears to be a norm in the Arabic speech community; that individuals 
should be able to distinguish when to use a particular variety of Arabic.  As we will see 





the speech community will create new norms for communication that can incorporate Standard 
English, without devaluing the standard language of Arabic.   
 “I do speak Arabic well. I’m not able to speak fusha at all” 
 
I met Suhaib in 2007 at the Gulf English School and was able to meet him again at 
Education City in the 2009-2010 school year.  Suhaib was from the ruling Al-Thani family and 
when we met the first time, he drew me a chart of his lineage going back to Prophet Adam.  He 
wanted to explain how close his family was to that of the founder of Qatar, Sheikh Jassim Al 
Thani, relative to that of the current strand which ruled Qatar (the argument being that Sheikh 
Hamad was actually more removed from Sheikh Jassim than his own father and therefore his 
family was closer to the founder).  Suhaib mentioned several times that he had to hide his 
lineage in order to be treated like an average person in Qatar.  Suhaib had changed remarkably 
over the three years I knew him, going from antipathy toward the changing climate of Qatar to 
acceptance and promotion.  In 2007, he spoke with hostility about the growing number of 
immigrants in Qatar, especially lower class workers who were creating fitna (discord) in the 
country.  He also responded to a question I posed to him and his fellow classmates about their 
parents’ education with the following: “my parents learned in the old ways of education. My 
father was trained by his father in the ways of politics and my mother learned from her mother 
and other women, the necessary skills.”  He was the only individual to question the structure of 
schooling and present a different type of knowledge as important.  He asked me, “What do you 





the idea of apprenticeship, but we were both referring to education before it became equated 
with schooling.   
 In 2009, I observed Suhaib walking around the Georgetown building that was shared 
with the Academic Bridge Program (ABP) which Suhaib was enrolled in.  Most often, he was 
chatting with one or another of his teachers in their offices.  He ran for student president of the 
ABP, but lost.  He had applied to Georgetown in 2008, but not having gained admission, he 
applied like many of his fellow Qataris to the ABP program to improve his English, Math and 
Science skills.  In the spring of 2010, he informed me quite excitedly that he had gained 
admission to Georgetown for the 2011 school year.  One afternoon in the Georgetown library, 
Suhaib shared with me his thoughts about language in Qatar and the historical relationship 
Arabic has with Islam. 
 Here in Qatar, Geography and History are taught in Arabic and so is Qur’an.  The 
Sciences and Maths are in English.  Easier for people when they travel.  I know some 
people have poor Arabic, which is a shame.  It is not that they prefer to keep English. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Qatari family realized importance of English in the world – it is 
worldwide spoken language.  The Arabic schools begin to teach English. I do speak 
Arabic well.  I am not able to speak fusha at all.  I rarely speak it.  I speak my local dialect 
and that is considered enough.  The Qur’an is not in fusha, it is a mix of languages of 
Arabic from the Qur’aish who had the best language.  It is more oral than literary, in our 
own history, not a lot of things written.  It is a spoken oral culture.  When you speak, 
your daughter may change it, like a Chinese whisper.  (Field notes, October 18th, 2009) 
 
Suhaib agrees with Muhammad’s assessment that the Qatari culture is an oral one.  He explains 
that the Arabic language is rooted in the tradition of Bedouins who moved a lot and did not 
leave a lot of written texts.  Even the Qur’an is not considered by Suhaib to be a primarily 





Muhammad.  Suhaib draws upon various ideologies about language in Qatar to support his 
points about Standard Arabic and Standard English.  Fusha is the language of Islam and the 
Quran and therefore has a special place in Qatari culture, which is highly influenced by Islam.  
Meanwhile, English is the “worldwide language” which is needed when people travel and in 
order to learn math and science.  Suhaib also prioritizes knowledge that is handed down and 
shared through the generations and through oral communication.  He emphasizes that his 
parents, although not schooled, have gained valuable knowledge and training from their elders 
through hands on experience and participation in communities of practices (Lave and Wenger 
1991).  Suhaib believes that Arabic is in its’ essence oral and dialectical, but also respects the 
need for Standard Arabic.  In several of our other conversations, he emphasized the importance 
of Islam and the Qur’an and used phrases from fusha, the Qur’an and supplications often. To 
contend with the experiences of Suhaib and Muhammad who cannot speak or read fusha very 
well and feel their Qatari Arabic is enough for them, Arabic teachers at Education City schools 
decided to study how to increase literacy in fusha among their students.   
 Arabic for “Heritage” Learners 
 
I met with Ahmad Banna in the summer of 2007 and would later work with him over the 
duration of my fieldwork.   An individual with prolific experience in teaching Arabic to both 
native and non-native speakers, Banna moved to Qatar from Egypt to develop Georgetown 
University’s Arabic language program there.  Having published his textbook series for non-
native speakers of Arabic through Georgetown Press, Banna had a long standing relationship 





economist who had gone to English language schools throughout his life and lived abroad.  In 
response to the Egyptian food crisis and the calls on the streets for bread, the young man asked 
“Why do Egyptians only eat bread?” Banna found this question appalling and indicative of the 
Egyptian economist’s position in America, far removed from Egyptian life, where bread plays an 
essential part in Egyptian culture. Banna does not want this cultural alienation to happen to the 
next generation of Arab youth who are being educated in western institutions and in Standard 
English.  His interests were now focused on a new series of Arabic textbooks, which would 
improve the language skills of Arab students studying in primarily English language schools in 
Qatar, and throughout the region.  To this effect, he had applied for and received a large grant 
from the newly created Qatar National Research Fund.  Over the course of three years, Ahmad 
and his colleagues at Georgetown in Doha and in Washington, along with a colleague from 
Qatar University, were to develop a series of books to meet the needs of Qatari and Arab youth 
who were exposed to heavy instruction in Standard English and poor instruction in Standard 
Arabic. 
In the proposal to the Qatar National Research Fund, Banna and his colleagues used the 
term “heritage learners” to describe the position of Qataris in Qatar’s knowledge economy.  
This term was first used by Kagan and Polinsky (2002) to describe students in the United States 
who are able to speak and understand their “heritage” (Spanish) language moderately well, but 
acquire greater proficiency in another language (English) because it is the dominant language of 
the society.  The argument is that heritage speakers require a different type of instruction in 
their “heritage” languages than the non-native speaker.  Ahmad and his colleagues adapted this 





medium schools require a different curriculum of instruction in Arabic than that of the non-
native speaker and that of the native speaker who lives in an Arabic supporting environment. 
The “heritage learner’s” exposure to their “heritage” language is betwixt and between the two 
categories of speakers that education historically caters to: the native speaker and the foreign 
language or non-native speaker.  
 In the course of several meetings of these Arabic teachers, there emerged a 
disagreement over the use of the term “heritage” to label the Arab students in the classes given 
at the Education City universities.  The opposition was from Zahra, a colleague of Banna’s, who 
has published numerous books on the topic of Arabic linguistics.  Zahra argued that the 
students at Education City were not “heritage” speakers because their context was an Arabic 
one, whereas Arabs in the United States could be called “heritage” because their context was 
majority English.   
The other issue that this group consistently came up against was that of diglossia, a 
seminal term in Arabic linguistics coined by Fergusson in 1959, which describes an ideological 
hierarchy dictating spoken Arabic to certain contexts while relegating Standard Arabic to 
primarily formal, written and religious contexts.  In one meeting, the following conversation 
occurred about which term to use to describe the students that ended up in their classrooms at 
Education City. The conversation begins with a question of what theory should frame their 
problematic.  The original term of “heritage” used in the proposal was not sitting right with 
most of the instructors.  They explored the idea of literacy and bilingualism, with Ahmad 





Ahmad: Let’s strengthen the theoretical foundation.  Is it heritage, literacy, bilingualism, 
diglossia? 
Zahra: Not bilingualism 
Hana: It is acquisition of a different variety -- English and Arabic bilingualism.  If Arabic is weak, 
then we should study everything in Arabic. 
Zahra: How about immersion in both. Science and Math in English and Arabic.  Same content, 
different languages. 
Yusuf:  Difficult for secondary level. 
Hanaa: If we start with Arabic, it’s not hard. 
Zahra: It is time consuming if you want bilingualism. 
Ahmad: Here and in the Emirates, the schools want to exit bilingual students. 
Ahmad: I have doubts on heritage learners - is that appropriate? Or, is it a matter of literacy? 
Ahmad: We should revisit the term heritage. 
Hanaa:  At a conference on heritage, they considered it a problem of literacy 
Zahra: It is because of language schools and international schools 
The difference is the language schools. They take a different subject in Arabic and the 
language is weak a little.  Students from international schools, they are heritage.  They only 
know alif ba - the definition of heritage. 
 
As the conversation progresses, Zahra does not think it is bilingualism, but Ahmad wants to 
consider Qatar as a bilingual context.  Hanaa suggests that at a United States conference she 
attended, the issue of heritage was considered in the context of literacy skills while Zahra 
contends that the problem is language schools versus international schools.  She considers 
students who emerge from the “international” and language school as “heritage” speakers 
because they are only exposed to the Arabic alphabet in these schools.  As the conversation 
continues, Hanaa defines heritage and Ahmad returns to the idea of bilingualism.  
Hanaa: There are three levels of heritage -- those that read Arabic, those whose parents are 
Arab, and those who speak Arabic, but they are illiterate. 
Ahmad: Relevance - Al kifa’… - what does it mean in language competence?  Among heritage 
there are those who understand 100%. I feel if we teach some subjects in some languages like 
in AUC- students from international school - their language was okay.  I want to see standards 
for bilingualism. 





Hanaa: Perhaps it is because acquisition of the language stopped, the second language was 
dominant. Polansky calls it interrupted literacy-dominant language English 
Zahra- The level of English teachers is not very good, speak broken English. The feelings of the 
parents is that English is more important. This affects Arabic and English - and causes 
problems for Arabic. In Egypt - my niece speaks like an American- because the study is strictly 
in English. 
Ahmad: We need theoretical clarification.  
Hanaa: We don’t need to use heritage. 
 
Hanaa offers Polansky’s notion of “interrupted literacy” to describe their students’ language 
practices, but Zahra and Ahmad are not convinced.  Zahra emphasizes the role of parents in 
making students more interested in learning English rather than Arabic.  At this point in the 
conversation, they are still unable to come to a conclusion regarding the theoretical framework 
for talking about Arabic.  As they continue, Zahra offers a solution rooted in the culture of 
orality.  She suggests that students are “abna al luga” or “children of the Qatari language.” 
Zahra: Children of the language (abna al luga). They are the children of Qatari language. Is 
there a distinction for heritage- for the level of listening, the ability of listening is always 
better. 
Ahmad: In Fusha they have strong listening. Better listening comprehension. 
Zahra: They are still children of the language (abna al luga) 
Ahmad: There are some that are very religious- this is a conservative society, they listen to 
Arabic language a lot. Around 80%. 
Zahra: Literacy events more in Arabic. They are not illiterate- this is difficult. Literacy has a 
different meaning - they work with the language. 
Ahmad: We need a synonym - illiterate has a negative connotation, the word illiterate is 
shocking  
Zahra: At Northwestern, there are different types of students. Carnegie Mellon University are 
ibn al luga - the students at Georgetown are weak. Qatar Academy very bad. The type of 
instruction is poor.  
Zahra: I see even in heritage - at home they watch TV in Arabic, speak with others in Arabic, 
shib mutasawi - 





Yusuf: They have the ability to listen - if we knew the depth of the language - the absence of 
culture. 
Ahmad: Is it culture or the people. The issue of culture. The students at AUC [American 
University in Cairo] - weakness in culture, but still better than here.  
Yusuf:  After six months here, I see the historical experience is very different from Egypt and the 
Levant. 
Zahra: Their thoughts differ completely, the new generation - have no culture. Northwestern in 
the middle - when I talk to them, they are Arab - linguistically they are confused. kullu khabar. 
From children of language - what can we ask them? 
Ahmad: We can’t call them ibn al luga.  They are very limited in fusha.  
 
Zahra is against the term heritage and prefers abna al luga, children of the language, and 
specifically, children of the Qatari language.  She brings up the point that while the students 
have very strong Arabic language comprehension and listening skills, their written and spoken 
skills in Standard Arabic are limited.  Her colleagues agree on this point.  The idea of literacy 
being the framework is refused because it would require defining the students language usage 
as “incomplete literacy” or basically illiterate.  Ahmad uses the Egyptian vernacular term 
sadma, or shocking, to refute the use of “illiterate” to define the students.   Then they finally 
discuss whether it is an issue of culture and environment, that the students are not sufficiently 
immersed in an Arabic language culture.  This issue comes up throughout the discussion 
through Zahra’s points about the different types of schools students attend.  She argues that if 
they are in “international” schools, then the student is more likely to have poor literacy in 
Standard Arabic.  Although they all agree on this point, there is no simple pedagogical solution 
to this society level problem.  In later meetings, the emphasis on culture becomes more 
important and they discuss the seminal texts, writings and authors who Arab students should 





English and want their Arab students, Qataris and non-Qataris, to recognize the beauty and 
pleasure that can be found through fusha. 
 The issue of “heritage” speakers is addressed by Garcia (2005) who argues that the term 
came about in a time in American history when bilingualism became restricted.  She says, “by 
leaving languages in the past, the term heritage languages connotes something that one holds 
onto vaguely as one’s remembrances, but certainly not something that is used in the present or 
can be projected into the future” (2005:601).  While students are exposed to Arabic, it depends 
on the types of schools they attend whether there is enough exposure to Arabic for it to be 
considered their native language or a “heritage” language.   As Garcia notes, there is a tension 
between history, the present and the future, which is implicated in the use of the word 
“heritage.” This conversation and “talk about talk” among teachers and researchers of Arabic 
demonstrates how Arabic functions outside the definitions that were available in western 
academia to describe Arabic language practices in Qatar’s speech community. As members of a 
language community, these teachers are invested in outlining and defing the parameters of 
Standard Arabic.  They are finding their jobs challenging in the light of the increasing emphasis 
placed on Standard English in schools in Qatar.  In order to understand these debates further, I 
interviewed Dr. Zahra, who was very outspoken about her views on the subject. 
Old versus New Ideas about Arabic 
  
I went to Dr. Zahra’s office in order to get her perspective on the dynamics between 
Standard Arabic and the dialects in her eyes.  As a linguist and teacher of Arabic for several 





her opinion, the socioeconomic context in Qatar, in the shops and in most public arenas, did 
not support Arabic language acquisition and practice, but the home and family served as strong 
bulwarks for the language.  Despite all the academic focus on dialects versus the Standard 
Arabic, Zahra felt that they are just variations of one another and that the dialects stem from 
Standard Arabic.  One of my Arabic teachers had described this view of Arabic and its 
relationship to the dialects as the “older” theory or idea about Arabic, implying that there were 
newer ideas about Arabic and its dialects that were being espoused today.  When I asked Dr. 
Zahra what she thought of the idea that the dialects and Standard Arabic were disparate 
enough to be considered two different languages (a new idea) she responded, “People who 
think fusha and the colloquial are two different languages, don’t know anything about Arabic.” 
The distinction between the older theories which perceived of the dialects of Arabic as 
directly linked to Standard Arabic and newer western theories of Arabic which advocated 
considering them as different languages became apparent in an interaction between Dr. Zahra 
and a gentleman who came to her presentation on her most recent work in Egypt.  
 Zahra was presenting her findings at a lecture series organized by Education City 
professors to share work in which various members of the community were involved. 
Zahra had conducted a survey of Egyptians from various backgrounds who were asked 
to distinguish between words which were from the Standard Arabic and those which 
were deemed ammiya or dialect.  In her presentation, she emphasized that even those 
who were Arabic language teachers mistook many Standard Arabic words as only 
occurring in the dialect.  Zahra was attempting to demonstrate that speakers of Egyptian 
Arabic do not realize that their dialect is in actuality drawn primarily from the standard 
vocabulary of Arabic. She concluded with recommendations for teachers, in the early 
years of schooling, to emphasize and teach the relationship that Standard Arabic has to 
the spoken language by using Standard Arabic words that are found in the dialect. In this 
way, children might acquire Standard Arabic more readily and fluidly and relinquish the 





In response to her presentation, a gentleman from the Supreme Education Council in 
Qatar relayed the findings from a study conducted by the Council on 5,000 children in 
Qatar which found that differences between the dialect spoken at home and the 
Standard Arabic taught in school could be the source of student’s poor performance in 
Arabic language tests.  Zahra did not find this to be a convincing argument, responding 
that she felt the quality of Arabic instruction is poor and the presentation of materials in 
Arabic is done in such a way that children are not interested in learning the language, 
especially when English and other languages are taught with more appealing visual and 
technological aids. [Fieldnotes, November 12, 2012] 
The gentleman from the SEC was facing dilemmas similar to that of researchers in Dr. Zahra’s 
group.  How could they reconcile western theories of language acquisition with an Arabic 
speech community which prized various dialects for speaking and Standard Arabic in 
education?   When tested, students’ literacy skills are often emphasized, but in the case of 
Standard Arabic, students often have better listening comprehension than written 
comprehension of the language because that is how they are often taught and encounter 
Standard Arabic, a language of Qur’an recitation, religious sermons, media news and similar 
events that span the oral/literary continuum.  The teachers and researchers in Zahra’s group 
explicitly note that their students have different levels of literacy in oral and written Standard 
Arabic.  Both Ahmad’s research group and the gentleman from the SEC are faced with this new 
emphasis on literacy practices brought about by the “knowledge economy” model in which 
literacy testing is essential to confirming a student’s position within the new hierarchy of 
private and public schools.  As an additional obstacle, Arabic is placed in competition with 
English and must demonstrate its ability to be a “modern” language before it can be used to 
teach math, science, technology and be the language of instruction in higher education. 
The perception or ideology of English as a uniform, international language, fractured 





mirror of its English counterpart in how it is taught and used.  While English speakers do 
experience variations between dialects, the teaching of a Standard English is so effectively 
accomplished through schools in Anglophone and post-colonial societies, that English is 
perceived to be a model for other languages (Parakama 1995).  As English serves as the vehicle 
of “international” and “private” education in Qatar, the perception of its superiority carries on 
into the teaching of the less “developed” Arabic language.  
Who put the “modern” in Modern Standard Arabic? 
 
 In order to understand the complexity of these ideologies of language across the 
English-Arabic divide, it is helpful to relay developments in the perception and teaching of 
Arabic in institutions of higher education in the West and in the region.  While Arabic studies 
designed for non-natives in American and European institutions frame Arabic as “Modern” 
Standard Arabic (MSA), distinguishing it from its classical counterpoint, institutions in the region 
have no equivalent terminology for studying a “Modern” Arabic. Only in the Arabic for Non-
native speakers program at Qatar University is the term MSA used, but only once on their 
program and class descriptions.   And while the issue of teaching spoken Arabic has been hotly 
contested in the academies of the United States and Europe, dialectical studies in the region 
are limited and have only recently become of increased interests to regional linguists.50   
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Arabicٌis taught under the name of “Modern Standard Arabic” (MSA) in most American 
Universities, although a more literal translation of the Arabic equivalent would be “The 
Eloquent Arabic Language.” 51 MSA is supposed to be a break from the Classical Arabic of the 
Qur’an and the early Islamic empire, divesting itself of some of the stylistic aspects of the 
language such as inflection, case endings and more complex verb conjugation (Blau 1981; 
Chejne 1999).  Blau (1981) argues that MSA emerged in the 19th century after a period of 
stagnation in which written Arabic was relegated to specialized fields such as that of the ulema 
(religious scholars), jurists and employees of the vast Ottoman Empire which used Turkish and 
Arabic as their primary language (also see Suleiman 1994).  He also argues that during the 
Golden Era of Islamic civilization, there emerged a Middle Arabic which differed from Qur’anic 
Arabic and the highly erudite classical language used in the period directly following the death 
of Muhammad to “preserve” the language of the Qur’an (1981). This theory has not been 
widely accepted and most histories of Arabic only mention a transition from classical Arabic of 
the Qur’an and early Arabic poetry to the emergence of Modern Standard Arabic in the 19th 
century (Bassiouney 2010: Chejne 1999). The variations between Classical, Middle and Modern 
Standard Arabic do not lie in their grammar or syntax, but in word choice and the decline in the 
usage of certain phrases or terminology.  Perhaps this is why many have hesitated to accept 
Middle Arabic as a distinctive linguistic phenomenon.  The contrast between Modern Standard 
Arabic and Classical Arabic is much more evident as MSA has absorbed numerous non-Arabic 
words and since the 19th century, Arabic teachers have attempted to simplify the complicated 
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grammatical rules of Arabic into more sizeable content.  What used to take over 20 years to 
learn through personal instruction at the hands of specialized teachers has been consolidated 
into smaller lessons so that children could be instructed in Arabic literacy in the span of 6-12 
years (Blau 1981).   
In textbooks at Qatar University and in course listings, Arabic is usually listed as al-
lughat al-arabiya, without reference to the word modern.  There is recognition of the historical 
shift of the Arabic language as represented by classes which teach jahiliyya poetry (the name 
given to the period prior to Islam) and in references to “modern” literature of the Maghrib, 
Egypt and the Gulf region. Nonetheless, Arabic in schools is simply Arabic.  The relationship 
between the development of “modern” language and the interest of the western world in the 
region and its’ language(s) is not coincidental (Hoffman 2000; Segalla 2009; Suleiman 2003).   
The standardization of Arabic was undertaken in accordance with the burgeoning 
nationalism in the region beginning under Ottoman Turkish rule and coming to fruition under 
colonialism.  Suleiman (2003) argues that the Ottoman Empire’s use of Turkish fueled Arab 
sentiments and led to several movements to unify and strengthen the language community.  
Colonial powers exploited religious, political and linguistic differences in the populations of the 
Middle East under their rule, contributing greatly to the unification of these groups under an 
Arabic and Islamic banner (Hoffman 2000; Segalla 2009; Holt 1994; Starrett1998).  The 
introduction of western styled education, first under Ottoman rule and continuing under 
colonial rule produced the conditions and contexts through which Arabic language 
standardization would occur (Fortna 2002).  This process was complicated by the formation of 





after a long period of invasion.  The intellectual and educational response to these events 
would give Arabic the responsibility of unifying the community.  
This responsibility can be seen in the formation of Qatar University in 1971, designed to 
be a premier institution of Arab higher education throughout the region. The recent shifts and 
trends in education reform have turned Qatar University’s language of instruction and 
administration primarily to English.  Their website has no Arabic equivalent and their university 
wide publications are either both in Arabic and English or just in English.  This is related to the 
increase in the number of non-Arabs who are working to make the university’s education 
comparative to that of the Education City schools.  As we turn to Qatar University’s Arabic for 
Non-Native Speakers Program, it becomes evident that interacting with and dealing with the 
mirror of Arabic through the eyes of non-Arabs and non-Arabic speakers produces a different 
set of questions regarding Arabic and its internal variation. 
Hazawi 2: How the “Non-native” influences the “Native” 
 
 At Qatar University, Arabic language courses designed for those interested in learning 
Arabic are called al lugat al arabiya li gair al natiqeen biha ةغللا ةيبرعلا ريغل نيقطانلا اهب  or literally 
translated as: “Arabic for those who are not native in it.”  Sometimes it is referred to in an 
auxiliary way as: “Arabic for those who are native in other languages.”  In the following 
situations, the native speaker and the non-native speaker mirror one another, like that of the 
anthropologist and his or her interlocutor.  When the non-native becomes involved in language 
practices of the native, he or she provides the native a different way of looking at their own 





Individuals at the Arabic for Non-Native Speakers (ANNS) Program at Qatar University 
arrive with varying expectations of the language.  Teachers in the program divide the students 
into several categories, based on reasons for wanting to learn Arabic to the country of origin 
and obviously, level of instruction.  Consistently, 50% of the students in this program, when 
asked why they want to learn Arabic, say it is for religious reasons, while the remaining 50 
percent offer political, cultural and economic rationales.52  But all of the students face a 
dilemma of learning how to speak Arabic with the local population.  For many, it is the first time 
in an Arab country, and for others it is one in a list of several. Those who have had longer 
exposure are aware of the divergence in Standard Arabic and spoken Arabic and that each 
country and region has various dialects of Arabic, which makes it challenging for the individual 
to gain credibility and confidence in their speaking.  This incongruence was highlighted in the 
end of the year ceremony for the ANNS program in June of 2010 in a video presented by two 
members of the first level Arabic class. In it, you see a young Caucasian man with sandy colored 
hair entering a shawarma (a meat sandwich) shop and carrying out a conversation with the 
vendors behind the counter. He appears to be a regular at the shop and the attendants are all 
smiles at the young man’s attempts to speak Arabic.  He begins with the Standard Arabic 
greeting of kayfa halakum?  or “How are you” and proceeds to speak broken Standard Arabic, 
asking for one shawarma.  The attendant tells the young man in Jordanian dialect that he 
speaks Arabic well, to which the young man says awkwardly in fusha, “maybe one day I will 
speak better Arabic than you.”  There are several times where the audience breaks out in 
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laughter at the young man’s attempts to communicate with the vendor, but there is something 
disquieting about the interaction.  The primary being that the young man, after completing a 
year of the program, seems incapable of carrying out this simple interaction without making 
grammatical errors.  But aside from this pedagogical concern, there is an underlying issue of the 
young man’s inability to communicate in the spoken dialects of Arabic, or some might say 
“street language,” in which most buying and selling occurs in the Arabic speaking parts of the 
city.  
 In a conversation with Carmen, a program mate of the young men who created the 
video, she shared her disappointment with the video, which did not show case their Arabic skills 
or demonstrate successful interactions in Arabic.  In addition, she felt that the young man in the 
video was disrespectful to the vendors in saying that he might speak “better Arabic” than them, 
emphasizing the status of Standard Arabic over the dialects.  This interaction highlights the 
difficulty of acquiring “native” like proficiency in a language in which formal instruction does 
not help to communicate effectively within the speech community.  This small scene can be 
extrapolated to understand the position of scholars who regard the status of Standard Arabic to 
be detrimental to spoken Arabic, like that of Haeri and several others (Haeri 2003; Ibrahim 
1983).53  Faced with this plurlingualism in the speech community, the non-native speaker must 
learn another form of speech that is not normally taught in the classroom, which they have to 
acquire (as Arabs do) from individuals in the speech community and through interaction.  This 
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arouses feelings of shame on both sides, with the native speaker made to feel deficient in the 
formal language and the non-native speaker incompetent in the spoken language.  It is obvious 
why individuals, on both sides, desire greater intra-lingual homogeneity. 
 “I had never seen Qatari Arabic written before” 
 
In order to help individuals like the young man mentioned above, the program 
coordinators had decided that year to create a course for their students in the Qatari dialect. 54  
Noorah, my tutor for one summer, was slated to teach the class and create the curriculum. 
During the summer in which she so generously tutored me in Arabic, we had several 
conversations about Qatari education, the growing use of English in Qatar, literature in Arabic 
and the issue of language divergence in Arabic.  One of these conversations is particularly 
relevant to her new position as the curriculum coordinator of a class on Qatari dialect.  In 2008, 
Noorah shared with me a story that reflected her relationship with the written version of the 
spoken Qatari dialect: 
I was a teacher in the high schools before I came to Qatar University and began teaching 
in the ANNS program.  The reforms to the schools had started to take place and I 
decided to explore the changes.  My friends and I attended one of the seminars hosted 
by the Supreme Education Council on how to teach Arabic.  The presenter was one of 
my former students. She had handed out copies of a sheet of paper to each of us. When 
I looked at it, I saw that it was a passage written in Qatari spoken Arabic. I was so 
shocked that I immediately turned the paper over.  The presenter was worried so she 
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came over to make sure everything was okay. I had never seen Arabic written that way 
and it seemed wrong to me (Trans. from Arabic by Author).  55 
What was before Noorah was a passage that would normally be written in Standard Arabic, but 
was instead written out with Arabic letters in the Qatari dialect.  An analogy to English would be 
the writing of a letter in African American Vernacular English, Cockney or Scottish English, 
which means adding or deleting letters to accurately reflect the sound in the spoken form and 
the altering of grammar and syntax to fit the spoken language, rather than the “correct” 
language usually taught in schools and required in formal settings.56 But what had caused 
Noorah to become the instructor of a class in Qatari dialect when only two years ago she was 
astonished by the use of Qatari dialect in educational settings?  When I asked her about this 
shift, Noorah explained that the students really wanted to be able to communicate when they 
went out and interacted with Arabic speakers and the program felt it was necessary to offer 
such a class.  She described her role as a passive one in which she was trying to make both the 
department and the students happy.  Noorah was considered one of the favorite instructors 
because she covered a range of topics and always brought in relevant material to instruct the 
students. She focused on topics familiar to the Qatari context and being Qatari herself, she was 
able to challenge stereotypes of Qatari women as docile, subjugated and ignorant.  She was 
also eager to discuss issues of inequality and to point out when something was cultural as 
opposed to a requisite of Islam, such as women not being allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia when 
they could drive freely in Qatar and many other Muslim countries.  Noorah loved to read 
biographies and the poetry of Muttanabi, a much revered lyricist whose poems are memorized 
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by school children across the Arab world.  Her love of Arabic literature could explain her initial 
objection to the use of Qatari Arabic in reading and writing, but when she realized that students 
really wanted to be able to communicate verbally with other Arabs, she acquiesced to design a 
curriculum to teach them.   
 Noorah’s predicament highlights several elements of the issue of Arabic language 
instruction and its’ various dialects within the context of Qatar. In this situation, emphasis on 
spoken Arabic stems from the non-native speakers desire to understand and learn Arabic as a 
unified whole.  There is an assumption that when learning to read and write Arabic, that the 
non-native speakers will then be able to communicate orally with Arabs.  When they interact 
with Arabs in day-to-day life, they discover that their Standard Arabic sounds odd and different 
from the language of every day communication, which are the regional dialects.  And although 
most Arabs can understand the formal Arabic used in teaching literacy skills, most prefer to 
speak in their native dialects, whether that is Egyptian, Jordanian, Moroccan, Sudanese or 
Qatari.  Noorah told me her opinion in this regard was the “old one,” similar to the opinions of 
Zahra Ibrahim mentioned earlier and also referencing the current disagreements about the 
nature of the relationship between the dialects and the standard.  This “old” opinion is that the 
fusha is the mother of all of the Arabic dialects and that most words in the spoken language 
could be traced back to an original word or construct in Standard Arabic.  This is how Noorah 
organized the curriculum for the Qatari Dialect course, in which she has a column showing the 
fusha or Standard Arabic way to say something and its variation in Qatari dialect.  Dr. Adam, her 
colleague in the program and a professor of Arabic literature on sabbatical from Cairo 





similar terms saying that spoken Arabic is the reworking of a term in the Standard Arabic to 
mean something different or new in the spoken.  An English equivalent would be that of “cool” 
or “bloody,” which when used in diverse contexts, mean very different things.   
As we have read, the variation between spoken and written Standard Arabic is a source 
of debate and discussion in both academic circles and in the Arabic pedagogical community. 
Within these circles, the emphasis is on different aspects of language, and I argue that the 
primary differentiation is that of the focus on speech communities versus language 
communities.  In the first section, we looked at varying definitions of the Arabic speaking 
community in Doha and individual and group attempts to tailor the teaching of Arabic to the 
diverse needs that Qataris learning in English language institutions face.  Arabic as a primarily 
oral language, learned through oral and aural practices, emerges as a theme for students and 
teachers.  While students at Education city, who attended private English schools, struggle to 
reconcile their poor Arabic language skills with their own perceptions of language use as rooted 
in oral communication, non-native speakers at Qatar University try to reconcile their Standard 
Arabic skills with the spoken Arabic necessary for daily communication.  The focus on speech 
practices and their alignment with schooling Arabic is the locus of concern for Arabic instructors 
and students of Arabic in both contexts. Language variation is normal to the Arabic speech 
community, but has been corralled in the historical process of clearly defining the border of the 
language community.  Arabic language teachers and students are finding it challenging to 
incorporate both Standard English and Standard Arabic in the language community because it 





speech community there is greater flexibility and a norm is emerging for individuals to use 
Arabic and English in communication.    
Speech Communities, Contemporaenity and Arabisi 
 
In a newsletter called Hazawi which was published by Virginia Commonwealth 
University’s Arts school in Doha, there is a lengthy piece on the back page entitled, “The New 
Arabisi.”  I discovered the newsletter when I visited the school’s arts exhibition during the 
summer of 2007.  Students’ work was presented throughout the school and this newsletter was 
outside the main exhibition hall which showcased the best works of students. The newsletter’s 
theme is stories of the future of the region, covering topics such as the abaya, technology, 
traffic, and cultural festivals. The entire newsletter is in Arabic and English, each piece 
translated from either Arabic to English or English to Arabic (it is not obvious unless you 
compare the two versions, which is the original).  In this particular piece, it appeared (from 
grammatical errors in English) that the young woman wrote in Arabic and translated to English 
with both pieces being well written.  In it, Noof Al Thani predicts that the new language of 
Arabisi will replace all other languages in Doha as the medium of communication among Arabs. 
Beginning the piece with an overview of the history of the region, Noof argues that, “language 
is a live process that follows even the slightest change of any nation.”  She explains that 
although the Ottomans and British empires have left the region, traces of their influence still 
remain.  The current dilemma stems, for the author, from the challenges of becoming 
economically and politically successful in today’s “era of globalization.” Thus, almost all schools 





to read and write Arabic, but are fluent in English.  The author also argues that English has 
become essential to everyone today, because there are many words that come from that 
language which are “impossible to translate” such as google, blog, online and log in, among 
others.  “Therefore, the Arabic language is getting poorer on a daily basis.”  She concludes with 
the following: 
After a while, the time will come when we can expect the new language called Arabisi to 
become the prevalent spoken language in the Gulf region.  It is still too soon to have it 
officially become the prevalent spoken language because its’ written form won’t be 
developed to such an extent, but the authors will start using it in their novels, for sure.  
At this stage, this new creation will be considered the jargon of the Arabian Peninsula.  
Many people will speak Arabisi instead of learning both Arabic and English simply 
because dealing with one foreign language rather than two in the region will be more 
practical and easier.  The presence of Arabic will still exist, but it will be possibly 
offered in schools, as a classical option and won’t be taught as a modern language any 
more.  The English language will be spoken by the western nationals who will never 
recognize Arabisi as a new language. [Al Thani 2009: 14] 
This prediction is an interesting one, especially as it is made by a young Qatari woman who 
does not fear the linguistic changes occurring in her country because she feels comfortable in 
her use of both Arabic and English and in her constant mixing of the two into a new language 
called Arabisi.  Arabisi or Arabizi has become a popular term for the intermixing of the two 
languages in every day speech and conversation and the use of numerous words from English in 
Arabic conversational speech.  The writer also feels that it is impossible to properly translate 
English words such as internet, website, mobile, cell phone, thus resulting in the decline of 
Arabic and the increasing use of Arabisi instead.  She points out three prescient factors, from 
her vantage point, in the increasing use of Arabisi: transmigration, technology/media, and 





medial languages, whether between Arabic and English, Arabic and Urdu/Hindi or Arabic and 
Arabic.  As individuals encounter people from different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds, 
especially those who work in the homes as maids, drivers, cleaners, nannies and tutors, the 
Qatari nationals are increasingly exposed to various languages and vocabularies, and ways of 
expression.   
 Noof’s vision is focused on the speech community in Doha.  While she is projecting into 
the future, she is actually describing the present only slightly rearranged.  The future world, 
where Standard English and Standard Arabic are on the curriculum and textbooks, while the 
tongue of the Arab adapts and incorporates English words into spoken Qatari Arabic, is already 
taking place in Doha.  The only difference is the projection that the majority of “educated” 
Arabs will develop Arabisi to the point where English and Arabic will not be spoken separately 
and that this language develops a written form accepted for usage in literary writing. As a 
student of an Education City school in Doha, where English is the primary language of 
instruction and Arabic is spoken with heavy use of English vocabulary, Noof’s forecast is easy to 
imagine.  In contrast to the Arabs, Noof believes that the western expatriates will never learn 
Arabisi and will continue to only use English.  Noof approaches the speech community and its 
transitional status, where languages are being used interchangeably in a straightforward way, 
devoid of fear or anxiety about a loss of cultural identity.   
 The development of Arabizi in the speech community, although inevitable for 
individuals like Noof, is a cause for anxiety for other Arabs.  Several articles regarding the 





Birbeck University in London interested in issues of Arabic language diversity 
(http://arabizi.wordpress.com/).  In particular, an article about Saudi Arabia and the increasing 
use of Arabizi has the following statement by a student:   
I was so addicted to this language [Arabizi] when chatting and sending texts to my 
friends. When it came to my research paper, I was finding it hard to write in Arabic. I 
had to write it in Arabizi first and then translated it into Arabic. When I start writing in 
Arabic, I found myself committing many mistakes and typos and sometimes had 
difficulty finding the words I wanted to express my thoughts (Ghanem 2011: 2).   
The article continues onto present the perspective of those who consider this to be a disturbing 
trend and those who feel it is in no way detrimental to mix Arabic and English.  It concludes 
with an Arabic language teacher at a private school in Jeddah who argues that if people don’t 
use Arabic, it will die out.  Language death is a reoccurring topic on Fatima Said’s blog, in which 
she goes between being concerned about linguistic transformations in Arabic and recognizing 
language creativity as a natural part of human communication.  While the blog is called Arabizi, 
Fatima Said posts often about policies, articles and op-eds in which the complications of 
Arabic’s standard-dialect continuum and the emergence of English, lead to concerns about 
Arabic’s demise in both spoken and written forms. 
The major concerns about Standard Arabic arise in the context of literacy, writing and 
the development and use of Standard Arabic as opposed to other languages.  The underlying 
issue is that Arabs have for centuries existed with a high level of plurilingualism within their 
speech communities, between Standard Arabic and local dialects. That literacy was primarily 
introduced through Qur’an schools has been noted in numerous historical sources.  The rise of 
foreign language schools during colonialism and the onslaught of globalization have now made 





native language speaker of Arabic dialects because exposure to Standard English, in an Alice in 
Wonderland type fall, has caused the Arab to look more closely at their own language use. How 
much language variation can a language withstand is the question that is challenging the Arabic 
speech community.  While Arabizi maybe one solution to this dilemma, which offers a medium 
of language for highly educated Arabs coming out of English schools and living in Arab states, 
the belief that Standard Arabic is essential to Arab and Muslim identity continues to be an 
influential ideology.  
Conclusion 
 
In the contemporary condition of globalizing processes, however, anthropological 
linguists find themselves in a current of rather fast-moving dynamic cultural processes. 
When these processes are viewed through the lens of the grammar-centered projects of 
the discipline, they give impressions of "language death," of less severe "language loss" 
in one or another respect of structural and lexical and pragmatic richness, and of 
"language interference" or mixing. [Silverstein 1998: 409] 
 
  Silverstein cautions anthropological linguists from placing a grammar based model of 
language upon practices which are “dynamic” by labeling languages as going through death or 
loss because they stray from grammatical correctness.  This comment is made in the context of 
a history of colonial linguistics and defining languages using the standards of western academic 
research.  In the context of Doha, where things are moving at a fast space, teachers and 
students are trying to understand how language should be used and should function in the 
society.  It is appealing, as Silverstein has suggested, to view language mixing and straying from 
grammatical correctness as a sign of “language death.”  Instead, Silverstein argues, and I 





contextualize variability in language practice.  Trends such as Arabizi and “heritage” speakers 
are indicative of changes to the speech community that are then reflected in discussions about 
what language should dominate the language community.  In approaching Arabic through the 
speech community model, where orality also takes primacy, Arabic can be studied not from a 
grammar centric perspective, but a speech centric one.  
  Silverstein’s notion of the speech community is particularly helpful for studying the 
context of Arabic speech and language practices. It allows one to analyze the variety of 
language ideologies that are generated by changes to the speech community and to recognize 
that these ideologies are attached to both oral and literary modes of language.  Teachers and 
students in Qatar emphasize that fusha is learned through oral and aural sources, with Arabic 
literacy being primarily connected to Qur’an, newspapers and other sources.  They also 
recognize that new standards and requirements for English literacy in the “knowledge 
economy” challenge the range and variability within Arabic.  It is not enough for Qataris and 
Arabs to listen to Qur’anic Arabic, read a newspaper with general comprehension or carry out a 
conversation in a mixture of dialect and Standard Arabic.  Now that students are required to 
take SATs and TOEFL in English and some standardized tests in Arabic, teachers and students 
are reassessing their relationship to Arabic language practices, oral, literary and aural.   
In exploring the relationship of multiple languages in the speech community, we can see 
why diglossia is not the most appropriate model for Arabic language use because the 
incorporation of English within the speech community through forms such as Arabisi illustrates 





diglossia model, we would have to conclude that the inclusion of English would indicate a type 
of triglossia.  But in effect, what is happening is that individuals are incorporating languages in 
the speech community according to norms of usage agreed upon by language speakers. This 
type of consensus occurs in practical, everyday language use. But the process of inclusion of 
Standard English in the language community is fraught with questions of language, identity and 
nationalism. It is not as easy for teachers and students to accept that Standard English maybe 
overriding Standard Arabic as the best language for participation in a Qatari language 
community.  While one might counter that language community and speech community are 
simply variations of the diglossia theory, I would argue that diglossia sets up a binary of usage 
internally within the Arabic language that doesn’t exist as strictly for the native speaker who 
views their own language use in light of the norms extant in the speech community.  Diglossia 
implies that there should be a norm in which Arabs use one unified language for all situations, 
usually the spoken dialects of Arabic.  In complicating the scene by incorporating Standard 
English and spoken varieties, we are able to see why the diglossic model is too simplistic in 
accounting for how and why individuals are interacting with languages in the way they are.  
There are no simple binaries and even the categories of speech and language 
communities overlap and run into one another.  There is an important recognition on the part 
of the teachers in this chapter that students have different needs and relationships with 
language.  Thus, the Arabic teachers at Georgetown recognize that Arabic students at 
Georgetown have limited exposure to Standard Arabic, but that does not absolve them of the 
responsibility to learn Standard Arabic as this language indexes Arab culture and identity and 





hand, they realize that Arabic presents students with a more complex system of norms related 
to language in the speech community.  This is highlighted most clearly in the case of non-native 
speakers of Arabic who have difficulty communicating in regional dialects of Arabic because 
they are taught Standard Arabic.  
I would like to return to the idea that the ethnographer creates an infra-language 
between themselves and their interlocutors.  This means taking the meta-pragmatic accounts 
of language speakers as reflecting a relationship that individual has with the language and how 
they feel it needs to be used in the community.  If we take this to be the case, then my 
interlocutors indicate that it is normative within the Arabic speech community to be familiar 
and competent enough in written and spoken forms of Standard Arabic, but use a regional 
variety of Arabic in most speech contexts.  This is slightly different from diglossia because it 
indicates a range of relationships with language that cross-cut both oral-literate divides and 
varieties of Arabic.  It is still a norm in the Arab community to be expected to use Standard 
Arabic when called upon.  While there are spaces more or less associated with Standard forms 
of Arabic, the expectation is that an educated Arab should be able to use the Standard form in 
any given context.  
What has happened at the university level is that several benchmarks have been created 
to indicate ones ability to participate in literary and oral practices in both Standard English and 
Standard Arabic.  In addition, because the norm in English is to speak some variation of the 
Standard English taught in schools, there is an easier transition between speech and language 
communities.  This English language norm has now become the standard with which Arabic 





flexible norms of language use, often attributing the problem to the hegemony of religion.  I 
posit that when we trace the practices of the speech and language communities, we can see 
that variation in Arabic becomes a problem in practices that require high amounts of 
standardization, such as schooling. 
Now one could contend that the religious practices associated with Arabic literacy are 
also a highly standardizing process, but this would indicate that a Standard Arabic should have 
already dominated and displaced the spoken dialects as legitimate means of communication. In 
contrast, there appears to be a relatively fluid interaction within the speech community that 
recognizes fusha as a legitimate language of communication in certain agreed upon instances 
and the regional dialects in others. The “native” speakers in this chapter have felt at ease with 
this relationship until the increasing accountability and testing in both Standard Arabic and 
Standard English have highlighted lack of successful acquisition of a grammer centric language. 
This unease can be traced to the imbalance of power that has historically arisen from 










Chapter 5: “The Qur’an is in Arabic”  
 
Before entering the field for a second time in 2009, I found myself explaining my 
research topic to a new acquaintance at a party.  She had recently arrived from Syria, having 
married an American of Syrian descent.  As I explained my interest in the diglossic nature of 
Arabic and wondered out loud about the reasons for keeping Standard Arabic as the language 
of almost all Arab states as opposed to expanding upon the dialect, she stopped me with these 
words: “It’s easy to understand the reason. It is because of the Qur’an.”  Another conversation, 
with a very different conclusion, took place after an Arabic conversation hour held at Columbia 
University in which I had explained, in Standard Arabic, my interest in the linguistic shifts in 
Qatar and the relationship with language variations within Arabic.  The head of the Arabic 
conversation session, Said, responded that it is a shame that Arabs have not divested 
themselves from the power of religion.  Quoting a prominent Lebanese secular nationalist, he 
argued that it was ridiculous that he could not write a letter to his mother in the spoken 
Palestinian dialect that he used to talk to her in on the phone.  He continued on to state that 
religious control over societies in the Middle East was and is a huge problem.  This same young 
man was teaching his spoken Arabic class in Standard Arabic.  
These two incidents reflect the diversity of opinions that abound in regards to Arabic 
and its ties to Islam.  Some find this relationship affirming and positive, while others question 
its efficacy.   Academic writing about Arabic has not been devoid of this tendency to place 





the key to understanding social issues in the region (Gellner 1983; Geertz 1971).  While religion 
does play a very important role in Muslim societies, it is not one that should be reduced to a 
symbol or considered a panopticon that keeps everything locked in its symbolic prison.  It 
should also be recognized that religion has increasingly been defined by its shadow, the secular.  
This chapter engages primarily with Asad’s (1986) reformulation of the anthropology of Islam as 
one that focuses on a discursive tradition, which Charles Hircshkind has describe as “an 
historically evolving set of discourses embodied in the practices and institutions of Islamic 
societies and hence deeply imbricated in the material life of those inhabiting them” (1996:1). 
Asad has tried to move the emphasis in the anthropology of religion away from deterministic 
and essentializing accounts to instead explore the ways in which individuals interact, 
discursively, with their religious tradition.   
  Hirsckind’s (2006) work on what he terms the “ethical soundscape” is an application of 
Asad’s notion of a discursive tradition in its argument for a “counterpublic” in Egyptian cassette 
sermons. He argues that the ways in which Muslims are asked to attune their ears and their 
bodies to religious sermons teaches the art of disputation and generates discussion in the 
neighborhoods of Cairo. Similarly, the medium of satellite television functions comparably in 
the lives of Arabs and Muslims by creating an auditory and oral medium through which ideas 
are disseminated and circulated through the Arab public.  This media circulation occurs 
primarily in Standard Arabic, although popular music and television programming is often 
produced in regional dialects of Arabic. Hirschkind further argues that western societies are 
primarily “occularcentric” and have ignored aural and oral communication and the ways in 





question of Arabic, in which oral, aural and literacy practices are all important forms used to 
debate and discuss the import of Islam’s central text/recitation, the Qur’an, for Muslims.   
The influence and impact of Islam on Arabic is clear from the beginning of this chapter 
and has been evident throughout the study. I will demonstrate in this chapter, through the use 
of media and ethnography, that Arabic is not only tied to religion, but also to Arab nationalism.  
The Qatari leaderships desire to create a “knowledge economy” is matched with a desire to 
connect with a religious and pan-Arab community of Arabic speakers. This produces some 
competition and concern for teachers, students and policymakers vis a vis English and also 
produces an interesting dynamic between secular and religious ways of looking at Arabic 
language use.  I argue that Arabic’s relationship with religion is perceived by secularists as its 
Achilles heel and by nationalists and Islamists as its’ ideological foothold.   While this supports 
part of Haeri’s 1995 argument that Arabic has a strong ideology of the “sacred”, I posit that this 
relationship must be understood within a larger discussion and debate about the role of 
religion and the secular in Arab societies in which the Islamic discursive tradition is perceived 
more favorably by Arabs and Muslims, Qatari and non-Qatari.  My interlocutors represent Islam 
as a positive connection for Arabic, one which identifies Arabic as a special and unique 
language.  The ideology of Arabic as essential to Islam has played an important role in history 
and also in discussions of Arabic’s role in Qatari society today.  To deny or deligimize this meta-
pragmatic view of Arabic is to deny the authority of its users to reflect upon, understand and 
change their own language practices.   
I begin this chapter with a historical and textual reading of the “discursive tradition” in 





followed by an analysis of major religious scholars in Qatar who have spoken about the 
intersection of religion, education and culture on a widely broadcasted TV program.  This focus 
on religion will be followed by a turn to the genealogy of secular thought regarding Arabic and 
the ways in which Arabs in academia and outside it relate to these ideas.  While these 
groupings are not exact, as western scholars have often romanticized Arabic and Arabs and 
Muslims have romanticized and idealized the secular model of the West, they are helpful for 
framing the current discourses in Qatar. 
My findings indicate that the majority of scholars, students and intellectuals seek 
reconciliation between Arabic’s roots in religion with its contemporary manifestations and 
variations in dialects and Standard Arabic.  The ways in which language functions in Arab 
societies, somewhere in between and betwixt the people, the nation and God, is an uneasy 
interplay for secular discourses to contend with.  In moving away from viewing religion as a 
solely semiotic force in the lives of people, which imbues their every action, towards a theory of 
religion which understands individuals as participating in a set of discourses and practices which 
have a long history in the region and play integral roles in their daily lives, we begin to 
understand that language is malleable and a reflection of the polity, whose needs are 
simultaneously religious, political, cultural and economic.  This malleability has been visible 
throughout the preceding chapters and I will argue that the roots of linguistic “inconsistency”, 
“dis-contemporaenity” or lack of uniformity in Arabic become problematic within a secular view 







Hazawi of Arabs, Arabic and the Qur’an 
{  ٌني ب ُّم  ٌى بَرَع  ٌناَس ل اَذ ََٰهَو  ٌى  مَجَْعأ  ٌهَْيل إ ٌَنوُد حْلُي ى ذَّلٱ ٌُناَسِّل  ٌرَشَب ٌُۥهُمِّلَعُي اَم َّن إ ٌَنُولُوقَي ٌْمُه ََّنأ ٌَُملْعَن ٌْدََقلَو} 
And We certainly know that they say, "It is only a human being who teaches the Prophet.The 
tongue of the one they refer to is foreign, and this Qur'an is [in] a clear Arabic language” 
[16:103]   
In the period prior to the revelation of the Qur’an, the Arabs of the region were a 
Bedouin society who prized verbal jousting and strong memories.  Festivals and gatherings of 
various tribes would pit each tribe’s best poets against the other.  The first written evidence of 
Arabic is reputedly on the Mu’allaqat, seven hangings placed on the walls of the Kaa’ba in 
Makkah to commemorate seven great poets and their poems.57  It would come naturally then, 
as the argument goes in the Qur’an, that the revelation would be revealed in the language so 
prized by these groups as to bring them together (Qu’ran 42:7; 20:113; 13:37: 46:12; 16:103; 
39:28; 26:195).  Language is what Arabs prided themselves upon and so the Qur’an is presented 
in a “clear” Arabic language, as a challenge to those who “understand” (Qur’an 43:3; 12:2).    
While the Qur’an mentions in several places that Arabic was chosen for its clarity, it does not 
ever say that Arabic is a sacred language, instead it describes it as both eloquent and clear.  It 
also presents a second justification for sending the revelation in Arabic, as it was the language 
of the messenger it was given to and the language of the people who would first hear the 
message.  Logical as it may seem, it appears many of the critics and doubters of Muhammad 
questioned the choice of Arabic.58 
                                                     
57
 There is a disagreement as to the actual number of the “hung” poems, whether it was six, seven or even nine.   
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Prophet Muhammad. Thus, many passages are responses to various events, questions and doubts that were thrown at 





  ٌرْقَو ٌْم  ه ناَذاَء  ٌى ف ٌَنوُن  مْؤُي ٌَلا ٌَني  ذَّلٱَو  ٌء اَف  شَو ىًدُه   ۟ اوُنَماَء ٌَني  ذَّل ل ٌَوُه ٌُْلق  ٌى بَرَعَو  ٌى  مَجْع  ۟ اَء  ٌٓ ٌُۥهُت ََٰياَء ٌَْتل ُِّصف ٌَلاَْول   ۟ اُولاَقَّل ا ً ي  مَجَْعأ اًناَءُْرق ٌُه
ََٰنْلَعَج ٌْوَلَو
ٌَوُهَو ٌْم  هَْيلَع ىًمَع ُوأ  ٌَ۟ك ئ
 ََٰل اَنُيٌَنْوَد ن م  ٌناَك َّم  ۟  ٌدي  عَب } 
And if We had made it a Quran in a foreign tongue, they would certainly have said: Why have not its 
communications been made clear? What! A foreign (tongue) and an Arabian! Say: It is to those who 
believe a guidance and a healing; and (as for) those who do not believe, there is a heaviness in their ears 
and it is obscure to them; these shall be called to from a far-off place (41:44) 
 
This verse and the one that opens this section both indicate linguistic diversity in the region 
where the message was revealed and that many questioned the rationale behind the choice of 
Arabic as the language of revelation.  It further insinuates that the choice of Arabic was because 
Muhammad was an Arabic speaker and his message was to be shared with his community and 
those who understood Arabic, not that the language itself was inherently special.  Several 
histories and biographies of Muhammad highlight that he was a very eloquent individual, 
although supposedly illiterate, who had the ability to speak to tribal groups in their dialects 
(Haykal 1994; Ibn Kathir 2000).  As Islam spread, Muhammad would reward slaves of the 
growing empire with freedom if they were to teach Muslims how to read.  The Arabic of the 
Qur’an was chosen to become the language of the new empire. 
As the community grew, the need to preserve the religious texts and traditions became 
paramount to the spread of religious and political unity.  The earliest work in written Arabic, 
after the mu’allaqat, stemmed from efforts to write the Qur’an in its entirety, an effort which 
was begun in the time of the Caliph Abu Bakr (573-634).  There were several folios of the 
Qur’an and several pronunciations of the primarily oral revelation.  By the time of Uthman’s 
caliphate (644-656 AD), people began to dispute which recitation was the most accurate.  





four prominent hufadh, or memorizers of the Qur’an, to work together to create a uniform 
version. In a hadith, it is related that Uthman told the group compiling the standard Qur’an, 
that "If you find yourselves differing, [the three of] you and Zayd ibn Thabit in anything of the 
Qur'an, write it in the tongue of the Quraysh, for it was not revealed but in their tongue" (Sahih 
Al Bukhari 6:183-184). Theories abound about the compilation of the Qur’an and the claim that 
Muslims make as to its authenticity and structural integrity.59   
Arabs and the A’Jam 
 
The idea that Arabic was chosen because of special and unique qualities as the language 
of revelation has been a challenge to the growth of the Islamic empire and in the current era of 
nation-states.  As early as the 7th century, disagreements regarding Arabic’s form and content 
stemmed from the growing community and the burgeoning influence of Persians and other 
linguistic minorities in the empire.  These clashes were a struggle over political power and social 
status as the Arabs were finding their inherited positions as the leaders of the growing ummah 
(community) challenged by the eager, intelligent and ambitious pursuits of the Persians, Central 
Asians, Turks and other minorities (Chejne 1969).  Over the centuries, Arabs and the a’jam, or 
non-Arabs, have debated the merits of Arabic and the necessity for its protection against other 
encroaching languages and speakers. 60 Arabic was the language of the renaissance during the 
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 I’jaz  or inimitability of the Qur’an is another issue which arose throughout the centuries following the Qur’an’s 
revelation. A claim made in the Qu’ran regarding human beings inability to imitate or produce a book similar to the 
Qur’an was a source of discussion and controversy throughout Islamic history, continuing into oriental studies of the 
Qur’an. 
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 Ayn-Jiim-Miim = to chew, try by biting. a'jama - to speak Arabic imperfectly, abstruse (language). a'jamiyyun - 
foreign, non-Arab, one who has an impediment in speech. a'jamiyyan - foreign tongue. a'jamina - non-Arabs. 





golden age of Islam, in which scholars published, taught and preached. Al Jahiz, writing during 
the time period of Abbasid Caliphate (7th to 8th century), said of Arabic: 
The Arabs have been 'more' eloquent in their expression and they enjoyed a language 
which was 'richer' in vocabulary, 'terser' and (uniquely) precise in word, the composition 
of its speech was 'more varied' and the application of proverbs which were in use 
therein were outstanding and more current (Al Attar 1991). 
 
An Arabic prose writer himself and an adherent of the mu’atazilite school of rational thought, 
Al-Jahiz sought to understand why Arabic would be chosen as the language of the Qur’an.  In 
his book Kitab al-Bayan, he argues that Arabic had been, since its origin, a language of immense 
expression; the language of Prophet Adam and then Prophet Ismail which was nurtured and 
protected by the Arabs until its last messenger, who would bear the message of the Qur’an.  His 
argument came in the face of growing shu’ubiya (linguistic and ethnic nationalism) and the 
expansion of the empire into lands with strong linguistic cultures such as the Persian, Turkish 
and the Central Asians.  While non-Arabic speakers learned Arabic and often became experts of 
Arabic grammar, philosophy, law and science, many felt that Arabs placed themselves in 
positions of superiority over non-Arabs by claiming that non-native speakers could never know 
Arabic as Arabs did.  Arabic, thus became a social and class indicator and those who wanted to 
achieve greatness in scholarly and political arenas needed to master it (Chejne 1999).  Al-Jahiz 
supported this linguistic hierarchy which placed Arabs closer to the source of the religious 
tradition, the Qur’an.  As we will later see, however, he also sought to understand the role of 






Ibn Khaldun (1958), some 400 years after Al-Jahiz, would express similar views regarding 
Arabic’s superiority and the natural ability of the Arabs in their language.  Ibn Khaldun also 
recognizes the increasing presence of the a’jam, non-Arabs, who were mainly Persian, in 
scholarly studies.  He distinguishes between the Arabs and the a’jam by using the urban-rural 
relationship, arguing that the Arabs are much better suited to political pursuits while the city-
dwelling a’jam naturally lean towards scholarship and more settled crafts and industries. This 
argument is similar to ones made by Muhammad and Suhaib in the previous chapter that posit 
Arabic as a primarily oral language, making it difficult for Muhammad and Suhaib to have 
fluency in the Standard Arabic of writing and reading.  
Linguistic Habit or Inimitable Speech? 
 
Both Al Jahiz and Ibn Khaldun wrote at a time of increasing heterogeneity in the Islamic 
empire when other languages and groups were gaining power. In Ibn Khaldun’s own words, 
asabiya or group affinity among other ethnicities was challenging the Arabs dominate status.  In 
reaction, these scholars advocated a religiously spurred belief in Arabic’s superiority and 
beauty.  This ideological framing of language as particularly beautiful and pure comes up 
against a need for a practical approach to language learning.  Is the language of revelation, used 
by a particular tribe of Arabia, acquirable by others?  Do others need to acquire it to the extent 
that it has been perfected in the Qur’an?     
Al Jahiz (1995) argued that the Arabic of the Qur’an was the most perfect and inimitable 
Arabic and human beings could never reach its level not because they were incapable of doing 





belief that humanity has the capacity (requiring free will) for great literary work at the level or 
beyond the Qur’an, but that God needed to limit them in this respect in order to present the 
most perfect revelation.61  But this limitation creates a conundrum that continues until today: 
Does a perception of Arabic as “perfect” limit Arabs from reaching greater linguistic heights? 
Does it also create a situation in which people feel unnatural speaking “God’s language” and 
instead of a human language? 
 Ibn Khaldun agrees with Al-Jahiz that Arabs had a fundamental malaka, or habituated 
practice, of Arabic that could not be acquired easily by non-Arabs.  But Ibn Khaldun also 
explicitly states that Arabic is acquirable as all habits can be acquired through repetition and 
practice (malaka). Ibn Khaldun’s theory of malaka has been interpreted by Saba Mahmood 
(2004) as most closely resembling the habitus of Aristotelian origins.  In this section, I quote Ibn 
Khaldun at length because he addresses both languages as habit and language acquisition by 
the Arab Bedouins:  
Habits that are firmly established and rooted in their proper places appear to be natural 
and innate in those places. Therefore, many ignorant people who are not acquainted 
with the importance of habits, think that the correct use of vowel endings and the 
proper eloquence of Arabs in their language are natural things. They say that "the Arabs 
speak (correct Arabic) by nature."  This is not so. (Correct Arabic speech) is a linguistic 
habit of (proper) speech arrangement that has become firmly established and rooted (in 
speakers of Arabic), so that, superficially, it appears to be something natural and 
innate. However, as mentioned before, this habit results from the constant practice of 
Arabic speech and from repeated listening to it and from understanding the peculiar 
qualities of its word combinations.  
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 While the mu’atazilites (a theological school of thought which advocated reason and logic) believed in a human 
free will unfettered by God, Al-Jahiz veered from this tenant in his explanation of why Qur’anic Arabic was an area 
in which the Jabrite (another school of thought which emphasized  doctrine of predestination) doctrine might be 





For comparison, let us assume an Arab child who grows up and is reared among Arab 
Bedouins.  He learns their language and has a good knowledge of the vowel endings and 
of eloquent (Arabic) expression.  He masters (all) that completely, but he does not have 
any knowledge whatever of grammatical rules.  His (correctness and eloquence of 
speech) is purely the result of the linguistic habit he has obtained.  In the same way, the 
(linguistic) habit may be acquired by those who live after the time of the (ancient) 
Arab Bedouins, with the help of expert knowledge of, and constant occupation with, 
(the documents of) their speech, their poems, and addresses.  This will eventually give 
them the (linguistic) habit and make them like persons who grew up and were reared 
among them.  The (grammatical) rules cannot do that. (Sec. 51, emphasis mine, 
Rosenthal) 
 
Ibn Khaldun is very clear on the notion that grammatical rules cannot teach one the essence of 
Arabic “linguistic habits” or more literally, “habit of the tongue” (malaka lisaniya ةكلم ةيناسل ).  This 
can only be achieved through exposure to Arabs who have the “Arabic linguistic habit” or by 
interacting with the documents of Arabic poetry, speeches and addresses.  “Natural” language 
habits are not actually natural at all, according to Ibn Khaldun, because they are acquired 
through repetition and practice, as all habits are.  In connection to Al-Jahiz before him, Ibn 
Khaldun argues that Arabic is beautiful and special in its choice as the language of revelation, 
but he disagrees on the point of human ability to acquire and use that beauty, arguing that non-
Arabs can acquire through situated learning in a speech community or the texts of their oral 
speech.  He also believes that individuals in urban settings lose the Arabic linguistic habit 
because they incorporate other languages into their speech habits.  Ibn Khaldun is critical of the 
Arabic speech habits of his time, saying that the intermixing and allowing other languages to 
mix with Arabic lead to “corruption” (داسف fasad ) of the Arabic language (sec. 46). 
 The evolution of this debate through history has resulted in two trends: one in which 
Arabic is connected to the Qur’anic claim of inimitability and considered to difficult to acquire 





through connecting yourself to speech habits and practices of those who have the Arabic 
linguistic habit.  In both scenarios, Arabic is tied to the Qur’an and to the Arabs.  Another 
perspective should be added, that of the non-Arab, or the a’jam, on what the relationship of 
Arabic is to the Qur’an.  For this perspective, I turn to the program al shariah wal hayat (Islamic 
Law and Life) on the Qatari funded satellite channel Al Jazeera. 
Hazawi of Al-Jazeera’s  
 
Al Jazeera is reflective of the Emir of Qatar and his wife’s vision of Arab societies as 
democratic and Islamic.  Although it is often criticized for partisan journalism, particularly in the 
case of coverage of Bahrain’s revolutions, it also played a crucial role in the Egyptian revolution 
and its coverage of the revolts in that country were lauded by many in the Middle East and 
North America.  The station reflects a desire on the part of the ruling family to create bridges 
between states in the region, with Qatar serving as an exemplary model and financial 
centerpiece to an Arab and Islamic revival.  Al Jazeera’s programming provides a unique range 
of perspectives and views.  Although it leans towards Islam and Arab ideologies of language, 
culture and religion, it does try to represent the range of views present throughout the Middle 
East.  Both Arabic and English Al Jazeera stations try to incorporate technology and new social 
media into their news coverage.  They also have been working to get their stations broadcast in 
Europe and North America.  Many Arabs in the diaspora watch Al Jazeera for news coverage of 
the region and it has changed the way in which public media is viewed from both western and 





and given Arabs a platform to discuss, debate and share important stories happening 
throughout the region through the medium of technology and in Standard Arabic.  
 In the following two shows on the popular Al Jazeera show, al shariah wal hayat 
(Islamic Law and Life), religious scholars from two states in the Gulf take on the task of 
describing Arabic’s importance to Muslims and the relationship Arabic has with the dialects. 
The first of these discussions on shariah wal hayat is with guest speaker Dr. Inayat Allah Iblag 
who is the head of the Arabic Department at Kuwait University.  Although this show is older 
(1998), it provides an interesting contrast to that of the show’s main speaker, Yusuf Al 
Qaradawi, on the Arabic language situation in 2007 and 2009.62  As an a’jam, Dr. Inayat’s 
perspective on Arabic is notably absent of Arab ethno-nationalism.  Instead, he  focuses on 
what obligations Muslims have towards the Qur’an and to learning Arabic.   
Learn Arabic out of Love, not Obligation 
 
Dr. Inayat is Afghani in ethnicity, a non-Arab, who has learned and mastered fusha.  The 
questions the moderator, Ahmed Mansoor, poses to him include the responsibility of Muslims 
toward the Arabic language and the ways in which historical conflicts have diluted Arabic’s 
impact and reach.  Ahmed is concerned with why Arabic has not been able to continue its path 
of dissemination and is now in a less powerful position throughout the world (in contrast to its 
dominance during the Middle Ages).  Dr. Inayat provides responses to his questions that 
primarily emphasize the distinction between religious obligation (fardضرف) and love (بح hub). 
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Dr. Inayat argues that the Qur’an inspires love of Arabic (بيبحت tahbeeb) and does not promote 
Arabization (Ta’reeb بيرعت), which would only become a burden (فيلكت taklif) upon the Muslim. 63 
Therefore, while it is obligatory upon those who want to engage intellectually with the Islamic 
tradition to learn Arabic, the average believer is only required to be able to read the Qur’an and 
use it in his or her prayers.  Although it is encouraged to learn Arabic and understand the 
Qur’an’s meaning in its original form, it is acceptable to read translations and interpretations of 
the Qur’an in other languages.  In regards to the question of dialects of Arabic, Dr. Inayat says: 
“Up until this point, we have been talking about the fusha language, but in regards to 
the colloquial language, the colloquial language has two roles: the first is as culture, 
because we don’t deny its importance. But if the colloquial language and the desire to 
study it becomes the reason for eliminating the fusha language, then it is upon us to not 
recognize the colloquial language if the promotion of the colloquial contradicts the 
knowledge of the secrets of the Blessed Quran. So what I mean is that it is 
contradictory, if we have built our dialogue upon the goal of studying the rules of the 
Arabic language, to support the dialects.  
But even with this, we do not deny the importance of the spoken language as popular 
culture and in its secondary status, it has its own importance, but by condition that we 
remain committed to the original Islamic goal and that is knowledge of the secrets of 
the Blessed Qur’an through the means of the fusha language.“ 
 
Dr. Inayat stays focused on expressing the religious view of the Arabic language which for him is 
deeply connected to the Qur’an. In his most rigid statement, following the above conversation, 
he states that Arabic grammar comes primarily from the Qur’an and efforts to change it are 
antithetical to its preservation.  He unequivocally states that the fusha of the Qur’an should not 
be changed.  But in the larger context of the discussion, Dr. Inayat emphasizes the role of both 
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fusha and ammiya, the term he uses for languages used in everyday speech. He states that the 
latter type of language is fine for cultural purpose, but it should not usurp fusha. He clarifies the 
responsibility Muslims have towards Arabic, predicated on the difference between obligation 
and love.  While religious faith should inspire a desire and love of learning the language of the 
Qur’an, Muslims are not required by their faith to learn Arabic.  This appears to vex the host, 
who repeatedly questions Dr. Inayat on the reasons why Arabic stopped its spread. Was it the 
fault of the Ottomans?  The Arabs themselves who don’t respect their own language? Or the 
fault of Muslims who advocate their own languages and don’t learn Arabic?  Callers at the end 
of the show, Arabs from Holland and Egypt, lament the decline of Arabic and the lack of respect 
Arabs show towards their “own” language.    
“Resisting Cultural Colonization” 
 
 Yusuf Qaradawi, the show’s main scholar, has a different attitude and tone towards 
Arabic than that of Dr. Inayat Allah, perhaps influenced by his political philosophy as the 
intellectual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  Qaradawi’s use of fusha is very 
impressive and his religious sermons on Fridays at the oldest mosque in Qatar, the Omar bin 
Khattab mosque, are highly attended and televised on Qatar television.  His sermons often 
connect historical movements, Qur’anic verses, the life and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad 
and Arabic proverbs to contemporary political, economic and spiritual struggles. He moved to 
Qatar in 1961 after being imprisoned several times by King Faruq and Gamal Abdul Nasser who 
both strongly opposed the Brotherhood’s activities in Egypt.  He was granted Qatari citizenship 





at Qatar University in 1977.  From his various posts, he has published prolifically about Islam 
and the path forward for Muslims, becoming famous for his fatwas, or religious edicts about 
living life according to Islamic religious law.64   
His show on Al Jazeera is one of the most watched shows across the region and the Arab 
diaspora. He is usually the main scholar in residence, but when he is unavailable, religious 
scholars and specialists such as Inayat Allah Iblag above, are invited to the show. Qaradawi 
discusses Arabic in two sessions, one in 2007 and another in 2009.  Both share themes of 
cultural occupation, the importance placed on learning English and other foreign languages 
over Arabic, the increasing rise of the dialects in spheres where they were not normative and 
the rise of private English education. In contrast to Inayat Allah, Qaradawi takes a hardline 
position toward Arabs who don’t respect their own special position of access to the language of 
the Qur’an.  He blames Arabs for the decline of Arabic, and in the 2009 show, Qaradawi focuses 
on Qatar as a case study.  In this segment, which is toward the conclusion of the show, 
Qaradawi reflects upon the resistance of the people towards cultural colonization by languages 
other than fusha.   
Othman Othman (The Moderator):  Why have we returned again to this resistance to 
cultural colonization? 
Yusuf Al Qaradawi: It has returned because in the presence of colonialism, people feel 
resistance.  When there is no presence of colonialism, we don’t feel this resistance, but 
there continues to be a stream that resists this, that resists these colloquials in every 
place and resists the foreign languages.  The foreign language schools are among the 
most dangerous things to the Arabic language. Here in Qatar, there are so many 
foreign schools to which the children of the upper class and the middle class go and they 
                                                     
64
 One such fatwa,  given in (), regarding Palestinian suicide bombers, landed Qaradawi in hot water and resulted in 





hardly know any Arabic. I see some small children that enter these schools and they 
can’t respond to their people, as if they live as strangers in their own land and aren’t 
able to read the daily newspapers and can’t follow a program on television or on the 
radio and they think about their response in English and then translate into Arabic. Look 
what happens.  These schools are dangerous and in addition, they don’t study the 
history of their country, but instead study the history of Britain and British civilization 
and the people of Britain and their conquests and they don’t know anything about the 
history of Islam. Some families try to complement this with private teachers to reduce 
the danger, but they can’t reduce the danger completely.  Here in Qatar, there is English 
language, English in the private schools, English in the independent schools and English 
in the companies and the organizations, then the language of the dialects, the Arabic 
dialects are different, the Qatari dialect, the languages of Asia, the dialects of the Asians 
because of the numbers of Asian workers. The gardener, the driver, the servant and the 
nanny and all of these individuals live in one house and from different countries and the 
children learn from these servants and nannies, and they don’t hear the mom. The mom 
is busy with herself and her beauty and her friends and the father is busy with his 
friends and his business or his money and the children are with the servant. The servant 
is the one who teaches language and is the one who teaches understanding, here, this is 
the danger. We must stand against this danger and we must have a political desire and 
we need public awareness. 
 
Although this is a lengthy quote, it encompasses many of the issues facing Qatar from the 
perspective of a religious and cultural ideologue who has lived several decades in Qatar and 
who has strong allegiances to a pan-Islamist and Arab movement.  Qaradawi’s finishing words 
are fighting words in which he attacks particular aspects of Qatari society and its progressive 
moves towards westernization and its consequent effects.  He specifically criticizes sending 
children to English schools where they become linguistic, cultural and religious strangers and 
bringing them up in households where nannies and servants from all different parts of the 
world are given the responsibility of raising the children and teaching them language.    
Whereas Dr. Inayat was fairly removed from Qatar and provided a perspective on Arabic 
and religion which distinguished political, linguistic and religious lines of inquiry, Dr. Qaradawi 





blatant displeasure with the rise in English language private schools and in the independent 
schools of the new public education system is also a message to the ruling family who has 
undertaken these measures.  Following Qaradawi’s first talk on Arabic in 2007, the Qatar 
Foundation opened the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies whose aim is to “enhance research into 
Islamic culture and promote the diversity and tolerance of the Islamic Fiqh, or understanding” 
(QFIS Website 2011).  Following the 2009 talk, Sheikha Mozah announced at the Education City 
graduation, the launch of a center called Sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad Al-Thani (a member of 
the ruling family) Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization. In addition, Qatar Foundation 
also put money into a Heritage Library and several projects to “protect Qatar’s heritage,” which 
include an Arab Modern Art Museum and the Arabic children’s channels Al Jazeera for Children 
and Baraem. 
 Qaradawi’s presence in Qatar and his pulpit, both approved by the government, are 
signs of the intersection between pan-Arabism and the desire of the Qatari government to be 
connected to other Arab states and towards a larger Islamic movement.  While the current Emir 
and Sheikha Mozah respect Qaradawi, they are not his patrons in the way the Emir’s father 
Sheikh Khalifa used to be.  Qaradawi is allowed to organize, mobilize and create initiatives, but 
he is not the religious arm of the government and as seen in the above quote, he often criticizes 
or extol’s Qataris for their perceived virtues and vices.  These two scholars represent a fraction 
of the discursive tradition in relationship to fusha and while both support the strength and 
dominance of the language with strong linkages to the Qur’an, they take very different views 
based on their political, ethnic and social positions.  Dr. Inayat is not a politician, but an 





a relationship with the Qur’an.  Dr. Qaradawi, as a political persona, with a historical and 
contemporary commitment to Islamic movements, finds in Arabic a tool for unifying several 
projects: that of the Arab revival and political mobilization and that of religious unity and faith.  
For Qaradawi, these two agendas are intricately woven together in the lives of Arab Muslims.  
In addition to connecting with religious discourse, pan-Arab nationalists have looked to 
European and American political systems and ideas for developing post-colonial Arab states.  In 
the following sections, we look at Arabic from the perspective of the “secular”, defined by a 
history of narratives regarding the proper role of religion in Middle East societies.  
Hazawi of the Secular 
 
While Muslim and Arabs scholars in the previous section tend to posit a positive valence to 
Arabic in its status as the language of Qur’anic revelation, western scholarship has struggled 
with how to categorize a language with a strong history and contemporary tie to religious faith. 
During the Middle Ages, Arabic was the interest of a limited group of translators, called 
Arabists, who wanted to benefit from the intellectual fruits of Andalusia’s scholars.   The actual 
language and its structure came under further scrutiny during the 19th century, with the 
emergence of philology and the group of scholars whose interest in the Middle East earned 
them the title of orientalists.  Edward Said (1978) criticized orientalists for their depiction and 
treatment of Arabs and the Arabic language because of their presentation of both the people 
and the language as inferior to that of the west.  Arabic and Hebrew, as Semitic languages, were 
both considered by scholars such as Ernest Renan as dead and incapable of growth (Said 1978).  





Muslims, the rising interest of non-Muslims in the language led to an increasing focus on the 
role of Islam in the language’s growth and development.  In the colonial period, colonial powers 
placed greater emphasis on proposing their own languages for study and teaching in schools 
and in the French contexts, encouraged the use of spoken languages such as Amazigh and the 
Morrocan dialect (Hoffman 2008; Starrett 1999).    
These policies toward Arabic and Islam led inadvertently to the unification of Arabs and 
other minorities throughout the region under the banner of Arab nationalism in order to defeat 
the colonial powers.  Language was increasingly tied to the creation of an Arab polity (Suleiman 
2003).  As new states would increasingly be responsible for disseminating the linguistic identity 
of the Arabs and ethnic minorities who lived throughout the region, Arab intellectuals 
throughout the region began to extrapolate aspects of secular political thought and integrate 
them with Arab and Islamic history.  The rise of nationalism meant the rise of Arabic, or one 
unifying language to connect the Arab people. 
Taha Hussein and Sati’ Al Husari tried to tackle these issues as directors of major 
education reform in the 20th century.  They both believed in the power of education, but 
differed slightly in their opinion of pan-Arab nationalism and the relationship with European 
nationalist ideas.  Hussein attempted to unite Egypt under the banner of a nationalism rooted 
in its Pharaohnic character that he argued made Egypt open to both European influence and 
Islamic and Arab empires.  Thus, he proposed that Arabic language be used in education, but 
that Egyptians maintain their sense of identity through the distinct patterns of Egyptian speech, 
which could incorporate both European and Arabic languages.  Husari was far more zealous in 





region.  He devoted much of his life to building a strong Arabic curriculum based in religious 
and cultural history of the region in Iraq and Syria (Suleiman 2003).  Although he drew upon 
European nationalists such as Herder and Fichte to espouse his theory of nationalism based on 
the Arabic language, Suleiman (2003) argues that he merely did so in order to solidify his 
already strong belief in language as the foundation of the nation.  These ethno-nationalist 
movements took hold of Arabic as a unifying element that crosscut major populations 
throughout the region.  In addition, they responded to the colonial occupation that in many 
parts of the region had denigrated and attempted to delegitimize the role of religious groups, 
leaders and institutions throughout Arab and Muslim lands.  In the post-colonial period, the 
state and the religious institutions attempted to find a balance of powers through which each 
could serve the population.  Each state throughout the region drew upon a varied sociopolitical 
and historical discourse to create unique relationships between the state and religious 
institutions (Hoffman 2008; Mitchell 1988; Segalla 2009; Starrett 1998; Messick 1991).   
The metapragmatic knowledge of these ongoing critiques of language in Arab and 
Muslim societies plays an important role in mediating western sources of knowledge about 
language.  The willingness to learn from and expand upon western theories of language and 
education, coupled with a strong religious and cultural sentiment, form the competing dyads of 
the question of Arabic language in Qatari society.  While Arabic has been historically integrated 
through a framework of religious education and English is currently being integrated through 
math, science and technology education, the notion of one language defining the Qatari nation, 
even that of one’s own dialect, is complicated by constant usage of “foreign” languages.  In the 





western states are fundamental talking points for understanding how Arabic should function in 
Arab societies. 
Is the Arabic Language Disappearing? 
 
On the Al Al Jazeera show Itijah Al Mua’kis ( translated by me as Counter Points and by 
Al-Jazeera as The Opposite Direction), there have been two debates about Arabic, its variations 
and its role in Arab societies since 2000. The first debate took place on April 8, 2008 between 
writer Ali Arsan and poet Rafiq Rohana, the former defending Standard Arabic and the latter 
advocating the development of ammiya (regional dialects of Arabic).65  The host, Faisal al-
Qassem, begins the show with a series of comments and questions about Arabic’s position in 
contemporary politics and with a poll that reports 86.4 percent of Arabs asked believed that 
fusha was in danger of disappearing.  They used the Arabic word, inqiraad ضارقنا, which is 
usually translated as ‘endangered.’  In the beginning of the show, Rohana asks permission to 
speak the Lebanese language during his defense of it.   Partway through the program, the host, 
Dr. Faisal, asks him to switch to fusha because the viewers in Morocco and Algeria and other 
places will not be able to understand him, to which Rohana replies that these same individuals 
would never use fusha to speak to their fathers, mothers or wives and even goes so far as to 
challenge viewers to try to speak fusha for the remainder of the show.  Dr. Ali’s defense of 
fusha runs along political and cultural lines, arguing that it was in the interests of the West and 
Israel for the Arab’s to divide themselves and lose their identity and long rooted connection to 
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Arab and Islamic history.  He feels that fusha is the language of knowledge, a high language 
with a rich tradition and that it is the mother of all dialects.  Dr. Rafik responds back that when 
a language is no longer on the tongues of people, it is dead, and therefore fusha has a serious 
problem, but one which would benefit from the history of Latin, which instead of fighting the 
growth of the vernacular, allowed for the development of French, German, Spanish and English.  
He argues that the Arabs are fighting against the natural course of language development, 
holding onto terminology and grammar which is no longer viable and used “in the street” by 
the people.   
In the second series held on the topic, Dr. Faisal again moderates a debate between another 
poet Anwar Imran and a member of the Arabic Language Council, Dr. Mamdouh, but this time 
the discussion is focused on why Arabic is no longer in touch with the people, rather than on 
the brink of extinction. The implications are similar, but the opposing side, unlike Rohana, is not 
arguing for the usurping of fusha with the dialects but a more medial language that 
accommodates and incorporates new definitions and words quickly.  The emphasis is on fusha’s 
rigidity and inflexibility. In this show, almost ten minutes are spent on the question of why the 
word for “computer” in Arabic fusha (بوساح hasub), was not being adopted in spoken Arabic 
and instead people like to use the English word transliterated into Arabic which is kambuter 
رتويبمك.  This was viewed as a sign of fusha’s incompatibility with modernity or the pace of 





fusha debaters for its contribution and role in developing the language and making it a living 
breathing entity in the homes of Arabs across the world, including the diaspora.66  
 This latter debate is interrupted by a very heated exchange with a caller, Nadal Naissa, who 
disparages fusha and insults the fusha proponent.  This caller spurred several other individuals 
to post comments and videos and articles denouncing him as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.  Many 
people in the comments section of YouTube curse Naissa for degrading Arabic and label him a 
Zionist, mainly for comments he has made on other shows on Al Jazeera against Palestine and 
in defense of Israel. This side story is relevant because the role of “western powers” is 
highlighted in both shows as reasons why Arabic fusha is in danger.  In addition to the mention 
of English and French language education, this political agenda and perceived “war” on Arabic is 
a major defense for protecting fusha from influence by any other language, including regional 
Arabic dialects.   
Religion also plays a central role in both discussions, although more so in the latter 
discussion in which Dr. Mamdouh answers the question of Arabic’s sacredness with the 
following: 
If an individual believes that Arabic is sacred, that is his opinion.  I do not want to argue 
with them about what they hold sacred. For me personally, as a scholar of language, I 
don’t differentiate between languages. Each one has its strengths, each has its 
weaknesses, and things that are not ideal, all of the languages of the world. And Arabic 
is like them, there is difficulty in it and easiness. In truth, I love Arabic and I respect it, 
but I don’t take away from other languages. But if I love my language, then I should 
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prefer it to others and make it better by making it the language of knowledge, not just 
the language of writers or poets, but I want it to be the language of poetry, literature, 
science, physics, chemistry and medicine. (Trans. from Arabic)  
 
Throughout the discussions, even the definition of language is contested.  The poet Rafik 
Rohana distinguishes between dialects (lahja ةجهل ) and language (lugha   ةغل ) saying that the 
ammiya (dialects) are languages in their own right because they are different in both 
vocabulary and structure from fusha.  Those who are pro-fusha argue in turn that all languages 
have a range of standard to dialectical variation, Mamdouh, in particular, cites French policy 
that protects the French standard from the various regional dialects encroachment.  In 
addition, Dr. Mamdouh and Dr. Ali both argue that the illiterate individual in the Arab states 
does not have trouble watching or listening to Standard Arabic on the radio and television, even 
if they may not speak the language in its “correct” form in their daily life. Both of the shows also 
reference schools, teachers and foreign language education as major areas that contribute to 
poor Standard Arabic education.  The pro-fusha debaters in both telecasts argue that the 
curriculum must improve greatly and higher education should not contribute to the “death” of 
Arabic by employing foreign languages such as English and French in their teaching.    
This latter point, regarding what is language and who defines its’ parameters, is integral 
to the perceived role of schools in society. The quality, methodology and success of Arabic 
language teachers are questioned throughout both debates with the host going so far as to 
note that he was only able to properly learn Standard Arabic abroad in England and not in his 
own home country of Egypt.  In addition to this program’s discussions of Standard Arabic were 
two other shows on Al-Jazeera, in which prominent figures in politics and religion in the region 





of English in the region and among young people. From these various conversations, it is clear 
that fusha is perceived as being under siege from many sides-- from the dialects, from foreign 
languages (and their political agendas) and from poor Arabic language pedagogy. It is also 
obvious that native speakers are thinking about the issue of Arabic’s language variability and 
the struggle to control and define the parameters of a language which has so many variations 
within the speech community.  But these discussions are not overtly related to religion or 
tradition, focusing instead on stagnation and lack of development and a contrast between Arab 
speech practices and those of Europeans and westerners.  The belief that fusha must be 
protected is emphasized from a perspective of social, cultural and political activism. Pro-fusha 
proponents argue that Arabic should not be denigrated or derided, but it should be developed 
and made to reflect the beauty of the language and its history.  Anti-fusha debaters are largely 
marginalized in both conversations and the host shows a strong preference for the pro-fusha 
debaters, although actively questioning the lack of development and teaching of fusha, in order 
that people may use it.  Al Jazeera’s role is especially critical in both debates as the news 
channel requires anchors and hosts to use fusha. While guests and news clips showcase a range 
of Arabic dialects, the anchors and news reporters always ask their questions in fusha 
regardless of how guests or interviewees respond.67   
The above debates demonstrate a meta-pragmatic view of Arabic that recognizes the 
divergence between regional Arabic dialects and fusha. But the majority of callers continue to 
support and advocate a strong political, cultural and economic alliance with fusha for Arabs. 
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Only one caller, Nadal Naissa, insists that fusha should be eradicated in favor of regional 
dialects. There is a plethora of discussion and debate about how to make fusha the language of 
literacy, politics and culture.  A summary of these views can be found in one of the most “liked” 
comments on the shows youtube page by alwaysambitious:  
The call to care for the Arabic language does not mean that people must speak fusha in 
the street, but we must be logical and the practical means to protect it.  For example, 
that we try to ensure that we use words from fusha as much as possible, without 
exaggeration or concavity.  So that we bring the dialects closer to fusha as much as 
possible and that it improves gradually.  We must simplify the rules of Arabic and 
develop the teaching methods.  Greetings to all those who love Arabic and take care of 
it.  What makes advocates of the dialects are those who most likely want evil to befall 
Islam (Translated from Arabic by Author). 
 
As seen in this response, the internal differences between fusha and the dialects are 
acknowledged, but the argument to promote the regional Arabic dialects is generally 
disregarded as a secular plot.  Al Jazeera’s viewership comprises Arabs from Qatar, the Middle 
East and the Arab diaspora.  The majority opinion appears to side with the pro-fusha debaters 
who argue that Arabic must be protected from extinction and derision from those who seek to 
do harm to Arabs and Muslims. While Rohana and Imran try to advocate for redefining the role 
of fusha and replacing it with the regional dialects, this argument does not appear to be 
successful.  What creates more discussion is the perceived war on Islam and Arabs by the west 
and the encroachment of English and other foreign languages.  This makes individuals angry 
enough to respond to Nadal Naissa and Rafik Rohana by calling them traitors and anti-Islam.  
These media based discussions, which occur primarily in fusha, illustrate the ways in 
which Arabs understand their own language use in the context of historical, political and 
geographic scales.  There is acknowledgement of Arabic’s variation in oral practices and a desire 





representation of the west as being secular and against Islam.  This conscious knowledge of the 
ways in which Arabic is treated by the “west” creates a stronger force of “resistance”, that 
Yusuf Qaradawi also noted in his response to “cultural colonization” in Qatar.   
Conclusion:  Metapragmatics of  fusha and the dialects 
 
“No they are not different, they are very similar and share similar words, many words come 
from fusha… we don’t use another alphabet to write about ammiya. We use ammiya to express 
emotion more often, our feelings” 
      -Dr. Fatima 
 “Everything comes from spoken word, it is the source. But we write in fusha and speak in the 
ammiya… ammiya is about sounds, orality, tonality, nuances you can’t really understand” 
     Dr. Kuwari 
 
 
 This chapter explored the genealogical origins of fusha with a focus on its’ relationship 
with Islam.  The history of thinking, writing and talking about Arabic as an important tool for 
unifying Muslims and Arabs allowed us to see the convergence, early on in history, between 
Arab political aspirations and the language of Islam’s central text, the Qur’an.  While the Qur’an 
itself is ambiguous about Arabic’s “sacredness,” it does posit that the language was chosen for 
its beauty and eloquence to bear the message of God.  This special status placed Arabs in a 
position of authority and strength over non-Arabs during the growth of the Islamic Empire.  
Scholars such as Al-Jahiz and Ibn Khaldun argued for the superiority of Arabs and Arabic in their 





In the modern period, two religious scholars reflect these complex origin stories; one in 
which Arabic is a medium of a religious message and one in which it supports Arab political 
mobilization in the name of Islam.  While Dr. Inayat Allah, a non-Arab, continues to see Arabic 
as essentially a medium through which access to God’s message is made possible and more 
clear, Yusuf Qaradawi uses the role of Arabic as the language of the Qur’an to espouse a 
political message of Arab and Islamic revival.  Qaradawi is interested in both the political and 
religious potentials inherent in unifying around and through the Arabic language.   
In contrast to this strong religious discourse, is the influence and impact of secular 
western ideas regarding language’s role in creating the nation.  Arab nationalists such as Taha 
Hussain and Sati’ Al Husari both took up the banner of Arabic under reformulations of theories 
of European nationalism.  The belief that language as a necessary foundation for the unity of 
the nation required that fusha be held up as the ideal of new Arab nation-states and within the 
opposition to colonialism, Arab nationalists also sought to defend what was distinctly theirs 
versus what colonial powers had insisted would develop Arab and Muslim societies.  The 
history of colonialism and its language policies against Arabic and in particular, the role of 
religious groups in defeating and pushing out colonial powers, is present in contemporary 
debates and discussions about the role of Arabic in society. 
 This is most apparent in debates on Al-Jazeera’s show, itijah al mu’akis, where Arabs 
from various parts of the Arab world debate the role of Arabic and its diversity of dialects.  
While one individual, Rafiq Rohana, supports the use of the regional dialects as the language of 





as the language of Arab history, religion and politics.  The place of the regional dialects is 
submerged under the important role of Arabic fusha, which is viewed as essential to Arab 
identity, history and contemporary political mobilization against western powers such as 
America and Israel.  There is a belief, represented through colonial history and policies, that the 
“West” would like nothing better than to divest Arab societies of their attachment to fusha and 
to Islam.   
This genealogical approach allows one to see how ideologies of Arabic have been 
shaped by religion and secularism, the definitions of which also shift based on the language and 
culture one is studying.  The interconnecting of Arab identity with an Islamic one has been 
challenged by secularists in the region and by western orientalists desiring to separate religion 
in the model of western European nations.  This western project continues to play an important 
role in the metapragmatics of talking about Arabic as Arabs reference Israel and the West as 
being against Islam and fusha.  In a political move, those who are religiously inclined and those 
who are politically inclined to support Arab nationalism, have found in each other allies against 
the encroachment of western secularism and colonialization.  Each bolsters the others 
importance in the lives of Arabs and Muslims in order to create a unified front against threats 
from the outside word. Any effort to divide the language is viewed as an assault on religion and 
Arab culture.  Attempts to vernacularize the regional dialects and move Arabs beyond a 
“dependence” on Islam are met with “resistance” and this resistance can be traced all the way 
back to the works of early Muslim scholars. 
 The ideological view of Arabic as the language of the Qur’an, found in the writings of 





European nationalists and adopted/adapted by Arab nationalists), produces a strong 
connection to Arabic, in all its forms, that can be seen in the speech of Arabs about their own 
Arabic language use.  The majority of Arabs whom I met over the course of my fieldwork did 
not appear to have a problem with the distance between fusha and the dialects in the speech 
community, but were finding it difficult to reconcile fusha’s historical status in the Arabic 
language community with its less prominent place in a Qatari society where literacy is 
increasingly tied to English.  It is a contestation between different ideologies of language, one in 
which Arabic reflects a religious polity that uses Arabic literacy occaisionally, a nationalist 
ideology that uses language for in group communication and then a final one in which language 
is disconnected from society, “de-localized” and placed in a position of being a pure medium of 
communication.  All three exist in regards to Arabic, but they also exist in regards to English.  
What is at issue in Qatar is not the value of Arabic to Qataris, but how to make these ideologies 
of Arabic competitive with a “de-localized”English language that is represented as ideally suited 
to carry knowledge throughout the globe. Arabic is stuck, in the oral speech community, in the 
traditions of a religious texts and oral stories and in a particular history.  To make Arabic global 
and mobile, means either following in the footsteps of English and de-localizing Arabic from its 
natural roots in Arab society and Islamic discursive traditions or to continue to encourage its 
speakers and users to tell their stories and histories through the multiple languages that 






Conclusion:  Language in the Mirror 
 
 
Through its absence, my very own native language (Arabic) came to allure me.  You see, 
language is a pillar in the very societal fabrics of reality. Imbued within its phraseology 
and wording are chief cultural keys.  This is why the monologues of my scatterbrain 
came to mostly find solace with Arabic language students.  As I have touched upon in 
my previous essay, God and reverberations of faith are appealed to in the most mindless 
of murmurs and most casual of chattered back in many Arab cultures.  For a believer 
however living in a religiously hegemonic culture, it never proved necessary to discern 
why I for one come to voice such categorically religious elements in my everyday 
speech.  More importantly, it never proved necessary to work out whether it is possible 
to still speak Arabic idiomatically and yet consciously veer away from such elements. 
 
Answers only came from the experiences of many of my friends who are studying Arabic 
as a foreign language.  Quite keenly, many came to reveal to me how, in speaking 
Arabic, they find themselves as if dragged into a realm of faith, even despite themselves. 
They spoke of finding themselves voicing notions that they do not consciously believe in 
and that they would perhaps never consciously choose to pronounce in their native 
languages.  The very language of the Arab world seems to open a door to a rather 
different reality and a different paradigm altogether. 
 
I could not help but sturdily nod as I curl back again into the back of my mind.  With a 
fairly bilingual upbringing, I have always felt to be caught in a sway between two 
different realities that do not mix but in which I yet equally dwell. It has always been 
through language that my very world seems to tune to one archetype or the other, as 
it is through language that I have always came to see the spirits of these archetypes 
unraveled.  A mark of my very existence however, I have never been pushed to 
conceptualize it neither to myself nor to others as I am now.  Never did I need to 
embark on a language’s elements of religiosity or lack thereof, regardless of how more 
neutral such a lack admittedly is.  Never did I need to infer any conclusions.  In its 
absence however, the Arabic language, and the peculiarities of the culture pinned to it 
are crystallized more than ever before.  In its absence, it is as if one of my very realities 
slip ever so slowly away; a reality ever so peculiar in a language whose every word leads 
to God. 
 






Sarah was the valedictorian of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service in Qatar in 
2010.  I met her on a bus ride while going to get state required medical tests in the fall of 2009.  
I discovered that she was Egyptian and liked the diversity of students she lived and studied with 
in Doha.  She had attended English language schools for much of her life and was fluent in 
writing and reading English and speaking Egyptian Arabic, but not as comfortable in speaking 
and using Standard Arabic.  She had written this piece following a study abroad experience in 
Scotland.  She mentions in her reflection that she had a “fairly bilingual upbringing,” but it was 
not until she arrived in Scotland that the ties of Arabic to Islam began to “unravel”. 
In this reflection, there are moments of Whorfian linguistic relativity, meta-pragmatic 
awareness, bilingualism and tensions between the secular (a “neutral” category devoid of 
religion) and the religious (described as hegemonic).  In Scotland, Sarah becomes attuned to the 
“peculiarities” of Arabic, a language in which she states “every word leads to God.”  When I 
came upon this reflection, I was intrigued by how similar Sarah, myself and Niloofar Haeri 
evaluated Arabic as a “religious language” when it was placed in juxtaposition within a Western 
context of secular language.  It is also relevant that all three of us automatically priveledged the 
secular model of European language over that Arabic.  Why was Arabic so strange?  Or were we 
(becoming) strangers to Arabic?  
 Sarah’s reflection becomes more intriguing when placed in the context of an incident 
that occurred towards the end of my field work.  Sarah and another Georgetown student, Nouf, 
were involved in a scandal of sorts in May 2010.  The two students were asked to represent 





Questions in a New Arab Millennium” being held at a hotel in Qatar.  It was the last day of the 
conference and the girls were on a panel with several leading Arab thinkers, including Wadah 
Khanfar, the head of Al Jazeera at the time.  A controversy arose when Nouf and Sarah refused 
to speak Arabic in front of the audience of primarily Arabs. The students argued that since this 
was an “international conference,” they were under the impression that it would be acceptable 
to speak English. This led to discussion and debate about what universities like Georgetown in 
Qatar were doing to the identity of Arab youth, leaving them unable to express themselves in 
Arabic at a conference on nationality and citizenship in the Arab world. 68  
 In the incident that occurred in Doha, Sarah was in the context of Arabic speakers, most 
of whom were proficient in both Standard Arabic and a regional language, a norm in the Arabic 
speech community.  The expectation in this setting, where a language community was being 
performed, was that the speakers would use Standard Arabic when giving their talks.  When 
Sarah and Nouf disregarded these norms, there ensued a debate about the role of English 
language schools in making the future generation of Arabs strangers to the Arabic language. In 
this context, it is not religion per se, but identity that is in question.  There are certain norms by 
which Arabs utilize the many varieties of Arabic and different norms for when it is appropriate 
to use “foreign” languages.  In this arena, Standard Arabic is not perceived as “too religious,” 
but the appropriate language for communicating within the language community.   
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 In the first (written) reflection on language in Scotland, Sarah becomes meta-
pragmatically aware that Arabic has many features tied to religious expression that English does 
not.  While she tries to find comfort with fellow (non-native) Arabic speakers, she increasingly 
realizes how “different” Arabic is from English in its reliance on religious terminology.  She 
further suggests that these religious elements are “mindless murmurs” and that she is coming 
to realize that this makes Arabic less “neutral” (than English?).  In the context of English, Arabic 
becomes a strange language.  But in the Arabic context, Sarah becomes a stranger to Arabic.  
Sarah’s linguistic dilemmas emphasize the nexus of language, religion and schooling in Qatar 
and in many other places.  As individuals engage in ever more increasing “close encounters,” 
they are forced to see themselves in the mirror of the “other.” 
Linguistic Heterotopia and Metapragmatic Awareness 
 
In Foucault’s 1967 talk entitled “Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias,” he outlines a definition 
for a term he identifies as heterotopia. According to Foucault, heterotopia can be found in 
physical places such as cemeteries, prisons, ships and in “heterotopias of crisis” such as old age, 
pregnancy and adolescence: periods or spaces of transition and transformation which reflect in 
their existence, the utopia or ideal time and space. The notion of heterotopia captured my 
attention because in its juxtaposition with utopia, it captures the transient nature of movement 
in the Gulf state of Qatar.  Heterotopia’s reflection of utopia is captured in the example of the 
mirror: 
The mirror is after all a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself 
there where I am not, in an unreal virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am 





that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the 
mirror.  But it is a sort of heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it 
exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the 
mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. 
Starting from this gaze that is, as directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual 
space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to 
reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this 
respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the 
glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point 
which is over there (1967:3 emphasis mine).  
Where Foucault has often placed greater power in the utopian mirror to define heterotopia, I 
would argue that individuals are always contesting and questioning whether the reflection in 
the mirror is accurate.  As Foucault ends his section on the mirror, he finds the individual back 
in their body, “reconstituted,” but unsettled because of knowing that the mirror presents the 
individual to some degree, but how much, is still up for debate.  This out of body experience in 
which an individual attempts to see themselves and their behavior from a different perspective, 
or in our case, a different language, produces a feeling of estrangement because it questions 
the very thing we make meaning through; language.  In entering a linguistic heterotopia, an 
individual reflexively recognizes a discomfort with those language(s) being used in 
communication.   
In this ethnographic study, I have shown that school reform has created a utopian vision 
of the knowledge economy that gives English a language ideology that associates it with 
international citizenship.  In its mirror, Arabic appears strangely tied to religious institutions and 
religious texts.  Those on the side of Arabic, see this through the history of the games that have 
been played using language in the region.  Colonization and western imperialism are fresh in 





cultural history, must be defended.  This is the reconstituted position after discussion and 
debate about the meta-narratives that circulated regarding Arabic.  The emphasis in this study 
has been on how individuals debate and discuss language when faced with utopian images of 
another language.  In the example of Sarah above we can see two instances where linguistic 
heterotopias were entered. The first is in Scotland in which Sarah sees Arabic through the 
mirror of English and comes to awareness that Arabic speakers refer to God more often in their 
speech than do English speakers.  The second time, Sarah becomes the subject of meta-
pragmatic conversation regarding the displacement of Arabic by English among graduates of 
English language universities and schools.  While I could easily focus on only one conclusion 
made from meta-pragmatic speech about Arabic (that Arabic is too religious or that Arabs are 
losing their language), I have chosen to illustrate the debates that are produced when linguistic 
encounters occur.  In doing so, I argue that language ideologies should account for variation 
and debate among speakers of language(s) in their meta-pragmatic talk about talk.  When 
comparing multiple languages, users have greater awareness of language ideologies and are 
sensitive to the power and privilege granted different languages.  Language ideology literature 
must not devalue this awareness or simplify it to conclude that language speakers are “limited” 
in their awareness of how these ideologies play a role in their lives.    
Are Arabs Limited in Their Awareness of Arabic? 
 
One of the most important findings of this study is that Arabs are discursively debating 
and discussing the merits of their own language(s) and recognizing the limitations imposed 





academics often want to apply a priori theories of language onto another setting and context. I 
have tried to avoid this by emphasizing my role as a mediator of individual meta-pragmatic 
awareness with the questions and theories that I myself am interested in.  The result has been a 
corrective to the tendency in the literature on Arabic language to emphasize the diglossic 
aspect of Arabic at the expense of the native language speaker’s awareness that languages are 
fluid in their speech community.  But there is still the dilemma of how “aware” is the native 
speaker of their own language use and the language ideologies they are expounding. 
Recent literature on language ideologies and meta-pragmatic awareness has focused on 
how aware individuals are of their language use and whether this is a result of the language’s 
ability to reference itself or a lack of “awareness” on the part of the speaker (Lucy 1992; 
Silverstein 1981b; Verschueren 2000).  Many of these ideas about language stem from a 
reading of Michael Silverstein’s work on the meta-pragmatics of language and his development 
of Roman Jakobson’s work on the functions of language and Whorf’s theories on linguistic 
relativity (Silverstein 1976).  Verschueren (2000) defines language ideologies as “taken for 
granted interpretations of activities and events” (450).  So there is the idea that there are 
“limits to meta-pragmatic awareness” for the native speaker, but that this, Verschueren argues, 
does not remove the salience of a language for the user: “language users know more or less 
what they are doing when using language.  Self-monitoring, at whatever level of salience is 
always going on” (2000: 444).   
So how do we reconcile these positions, one in which we are “limited” in our awareness 





given context, with the complication that arises from multiple languages?  Let’s return to Sarah 
and the contextualization of Arabic in two different settings.  In Scotland, Sarah observes that 
the English speech community does not constantly refer to God in their speech and that religion 
is relatively (in contrast to where she is from) absent from social settings outside of religious 
institutions.  When Arabic is in this setting, it does not seem to fit in the prevailing uses of 
language in the speech community.  In the next context, that of a conference on Arab nations in 
Qatar, English is the strange language because it does not have salience in the language 
community, but this is being contested by Sarah and Nouf who want it to be accepted because 
of its status as an “international” language.  
In approaching this questions from the perspective  of multiple languages and what 
happens meta-pragmatically when they meet, I have argued that we see how strange language 
is vis a vis our own relationships with the language.  Therefore, we take for granted 
“interpretations of activities and events” until we come against a mirror that reflects how 
strange our particular language is in juxtaposition to another language. This is an essential 
revision to the language ideology theory because it illustrates that native speakers will 
metapragmatically evaluate their own language as “limited” when they are performing their 
language in linguistic heterotopias.  This should come as no surprise to the linguist or the 
anthropologist because that is at the heart of our enterprise.  We come to know more about 
ourselves through study and analysis of another culture and similarly, our interlocutors engage 





But this brings up another problematic for the researcher.  If individuals can identify 
limitations to their language(s) as they are used in society and do so because of a hierarchical 
evaluation of one language as more or less “religious,” should we allow one language ideology 
to supplant another for the native speaker?  Most linguists have come to agree that all 
languages have the capacity for a wide range of communication.  Whether they all do the same 
exact things in practice is based on specific places and the needs of the speakers.  I would argue 
that we have to extend language “salience” to account for language “choice.”  We have to let 
our interlocutors decide whether a language’s salience is enough to signal a language as fit for 
multiple mediums of communication or for one.   We have to let them contest their own 
ideologies of language through debates that utilize meta-pragmatic awareness, while being 
aware of the dynamics of power and privilege that come with certain languages.  
Schools, the Nation and Language Ideologies: A War of Two SuperLanguages 
 
Schools are important places for playing these language games because they represent 
the working out of a national strategy towards language.  While Anderson (1981) placed much 
of the emphasis on newspapers and the circulation of texts, I would argue that schools are 
equally, if not better, sites for studying how the imagined community is constructed because 
you can combine the oral and literate practices of the community.  Anderson places too great a 
power in the language of writing to unify a community and this is major reason his theory fails 
to account for instances where standard literary practices differ markedly from spoken 
language.  If we were try to extend Anderson’s theory to Qatar and other Middle East states, 





national imaginary based on a vernacular that dethroned religious and scripted communities to 
create a secular polity.  This conclusion might satisfy the denotational aspect of what we 
attribute to the “nation,” but it does not help us to understand communities that circulate their 
idea of imagined communities through multiple mediums and channels that are not rigidly 
bound to the notions of print or the secular nation state. 
I have argued that rather than positing a priori conception of how languages should 
function that are based on ideologies of academia, we should inquire into the ways in which 
languages are used and perceived by their speakers.  In both of Sarah’s stories, we see how 
juxtaposition of languages allows certain languages to take on particularly ideologies because of 
the different realms they inhabit and the different purposes they serve.  While Yasmin’s native 
Arabic allows her to speak in religious terms, English permits her to write on public forums and 
speak at international conferences.  Each begins to take on an ideology because of the ways 
speakers connect their language practices to a special quality or purpose of the language.  
While all languages are capable of a diverse range of oral and literary expression, it is important 
to understand why particular languages take on the ideologies that they do.  
Sarah, Mimi, Noorah, Muhammad and Suhaib represent Qatari and Arab youth who are 
struggling to reconcile their growing fluency and literacy in English with their partial knowledge 
of spoken and written Arabic.  While these students are pushed to become “global citizens” 
through English language education, they are also tested for cultural and linguistic competence 
in Standard Arabic.  Arabic teachers like Ahmed, Zeinab, Noorah and Ikhlas are those who are 





As we saw throughout the chapters, these teachers are struggling to teach Standard Arabic in 
an environment where English is being increasingly favored as the language of the “knowledge 
economy.”  I have argued that local languages are always competing on a scale of importance 
with regional and global languages.  This competition often overshadows the natural linguistic 
diversity of human societies.  In large part, Arabic teachers and students felt that Arabic was at 
its most vital in oral forms, regardless of whether they sometimes took on the form of dialects 
and other times that of Standard Arabic.  Since many individuals interacted with fusha by 
listening and attending to it as speech, rather than literacy, fusha and the dialects were both 
considered vital elements of the Arabic speech community. This results in an important 
distinction between Arabic and English in the language and speech community in Qatar.  Where 
English increasingly dominates in the language community, where Standard language and 
literacy are essential, Arabic, in both standard and regional forms, is still the primary language 
of oral speech and communication among Qataris and Arabs. 
 There is a considerable ideological connection to fusha that connects it to religious 
tradition.  This ideology does not produce “discontemporaenity”, but does elevate the status of 
fusha over that of the dialects.  Arabs, like Qaradawi, who connect fusha to both religious 
revival and Arab revival, usually denigrate the dialects in order to prioritize fusha.  This vexes 
many language scholars, because the dialects and fusha are all linguistically speaking, each 
language with the possibility for a wide range of expression.  This is a political move that allows 
Arabs to push for unity through utilizing the power of the Islamic discursive tradition, which is 
centered on the Qur’an.  While this is problematic for a secular polity, it is not so troubling in 





language and Arab societies use religious expressions and connect religious faith to everyday 
practices.  In the context of Qatar, these issues are increasingly complicated by the rising 
population of non-Qataris in the country and the growing demand and exposure to English 
language education.  While English is “de-localized” by its connection to international agencies, 
Arabic is oppositionally localized and situated in particular traditions and practices.    
I have also argued that it is through juxtaposition with English and its strong literacy 
ideology, that Standard Arabic looks “developmentally” inferior.  People begin to question, why 
do Arabs speak one dialect in the speech community and use another dialect for writing in the 
language community? Although Arabic does have a strong ideology attached to it as the 
“language of the Qur’an,” it is not an ideology that places a priority on standardizing literacy 
practices in the same way that nation states require.  While fusha is special because it gives 
access to the Qur’an, as Inayat Allah notes it is not required for Muslims to learn Arabic.  Within 
the context of ethno-nationalisms, as witnessed in the writings of Ibn Khaldun, al-Jahiz, Sati’ Al 
Husri and Taha Hussein, standardizing Arabic language becomes a priority for political reasons. 
Pan-Arab and nationalist desires to elevate Arabic to the status of a standardized language of 
written and oral communication light upon language ideologies that consider dialects as inferior 
to the standard.   
While anthropologists have historically championed the oral forms of language, in a 
scenario where language speakers are metapragmatically debating the merits of various 
languages, it is essential that we understand why certain languages are salient and for what 





the unique history of the region.  Language speakers identify the linguistic boundaries as 
occurring between English and Arabic and not between regional variations of Arabic and the 
Standard Arabic.  In the debates on Al-Jazeera and the responses of Arabic teachers in schools 
in Qatar, Arabic is not a divided language, but a weak one that has had trouble becoming salient 
to speakers in the ways that English has.  The primary arenas of Arabic’s weakness are 
identified by Nouf’s article on Arabizi and the Al-Jazeera debates as occurring in areas of 
technology and literacy practices.  Arabs are increasingly favoring English in these areas and 
pushing Arabic to the margins.   
This is difficult for Arabs, both Islamists and Pan-Arabists, to accept because Arabic has 
been an emblem of Arab greatness for many many centuries.  The discussions and debates 
about Arabic are centered on how to make the language more powerful and useful for Arabs 
and there is an understanding that if Arab youth can learn and use English, a language even 
more foreign to the native Arabic speaker than Standard Arabic, why can they not learn 
Standard Arabic?  There are several attempts being made by teachers and policy makers to 
come to support Arabic literacy and use in areas of technology.  Dr. Zeinab and Dr. Ahmed are 
continuing to lead research on ways to teach Arabic better.  There has been a recent decision at 
Qatar University, where resistance to English “colonization” has been its highest, to return the 
language of instruction in several programs to Arabic.  Qatari and Arab youth in the region are 
trying to make Arabic more fun by using it on twitter and facebook.69 The Qatar Foundation is 
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also supporting many forums where Arabic is used to debate and discuss social issues and to 
create appropriate children’s programming.  These programs and inititives are examples of the 
“reconstituted” response to the increasing use of English in Qatari schools and society and are 
important arenas of future research.  
Multilingualism in a Global Culture 
 
 One of the most striking things about studying language in Qatar is the extent to which a 
monolingual culture is no longer an option for Qataris.  I would posit that Qataries should see 
their history of multi-lingualism in which Standard and regional varieties of Arabic are accepted 
as mutually intelligible and valuable to the speech community as an advantage in a “global 
culture” where many languages will be experiencing “close encounters.”  The Qatari 
government is trying to navigate these linguistic complexities by tacitly conforming to the one 
language one nation model, but in practice supporting the use of many languages. Standard 
English, Standard Arabic and Qatari Arabic have each become critical to indexing the state’s 
ambitions, while rooting it in the region’s history.  In order to identify a space for national 
citizens, the state has continued to support the local dialects, customs and practices of tribal 
groups. But while they safeguard the position of national citizens, the Qatari state is also asking 
these citizens to interact and be at home with Arabs, Muslims, non-Arabs and non-Muslims 
through use of Standard English and Standard Arabic.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
based originally in the United Arab Emirates. It has since to grown to include Qataris and Arabs from nine other 
countries in the region. Volunteers promise to tweet only in Standard Arabic and are actively promoting the use of 





The reality of this ideal vision is a complex hierarchy of languages and cultures in Qatar.  
In order to balance the linguistic scales that have been tipped in favor of English, the 
government and the Qatar Foundation are opening new centers for Arabic and Islamic 
education.  Sheikha Al Mayassa, the Emir and Sheikha Mozah’s daughter, recently opened 
Mathaf, a Modern Museum of Arab Art, whose purpose is to be a “cultural instigator” 
throughout the region.  In a speech titled, “Globalizing the Local and Localizing the Global,” 
Shaykha Mayassa says, “we are changing our culture from within, but at the same time we are 
reconnecting with our traditions.  We know that modernization is happening and yes, Qatar 
wants to be a modern nation, but at the same time we are reconnecting and reasserting our 
Arab heritage” (Al-Thani 2010).  This initiative again highlights the desire of Qatar’s leadership 
to connect to other Arab states and to the “modern” Western.  
In the same speech, Sheikha Al Mayassa also says, “People have said, ‘Let's build 
bridges,’ and frankly, I want to do more than that. I would like break to the walls of ignorance 
between East and West.” This is also an agenda of Sheikha Al Mayassa’s mother and father, 
who want to re-write the naratives about Muslims, Arabs and Islam (Al-Missnedd 2003).  Qatari 
leaders feel that Arabs and Muslims are misunderstood and are trying to speak in English to 
make Arabs (and Arabic) better understood.  To a certain extent, as a small polity with a 
colonial history, Qataris have to operate strategically as “subalterns” on the world stage and 
navigate the question of “can the subaltern speak?” (Spivak 1988) by challenging what the 





I am not arguing that the Qatari state and citizens are engaged in a subversive political 
movement, but I am suggesting that the moves that Qatari citizens and their government are 
making towards a “global” culture are reflective of their position in the mirror as minorities who 
have largely felt misunderstood by the dominant culture.  That is why Al Mayassa is bent on 
breaking the “walls of ignorance between East and West.”  Language plays a crucial role in this 
process as the subaltern Qatari contends with taking on the language of the colonizer and 
whether this means a betrayal of their “own” languages.  In the process, it is easy to forget that 
having access to multiple languages is a positive and useful tool of the subaltern, who in 
speaking their language and the language of the other, may be able to place the mono-lingual 
in the position of the subaltern at some point.  This is an important arena of future research in 
Qatar because it is clear that western expatriates, many of whom are mono-linguals, do not feel 
the need to learn Arabic because of the “global culture” in which English is quickly becoming a 
lingua franca.  How will mono-linguals begin to feel in a world where everyone knows a second 
language, usually their own, but they do not have access to the language(s) of the multi-lingual.  
Could mono-lingualism eventually become the subaltern in a “global culture?”  
Arabic and Islam: The Ties that Bind the Arab and the Muslim 
 
 Qataris in this study recognize that they are not only linguistic subalterns, but also 
religious subalterns in the mirror of a dominant Christian west.  The role of Islam in this study 
has highlighted how religious discourse has supported Arabic and other languages, but also 
how it has been utilized in the political ambitions of Arabs.  Non-Arab Muslims also play an 





incorporate the experiences of non-Arab Muslims in this study, they are a significant part of the 
Arabic language learning community.  In the future, it would be important to interrogate how 
Arab and Non-Arab Muslims view Arabic and whether they have the same meta-pragmatic 
response to the Arabic language.  Since this study has focused primarily on Arabic in Qatar, I will 
outline some of the implications of Arabic and Islam for the countries citizens and inhabitants.  
Islam is an important aspect of Qatari society and politics.  It is a yardstick that is used to 
judge Qatar’s leadership.  In order to show their allegiance to Islam, the Qatari state’s leaders 
have built a national mosque and named it after Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, the 
founder of Wahabism.  It is unclear to what degree the Emir, Shaykha Mozah and the current 
leadership of Qatar’s government are committeed to a Wahabi understanding of Islam.  In 
order to explore this, it would be important to interrogate the relationship of the ruling family 
with Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  In the beginning of 2012, Qatar 
Foundation also launched the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics under the 
Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies and made Tariq Ramadan its director.  Tariq Ramadan is the 
great grandson of the first founder of the Muslim Brothers, Hassan al-Banna, and an academic 
who has taught and published in French, English and Arabic.  Through the support of individuals 
such as Tariq Ramadan, Yusuf al Qaradawia and many others, the Qatari leadership is trying to 
creat e a center of Islamic intellectual thought in its capital city.  
  Finally, the Qatari state’s involvement in the revolutions throughout the region has 
produced criticism that Qatar’s leadership is supporting political and perhaps “wahabi” Islam in 





Islam as a religion needs to be explored further for meta-pragmatic discussions of Arabic 
language ideologies.  As noted by one of the debators on Itijah Al Mu’akis, there are Arab 
Muslims who believe that Arabic is a “sacred” language.  How widespread is this view and does 
it have any correlation to particular Islamic political movements? 
 This raises another issue regarding the relationship between regional states and 
“international” coaltions based on ethnicity, language and/or religion.  Is the Qatari state 
moving towards consolidating and creating coalitions throughout the region based on religious 
and ethnic affiliation or is the state simply supporting “development” throughout the region?  If 
the former is the case, it would be the first time since the Ottoman Empire that the region 
might have a focus on something beyond the nation-state.  Stable coalitions are highly 
improbable, but the state’s leadership will likely continue to use allegiance to Islam and Arab 
culture as important points of collaboration with other states throughout the region. It will be 
important to study the internal dynamics between those whose interpretation of Islamic 
tradition is strictly along Wahabi lines and those, like the leadership of Qatar, that are taking 
from a modernist Muslim position on many issues to understand how these varying visions of 
Islam can be used to collaborate and consolidate support throughout the region. 
 Another area for further exploration is on the question of language, Islam and agency. 
Saba Mahmood (2005) argues that agency among Muslim women in Egyptian society is 
mediated by their relationship with a religious tradition and in embodying that tradition. By 
conforming to certain behaviors, these women embody piety and become agents of change in 





theorizing into the metapragmatic space of the believer.  It might be useful to see language and 
agency in similar ways, as structured through secular and religious views of agentic selves. 
While Mahmood uses Ibn Khaldun’s theory of malaka, it would be beneficial to see if there are 
other philosophical constructs coined by Muslims that might aptly explain Muslim attitudes 
towards language and behavior in society.  
This study also highlights how important contestations and oppositions are to forming 
language ideologies. Further genealogical and diachronic studies of language ideologies in the 
writings and ideas of Muslims would be beneficial to understanding what types of language and 
discourse resonated among Arabic speakers, Muslim and non, and continue to do so.  How 
have Muslim Arab thinkers been able to convince each other of the value of Arabic by utilizing 
political upheaval and cultural and religious discourses?  These issues are also connected to 
nationalism and whether or not religious ideologies of language can elide the one print 
language - one nation paradigm. 
Language, Nationalism and Internationalism 
 
 If we understand linguistic nationalisms as arising out of contestations within the speech 
community, the Qatari states efforts to create multilingual citizens with a global perspective 
have important consequencs for an emerging concept of the “international” citizen.  It will be 
interesting to study how this citizenship is linguistically, legally and politically regulated, or if it 
will continue to be rhetoric utilized to engender support for globalizing projects.  The 
emergence of new lines of “international” citizenship can be witnessed in the ease of travel 





easterners to travel in and out of Qatar as these individuals’ movements are highly regulated. 
The evolution of an “international” citizen will likely be along lines of national citizenship and 
states that have close relationships might begin to allow free movement of nationals between 
their states.  There have been talks about a Gulf Cooperation Council card that would allow 
nationals from the varying Gulf States to move about easily from one state to the next.  There 
are also talks about a bridge to Bahrain and opening up trade and labor force movement.  But 
these talks have been impeded by each state’s desire to maintain autonomy over their internal 
affairs and in particular, because of fear of the power and size of Saudi Arabia, which might try 
to dominate and subsume the smaller Gulf States under its umbrella.   
Language regionalism is most likely to continue to rely on Standard and regional dialects 
of Arabic while “internationalism” would most likely occur through Standard English.  Both elide 
the need for one print language to mediate the Qatari citizen’s relationship with the state. 
While the Qatari citizen can be identified through their use of Qatari Arabic and oral 
communication in that dialect, they are also being called upon by the government to become 
plurilingual and cross regional and international boundaries to create alliances with other 
countries and states.  The potential to explore different types of international and regional print 
and oral communities is possible because national citizen is no longer directly connected to one 
print language.  Qatari citizens who are increasingly being encouraged and financially supported 
to learn English will have to read newspapers in both Standard English and Standard Arabic in 
order to know what is happening across the linguistic communities they are apart of.  It would 
be important to study how newspapers in multiple languages are used and how individuals 





communities.  In the SFS Qatar library, newspapers from Britain and France were side by side 
with regional GCC newspapers and national newspapers run by Qataries.  There was also a 
distinction in Qatar between newspapers for expatriates in Qatar, written in English, (Gulf 
Times, Peninsula) and those for national citizens, written in Arabic (Al Raya, Al Sharq). 
This focus on newspapers could lead to a reevaluation or expansion of Anderson’s thesis 
of the imagined community that incorporates the perspective of multi-linguals. How do multi-
linguals participate in many different imagined communities?  Is print still the main medium or 
do most people now get their news from the internet or tweets?  What happens to the Qatari 
who attends only English schools and reads only in English?  Will newspapers cater to this 
community and how will they connect the national citizens if some are reading in English and 
others are reading in Arabic?  What will the transfer process look like from news in one 
language to another?  Already in Qatar, newspapers that are geared towards expatriates 
(printed in English) focus on issues that are important to these communities, highlighting news 
about American, Indian and British private schools and announcing events in these 
communities.  On the other hand, the Arabic newspapers report on the state’s recent 
initiatives, events at Qatar University and public schools and on the marriages and deaths of 
prominent Qatari families.  These different mediums of communication bring up the variable 
importance of literacy to these discussions.  While English is largely taught with a focus on print 







Language [Literacy] Ideologies, Schooling and Religion 
 
 Language ideologies incorporate the different ways in which language is used, whether 
in oral or literate forms.  I have argued that Arabic speakers have a stronger relationship to 
Arabic in their oral practices and that there is growing demand for literacy in English that is 
challenging this paradigm.  Schools are playing a major role in this mirroring of language.  As 
Arabic teachers observe students speaking, reading and writing in English and see these same 
students struggling with Arabic literacy, this raises questions about the literacy ideologies that 
individuals have to navigate and debate as they participate in Qatari society. Marcia Farr (2010) 
has argued that literacy ideologies should be interrogated for “two important aspects of ‘literacy 
reality’— one, that it is language and literacy purism (not dialect features) that function as 
impediments to literacy learning (Adger, Wolfram & Christian, 2007), and two, that ‘literacy’ 
itself has varying definitions, from the purely linguistic (which applies across cultures and across 
time) to the cognitive (which is culturally-determined)” (21).  The first refers to the tendency in 
teaching literacy to correct the student’s speech practices in favor of the standard language and 
to constantly mirror the individual’s language use through a utopian mirror.  The latter aspect 
refers to the tendency to elide the different expectations people have of what they should be 
able to do with literacy.  Much of what is emphasized in western education is the use of literacy 
for “critical thinking” while being able to read and write a language is often the minimal 
definition used by many other societies to define one as literate.  
 These differences are critical in multi-lingual and cross-cultural situations where 





on the literacy ideologies associated with learning Arabic for religious purposes. If Qatari 
students are expected to be literate in Standard Arabic, what types of literacy practices do they 
engage in at home and in relationship to the Qur’an, which has been noted several times as the 
number one reason many Arabs must “defend” Arabic?   In addition, what do children do at 
home with literacy in Arabic and English?  Is it enough for one to simply be able to participate in 
a literacy event (Heath 1982) or does one need to be using their literacy skills to critically 
analyze and challenge others in their reading and writing of similar texts?  While it was 
suggested by RAND that this is not already occurring in Arabic, there are several events and 
discussions throughout this study that illustrate that critical thinking about Arabic is occurring in 
many different spheres throughout Qatar. In schools, the media and at home, Arabic is being 
used both orally and in literate forms to engage in meta-pragmatic talk about Arabic.  This 
exploration is much needed to broaden the scope and reach of language ideologies literature 
and theorizing.   
Contributions to Gulf Studies 
 
 Gulf Studies has heretofore focused on political relationships between Great Britain, 
Saudi Arabia and the Indian Ocean trade route.  Only recently have scholars began to 
interrogate the complex array of questions that the influx of labor, ideas and things into the 
Gulf Region might mean for national citizens, “outsiders,” and for academia.  As my 
ethnography highlights, there are “close encounters” occurring in almost every imaginable 
space in Qatar.  These encounters could be used to challenge ideas we have about nationalism, 





Qatar and its neighboring states try to bring people from all over the world into their country 
and to shoot out ideas of what it means to be “modern” Arabs and Muslims, there are several 
conflations and conflagarations that are taking place.  Schools, art, fashion, cuisine, language 
and architecture are all on the table to be re-imagined, re-built and critiqued through the eyes 
of the mediators of what is considered “local” and “global.” 
 Gulf Studies provides a platform for making connections between “East and West” and 
also for looking at these connections in small populations.  The major challenge to Gulf Studies 
is the perception that the region is unworthy of interest because of its small population and 
humble roots.  While there are a few individuals who might meet the stereotype of a spoiled 
Khaliji spending his or her government’s money on expensive western merchandise, there are 
many more individuals who are struggling and contending with questions of identity, religion, 
language and culture in these states.  Instead of polarizing views of the Gulf citizens as 
“glittering empty shells” or “wahabi salafīs,” it would be beneficial to study the region as full of 
potential mediators, diversifying and multiplying difference while simultaneously being 






Epilogue: Two Little Reflections in my Linguistic Mirror  
 
 This study has followed me throughout my experiences as a student of anthropology 
and education, as a mother and as multi-lingual navigating diverse continents, countries and 
cities.  It has helped me to think through the challenges of constantly reflecting and seeing 
myself through the mirror of others. Each of us must return home, to ourselves, after our 
travels and studies to contend with the complexity of our theorizing in our daily lives.  In this 
epilogue, I would like to share some of the ongoing challenges and debates I am contending 
with that relate to this study.  I opened this study with a history of my relationship to multiple 
languages; Arabic, English and Bengali, and I end with how these relationships continue to 
evolve. 
 When I began this study, I was a mother of one daughter, whom I had decided to 
attempt to raise multilingual.  I spoke to my daughter in Bangla, her father spoke to her in 
Arabic and we hoped that she would easily pick up English from family and friends and 
eventually in school.  This worked pretty well in the first two years because we lived apart from 
family and spent a lot of time talking, reading and “teaching” her our chosen languages.  While 
some of our family members were concerned that she would not pick up English or that she 
would speak English with an accent, this fear was allayed in the years between three and four 
when she began to attend an English preschool.  While in Qatar during field work, this daughter 





our stay, the oldest daughter was speaking bits of Qatari Arabic and also rapidly picking up 
English. 
Things became linguistically more complicated when we returned to the United States.  
While writing up this ethnography, my youngest daughter was being taken care of by my 
mother, who spoke to her in a mixture of Bangla and English.  My oldest daughter we placed in 
a school that had an Arabic curriculum.  We wanted to continue to develop her Arabic skills as 
she became more and more fluent in English.  While our oldest daughter had spent her first two 
years being primarily spoken to in either Arabic or Bangla, the youngest was being rapidly 
introduced to all three languages through socialization with English speaking children.  Add to 
this the existence of an older sibling who was increasingly speaking English with everyone 
except her parents. 
 I finished writing this ethnography in Jackson, Mississippi with my two girls entering 
school/daycare where English is spoken all the time.  No longer surrounded by family or a 
community large enough to support Arabic learning, the responsibilities of raising multi-lingual 
children were becoming daunting.  My husband began lessons after school on Arabic 
vocabulary and grammar with both girls and I realized I needed to pull out the Bangla books 
that I had used with my older daughter to start helping my younger daughter gain a better 
vocabulary in Bengali.  It had been decided before we moved to Mississippi that I would take a 
trip to Bangladesh with the girls to get some immersion in Bangla. The trip was two and a half 






  The most recent struggle in the lives of my (hope to be) multi-linguals is the struggle to 
learn to read and write in English.  In school, this process has already begun for my oldest 
daughter, whose struggles with flipping letters and sounding out words are quickly becoming 
the most important after school focus.  As a former teacher of English literacy and an 
anthropologist interested in language ideologies, I knew that we were being caught in the net 
of schooling practices that emphasized testing and failure, rather than success.  What is a 
parent to do? Home school their child? Put them in private school? Get them a private tutor? 
Or try to help their children be successful in the institutions and communities they are 
becoming members of?  
 As I went through this process, I realized that these are the same dilemmas facing many 
Qatari parents and children many miles away.  We each get stuck in the familiar, cultural and 
social nets that are in place, while trying to figure our way through them to navigate linguistic 
and social success for ourselves and our children.   We often get caught up in the expectations 
placed by the language ideologies of our society and begin to think only one language can lead 
us to economic success or to God.  But in reality, languages are mirrors into another world that 
can perhaps help us to see ourselves more clearly.  They refract and reflect our own light or lack 
thereof, but they are not in and of themselves utopias.   
There are studies every day touting the benefits of bilingual education for children, but I 
am not trying to teach my kids different languages because I think it will develop them 
cognitively (although this is a great side benefit).  My interests in multiple language stems from 





crossed many language borders to find that they are porous, I come back to reflect on the 
Qur’an when it says, “and of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the 
diversity of your languages and your colors. Indeed in that are signs for those of knowledge” 
(Qur’an 30:22).   Linguistic diversity is a given, a natural gift to people.  When we distort this 
into fodder for politics, for religious dispute or stereotypes, we are going against the grain.  The 
natural grain is for people to learn from one another, not create boundaries that divide us.   
What are the boundaries we are placing between languages and how are we keeping our 
children and ourselves from learning a new way to say something or to write something in a 
different language?  This is a question that I think needs to be studied and reflected upon.   
I know this does not resolve the many dilemmas that are posed throughout this study.  
Individuals navigating complex linguistic expectations require more than a religious verse or a 
uniform language policy touting the benefits of bilingualism.  We need individuals who are 
willing to share their love of language(s), to teach and illustrate how beautiful it is to speak, 
read and write.  We also need institutions that support multiple ways of working with words.  
One of the consistent challenges I face as a multilingual, trying to raise children with more than 
one language in their lives, is the relative ways I use these languages.  English is the dominant 
language in our lives as each of us lives and works in speech communities that emphasize not 
only spoken proficiency in a Standard English, but also in reading and writing. Bangla is 
primarily an oral language in which we communicate when we are together.  Arabic is both a 
written and a spoken language in our household, but also is affected by the time we can give to 
its study after a full day of school, work and homework.  I would like to teach my children to 





where I wonder whether we must, as a family, create a space at home in which we can 
immerse ourselves in one language (since we are linguistically divided family).  
 These are the dilemmas of sustaining multiple languages and multiple “ways with 
words” in a mono-lingual, mono-literate speech community.  I know there are spaces and 
communities in which multiple languages can be sustained (such as the Scandinavian countries, 
South and East Asia, Africa), but my research illustrates that the growing importance of literate 
practices (usually in English) tied to schools and the economy are changing the dynamic and 
flow between multiple languages.  As we move more and more towards a world in which 
English is becoming a second, if not a first, language for many, we have to contend with how to 
support multi-lingualism and multi-literacy. Questions of identity and belonging might also 
become more fluid if we can encourage one another to cross linguistic boundaries and 
communicate with people through languages they understand and value.  
The children are brought to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and 
to react in this way to the words of others.  (Wittgenstein 2009: 6). 
 Wittgenstein redefined language as a language game reflecting a particular “life world” in his 
Philosophical Investigations.  In the above quote, Wittgenstein emphasizes the training that 
children undergo when we initiate them into a language.  I find this quote particularly relevant 
to the dilemmas of language that have been posed throughout these pages and in my day to 
day life.  As I play language games with my children and as we build different languages, I also 
recognize that at any one point, we can stop building.  This is an option available to those of us 
who have more than one code by which we communicate.  This process is already starting in 





when I go to give her a block in Bangla, she gives me a block back in English. Because I know 
what that block means and can use it to continue building our conversation (and often times 
do), I am teaching her that it is okay for her to work with language in this way (to take block A in 
language A, and give me back block A in language B).  
 This complicates the language game, but it also demonstrates how important the 
language games we play with children are to helping them construct meaning.  Wittgenstein 
focuses on the doing, the practice and use of language as the source of meaning. This mutual 
co-consenting co-construction gives life to language. Why is this significant for a study of 
multiple languages?  Because it shows that despite the limitations of particular ways of working 
with words that a specific language has, individuals can, through language games, build 
associations and relationships across language.  This might be an act of borrowing or 
translation, but as long as it works in the language game that is what gives it life.  This leads to 
one of Wittgenstein’s conclusions that I find particularly helpful: it is in the doing that we find 
our meaning. So perhaps the answer is to forge ahead in our experimental multi-lingualism and 
figure out how to sustain multiple languages and ways with words.  This new building might 
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Appendix A: Speeches of Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned 
Event Date Location Topic Themes 
UNESCO World 
Conference on Higher 
Education 
June 23 2003 Paris, France Reform and Innovation in 
Education, Democracy as a 
basic need before education 
can work 
Culture of quality 
Radical changes in Qatar- strong alliances, 
competitive education, research initiatives, 
equity  
1) Charter Schools 2) State university reform, 
3) private funding for private universities  
Reconsider archaic methods, Democracy 
needed 
Fund for Iraq 
Cultural integrity 
Knowledge based education and holistic and 
global education 
Education City Inauguration October 13, 
2003 
Doha “The Sidra tree, growing 
strong and proud in the 
harshest of environments, 
has been a symbol of 
perseverance and 
nourishment across the 
borders of the Arab world” 
Citizens our richest resources,  
“we should not transfer any idea into a cult and 
bound ourselves to worship it,, but we set out 
on our journey with open-minded flexibility 
and genuine curiosity” 
“Education City as the prototypical educational 
network of the future” 
Qatar Foundation: Qatar Academy, Learning 
Center, Academic Bridge Program, VCU, 
CMC, TAMUQ, RAND-QPI, STP,  




Texas, USA Embracing Change Dead and living traditions 
Meeting of cultures, not melthing 
Religion as agent of change 
Women imp. Part of every society. Dead 
traditions place constraint on women 
Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee 
October 2 , 
2004 
Michigan Relations between East and 
West 
Monoliths, freedom, creativity and innovation, 
don’t fear the West 




Doha Role of the Family Restore importance of family to  creating 
healthy societies 




London Globalization, Education 
and Human Development 
Meeting, not melting of cultures. History of 
Arab scientists and philosophers, Education, 
Culture of Quality  
Euro-Gulf Forum June 19 2005 France Culture of dialogue Education key to human development 







“Islam in its universal dimension is capable of 
adaptation and compatibility with the 
requirements of each age” 
Arab Women Past and 




Doha Narratives, unraveling Dominant Cultures, conformity to them , one 
narrative is trying to impose on others 
“need to reclaim tradition has been a prominent 
discourse in Arab societies, particularly over 
the last 20 years or so… What is our tradition?” 
Loyal to Islamic tradition-grants women equal 
rights 
Culture of quality, questioning for both men 
and women  
The Founding Conference 
of Expatriate Arab Scientists 
April 24, 
2006 
Doha Human Development, 
Research and Science 
Arab Traditions of research, science, learning 
Innovation in Education 





Doha UNESCO and Qatar 
Foundation 
Research, asking questions,  
“When we look forward to the future, we 
should always carry our pasts with us. Bringing 
our traditions into the present is also a critical 
part of the equation for success, especially in 








Pittsburg Dialogue between East and 
West 
“Civil society, a cornerstone of democracy, has 
always played a vibrant role in Islamic cultures. 
Islamic society, from the earliest period, has 
had a system of checks and balances that 
prevent all power from lying in the hands of the 
state. For example, the Ulama—intellectuals 
and legal scholars—have been compared by 
some experts to the mass media in 
contemporary society.” 
Dialogue, think, get to know 






Women’s Issue in Context: 
Deframing the Discourse on 
Middle Eastern Women 
Deframe debate- not secularism or radicalism 
as the solution, but a balanced approach to the 
position of a women from a sociological 
perspective 
Conference on Youth May 15 2007 Los Angeles War on Cyncism, Winning 
young minds 
Fear of our own children.  
Provide models, paradigm shift 
Offer youth more opportunities to be creative, 







Appendix B: Private English Language Schools 
 Administration English, Math and 
Science Curriculums 
Arabic/Islamic Studies Teachers 





Don’t feel respected by some students.  Hours not enough to teach.  
“Prestige” of learning English for parents and students.  At Upper 
levels, Arabic is reduced to preparing for International Bacalaureate 
Exam. Respect “foreign” teachers and staff more than Arab. 
"فيعضلأ يف ىلولاا فيعض يف ةغللا ةيناثلا"  





American curriculum English is introduced in pre-kindergarten, Arabic in Kindergarten.  
There was an increase in hours of Arabic instruction, last year it was 
four, now it is five.  Very diverse student and staff population so 
English the primary language. 
Principal: “The Qataris don’t know what they are doing. They bring 
in people, then they get rid of them. They don’t respect experience.” 
He was a part of the initial reforms, but then was not rehired. He is 
now doing various projects in Doha while writing a book and 
traveling extensively.  
Oxford English School Jordanian Principal British Curriculum Principal used to be Arabic Department Head for Gulf English 
School.  “They want the English, but they are worried. They always 
come to me and ask, ‘will it change the mentality? Did you see this 
letter? What does it mean’ For this school, there is a satisfied feeling 
for parents”  They want social studies in Arabic.  Parents want 
progress in English and maintain Arabic. They get broken Arabic and 
English from maids and nannies. “I am always keen to tell them to 
respect your own language. People will respect you more.”  




“It is unfortunate that the focus in the household has become 
on teaching the child the second language (English) before 
(Arabic) and if it continues, the child will lose his mother 




“The focus on the English language in all the subjects except 
the Arabic and Islamic education lesson leads to the lack of any 
support for the Arabic language outside the limits of the lesson 
and also sometimes creates students who have weaknesses.”-
Mayasa 
Hayat Universal Bilingual 
Schools (HUBS)  
American 
Principal/Hispanic 
Canadian Curriculum Owned by Kuwaiti intellectual Ibrahim Al Khulaifi, a psychologist by 
profession.  Focus on creating moral and thoughtful students. 
“ بلاطلا نوسردي ةغللا ةيزيلجنلاا  لاوط مويلا ,لخدت ةسردم ةغللا ةيبرعلا وأ ةيعرشلا 
لك مويلا وأ موي دحاو يف عوبسلاا,  
“The student studies English   all day. When the Arabic teacher enters 
or the Islamic studies teacher, it is only once a day or sometimes once 
a week.” 
Arabic teachers work with English teachers. Library has a section for 






Appendix C: Independent/Charter/Public Schools 




There is a return to the way the Ministry used to run the schools 
Reforms are لشف ريبك  a big failure 
Students don’t know Arabic or English well.  
A Qatari teacher who taught for many years in the Ministry schools said that the new 
Supreme Education Council is doing a 360 and returning to the old MOE curriculum in 
Arabic and Islamic Studies, despite the calls for reform and new ways of teaching 
Arabic,  
Amna Bint Wahab 
Preparatory and Secondary for 
Girls 
Two Arabic 
teachers, head of 
Arabic department 
Girls don’t like using Arabic, they prefer English. They speak their dialects during class 
time and also use a lot of English when they speak. 
Very good school where the students do well on standardized tests in English and 
Arabic 
Arabic teachers not pleased with student performance in their classes. 
Strong sense that Arabic is neglected by students and parents. 
Arabic head does not understand the reason why they chose English for math and 
science, saying “Didn’t they use Arabic for all of these things during the golden age of 
Islam” 
The Arabic teachers said it is important to learn Arabic because it is the language of the 
Qur’an. 
Al Bayyan Preparatory and 
Secondary School for Girls 
Head of Arabic 
Department 
Very positive. Felt reforms were good and that if the teacher is good and the student 
tries, than the current Arabic program is very good. Al Bayyan systematically performs 
well on standardized tests in all subjects. It is a magnet school for girls. 
The head Arabic teacher spoke of her own desire to improve her teaching and to 
motivate other Arabic teachers to do the same. She implied that the onus was on the 
teacher to make learning more enjoyable for the students rather than complaining about 
students. 
Khadija Primary School Three Arabic 
Teachers, Three 
English Teachers 
The direction of higher education influencing lower levels and pushing the introduction 
of English earlier and earlier. 
English teacher who feels that the schools don’t teach enough Arabic. She supplements 
at home and encourages her children to speak. She tries to implement a time when 
everyone has to speak Standard Arabic, although the children find it challenging, she 
thinks it is important. 
As primary teachers, they find that the children’s Arabic at this stage is much better 
than their English so the emphasis on home is on learning the English alphabet and 
reading. 
Effect of Baraem. Some students incorporate more fusha into their speech. 
Principal informed me that they recommended to the SEC that more of the school day 
should be in Arabic so students language skills are strengthened in Arabic before 
learning English. 




Won awards for teaching Arabic. Teachers feel the reforms emphasize English too 
much and there is a movement away from the culture. 
They received several awards when all the schools used to be Arabic medium, but now 
they are making the transition to teaching English in Math and Science.  The teachers 
spoke of being unsure if they would continue in the new Independent schools as the 
hours were long.  The head teacher, in the current system, could go home and 
breastfeed her daughter and return to resume her duties. This is not looked highly upon 
in the newer independent schools where the competitive environment demands teacher 





  ربحية مؤسسات إلي حولها المستقلة المدارس لنظام الخاطئ لتطبيقا
  التعليم لهيئة ادعاءات مجرد العالمية للمستويات التعليمي النظام وصول
  اختصاصاتهم مع يتعارض للمناهج موضوعات المدرسين إضافة
  غامضة والاستراتيجية غائبة التربوي النظام فلسفة
  تربوي خلل.. التراخيص لأصحاب المقررات تقدير ترك
  والرياضيات العلوم تدريس في الإنجليزية لاعتماد خطيرة آثار
  للدستور وفقا   الرسمية باللغة التدريس عن التعليمي النظام تخلي هل

















Appendix E: Private and “Community” Schools in Qatar in 2007 
List of Private Schools in Qatar Nationality/ 
Curriculum 
Price(Month)  Primary Language 
Al Jazeera Academy (AJA)   Qatari 400-800 English 
Al Maha English Schools  Qatari 500-700 English 
American School of Doha  American 800-1000 English 
Bangladesh MHM School & College  Bangladesh 150-250 Bengali, English 
Bright Future Pakistani School  Pakistan 100-200 Urdu, English 
Central English Speaking Kindergarten 
(CESK)  
  English 
Compass International School, Doha (CISD)
  
  English 
Doha Academy    500-700 English 
Doha College   English 
Doha English Speaking School    English 
Doha Montessori & British School  Great Britain  English 
Modern Indian School  India 200-400 English, Hindi 
English Modern School    English 
Ideal Indian School  India  English, Hindi 
International School of London-Qatar
   
Great Britain  English 
MES Indian School  India  English, Hindi 
Michael E. DeBakey High School for Health 
Professions at Qatar  
American  English 
Middle East International School    English, Arabic 





Qatar Academy  “International”  English 
Qatar International School  “International”  English 
Shafallah Center for Children with Special 
Needs  
  English 
The Cambridge International School for 
Girls 
Great Britain  English 
The Cambridge School - Doha  Great Britain 800-1000 English 
The International School of Choueifat – 
Doha 
Lebanese  French, English 
Iranian High School Iran  Persian, English 
Palestinian Elementary School Palestine  Arabic, English 
Phillipino School Phillipines  English, 
Philipino 
Stafford International School Indonesian  English 
Jordanian School Jordan  English, Arabic 
Lebanese School Lebanon  French, Arabic 
Qatar Canadian School Canada  English, French 
 
 
 
 
 
